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Introduction: Person, Community, Tian: The Way of Order  
 
As China plays an increasingly important role in both international economics and 
politics, contemporary Chinese scholars are becoming more interested in promoting 
Chinese thought. The Chinese government wants characteristic Chinese thinking to 
serve as a form of soft power to compete with other cultures. This raises the question 
of how specifically Chinese thought can adjust to a modern pluralistic world, and 
how it can contribute to contemporary socio-political structure and philosophy while 
re-appropriating traditional Chinese thought. This requires an examination of what 
the most original and important features of Chinese thought are, and how they affect 
the particularities of Chinese thinking. One also needs to trace what the source for 
Chinese thought is, in order to understand how to interpret the values of Chinese 
thought for the modern world. 
When I approach the questions of Chinese terminology, I avoid using words such 
as “heaven,” “ritual” or “transcendence” which can be easily misunderstood by 
Western readers. I therefore choose to use the original Chinese terms, such as tian, li 
and interpret them in detail. As the main concept I analyse, tian refers not only to the 
sky, but also nature, the whole world, and a supreme power. If tian is translated as 
“heaven”, it can be mistakenly understood as a transcendent source. Zhang 
Xionglong, a contemporary scholar who approaches Chinese philosophy through 
Heidegger’s philosophy, holds that tian is the transcendent and original source of all 
Chinese thought. He believes their similarity lies in their mutual commitment to 
non-dualism. Approaching Chinese thought according to Heidegger’s philosophy 
leads him to a different interpretation of tian. In translating his work, I use “heaven”, 
while using tian when referring to classical Chinese thought. The conclusion I 
propose is that tian is anything but a transcendent source. The second important term 
in my thesis is li. As a process of self-cultivation in Confucianism, li cannot be 
translated straightforwardly as what is understood in the West as religious “ritual”. I 
will expand on the question of what li really is in chapter 3 and 4. 
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To clarify the traits of Chinese thought, one must also answer the question raised 
by Western thoughts, and reveal the differences between the two. First I must clarify 
whether Chinese thought is more primitive, if ancient Greek and other ancient 
civilisation also share the idea of a correlative cosmos. To clarify this point, it is 
important to state that Chinese thought is a specific form of thought, and different 
from Western culture, so we cannot use a universalistic approach. Hence, I try to use 
sources from Chinese thought’s own tradition to analyse the question of the person, 
community and tian.        
From the reception of a dualistic world view, some Chinese scholars also build 
Chinese thought on the basis of dualistic worlds. For instance, Feng Youlan points 
out that Chinese scholars cannot create a modern Chinese philosophy without 
considering continuity with traditional thought, with it being necessary to use the 
modern analytical method to clarify different concepts in Chinese thought. It is not 
enough only to clarify the different concepts or ideas in Chinese thought, but we 
must also consider the connection between them and why such a connection is 
important.    
   Tiandao, as the most important idea in Zhang Xianglong’s work, is considered as 
the ultimate reality, but actually, there is no reality behind all other events which are 
appearances: the relationship between tiandao and other events are effectively the 
process itself and the products of this process. 
   The concept of “person” is significant in my thesis not only because it is the 
beginning of the order of analysis, but also because it is significantly different from 
the idea of the “self” in the West. The ideal ethic for Chinese thought is embodied in 
self-cultivation, that is to say, the cultivation of one’s life world: it is a process of 
shaping the world and also a result of the world itself. “Person,” “subject” or 
“oneself” are the beginning of all ethical events, while their final aim is to resonate 
with tian. This resonation means that personhood can expand and develop beyond 
the narrow self, which only focuses on self-interest. Because of the continuity 
between humans and tian, this approach solves the conflict between self-interest and 
public interest. The process of self-cultivation proceeds from self to others, to 
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toleration and openness to others, but this does not thereby mean that selflessness is 
promoted. Rather, it expands the territory of the person from private to public.  
   The person is a part of tian, and through the process of tian’s creation of awe, the 
position of the person is clarified and enhanced. Even though tian can be interpreted 
as having divine aspects, the underlying motivation of this assumption is to endorse 
the political order or the order of the human world: hence it does not ultimately 
matter whether tian is nature or not. Tian is always in context, and it is based on 
what kind of order the human world wants to have. The macro-order is the order of 
the cosmos, which is the harmony between human and tian; the micro-order is the 
ideal political order in the human world. Under the interpretation of Chinese 
scholars, the macro-order aims at endorsing the micro-order: it can then dismiss the 
problem that claims there is a conflict between a divine tian or a natural tian, that 
tian is nature or divinity. In short, tian functions as an endorsement for order in the 
human world, once this is properly understood and appreciated it becomes 
unimportant to ask what tian itself really is.          
   Unlike Western thinkers who analyse self through the relationship between mind 
and body, Chinese thinkers instead analyse personhood from the characteristic 
notions of analysing will, heart-mind, natural tendency, disposition and ming 命 
(fate, limit, mandates, order). It is seen that some elements of determinism persist in 
these notions, nevertheless, because personhood is always in context, and the 
concrete person can always make their own decisions in different situations for the 
aim of order based on its own judgement: this is also called the function of shi 
(timing, appropriateness, and opportunity 時).  
   In the bigger picture, there is a holistic order in the continuity between humans 
and tian, which is called “harmony between human and tian,” and this is a reflection 
of shi. The human world can share in this harmony once there is order. The ideas 
concerning the cosmos and human life are not separate for Chinese thinkers, from 
the inward heart to the outside cosmos, there is a coherent value: respect and care for 
the living. 
  The order is based on our positive dispositions: one’s disposition can be drawn on 
too much and lead to negative outcomes, which reflects poorly on Confucianism, but 
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it can also, once properly appreciated, always be appropriate and shape the structure 
of order in society. It must be clarified that this ‘order’ in a broad sense should be a 
natural one, which means it is achieved in a natural way or from our natural 
dispositions rather than from a normative legal system. 
   Through self-cultivation, li (as the outward tool that can be practiced) actually 
establishes a hierarchy for the human world, and this is the concrete way to produce 
order in society. Li not only consists of rites, but also disposition, and this is why 
people are willing to follow it: li is correlative with humaneness and 
appropriateness, and without these two, the idea of li is meaningless. Li is involved 
not only in inward humaneness and appropriateness but also outward instruments. 
Consequently, for Xunzi, after establishing differences between different categories, 
we will automatically have order: li is the concrete way to begin order in society. 
   Li is not only about dealing with relationships between humans, it is also 
involved in how humans should cope with other things, for example, mountains, 
rivers and tian. Apart from the supernatural elements, li is a holistic order in the 
whole universe: after establishing these differences in categories, each part should 
follow its own tendency, and the whole universe will have harmony.  
   Because the person is not fixed, but is rather a process, in the final stage 
personhood mingles with tian and dao. Based on this order, there is a possible 
political order called ‘great union’ which demonstrates that this cosmos order 
endorses a holistic order: one cannot ultimately separate the political part from the 
part of heart-mind and tian, because these parts are logically connected with each 
other. 
    What can be done in the future of the relevant research is to produce a more 
detailed analysis concerning the relationship between personhood and community in 
the specific context of East-West comparison to enhance the argument. Also, since 
Confucianism is held to always be practical and have the ambition to build a better 
world, it is important to further consider how to apply traditional values in the 
contemporary world. 
    The contemporary Chinese scholar Zhang Xianglong takes the dao of tian as the 
origin of Chinese thought, reinterpreting tiandao in the context of both Heidegger 
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and Chinese traditional ideas, while maintaining that tian as a whole has the 
perspective of divinity (but not an anthropomorphic divinity).1 Because his work is a 
valuable and relevant approach from comparative philosophy, I have translated two 
chapters of his book in the appendix. Unlike Zhang, who approaches tian from the 
context of comparison and cross culture, I engage in tian from the perspective of the 
philosophical question of which is order among personhood, community and tian.       
Inwardly, we can examine the connection between humans and tian through 
natural tendency. It is not easy to analyse the concept of tian without humans, 
because both humans and tian are connected through the heart-mind and natural 
tendency, suggesting immanent connections between tian and humans. Through 
analysing the relationship between humans and tian, tian appears not to be purely 
secular or sacred because of the remarkable continuity between tian and humans. 
The classical Chinese philosophers Mencius and Confucius appear to support this 
continuity in apparent contrast to Xunzi. However, even though it seems that Xunzi 
promotes the separation between humans and tian, his ideas are still framed 
according to the continuity between humans and tian. 
Chinese thought about tian can heavily embody and affect the affairs of human 
lives within the idea of ‘the time of tian’, and through the interaction with tian, 
social and political order is one outcome of this continuity. Many cultures build their 
society and politics on the original idea of tian, and their social and political 
structures are the embodiment of their tian. With the idea of continuity between tian 
and humans, the Chinese have a correlative socio-political structure which manages 
to include tian, and a highly integrated society based on the highlighting of 
spontaneous goodness and li, which is derived from tian and is also the embodiment 
of this goodness. 
This project analyses the historical relationship between tian and humans, and 
specifically addresses the tension between them, and how Confucians explain this 
question. This tension embodies the continuity between humans and tian, and this 
continuity became more inward for humans with Mencius’s philosophical 
                                                          
1 Zhang Xianglong, Haidegeer yu zhongguo tiandao [Heidegger and Chinese Dao of Heaven] 
(Beijing: Sanlian shudianshe, 1996), 237. 
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development. This research adopts the stance that if humans have a capacity for 
humaneness it is because our natural tendency is from tian. From this point, a 
number of problematic issues arise that must be dealt with. Why does an indifferent 
tian generate good for humans? Similarly, human societies desire to have order and 
peace, but such desires do not always coincide with tian’s pattern. How, then, should 
humans cooperate with the pattern of tian? In the process of addressing these issues, 
I argue that humans need to be observant of the shi of tian by following the way of 
li, as a process of adapting to the changing circumstances and following the proper 
dao. 
The process of self-cultivation of human affairs is a process of inward connection 
with tian, but in a less sacred manner, and also specifically a process of self-critique 
under the image of the ideal sage, as most people cannot always adopt good 
behaviour. This inward connection is based on humaneness (ren) and sincerity 
(cheng), which refers to the ability to be creative. Cheng begins from the coherence 
between one’s mind and body, talking and behaviour, to the continuity of tian and 
human beings. Cheng is not only a moral principle, but also aligns with the principle 
of the relationship between humans and tian. 
Tian as the source for Chinese thought is especially embodied in the way of li: 
humans have to follow tian or the timing of tian, and the way of li is modesty and 
observance of appropriateness. The way of li and appropriateness has a significant 
emphasis on timing: following this timing is to follow the way of li. Following the 
way of li not only improves the realm of social life, but also brings order and 
harmony to the socio-political context. From these, it can be seen that Confucians try 
to knit together all elements, not only inside but also outside, into the same narrative, 
and their final aim is order and harmony. 
Even though Roger Ames and Michael Puett hold quite different interpretations 
of Chinese thought, both maintain that they cannot see a trend of rationalisation in 
early China. To maintain the idea of continuity between tian and humans, Michael 
Puett would say that Chinese thought became more focused on human affairs 
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because humans had self-divination.2 For Ames, however, there is no process from 
superstition to rationalism, because Chinese thought does not have a notion of strict 
transcendence.3 That Chinese thought does not have the idea of transcendence does 
not mean that there is no value in Chinese culture, rather, Chinese people place their 
values in their limited life span and every day’s self-cultivation, and the idea of 
humaneness and appropriateness continues through different generations. Li, like 
tian, are both secular and sacred, some dealing with relationships between humans, 
others dealing with the affairs of politics, and also of nature—through worshipping 
tian, earth and mountains. These rites give a practical way to intertwine humans and 
tian in the same holistic narrative. 
Inwardly, the continuity between humans and tian is embodied in the process of 
self-cultivation. Outwardly, it is embodied in the socio-political structure which is 
the ‘great union’ (datong) and ‘small tranquillity’ (xiaokang). In the small 
tranquillity stage, people still rely on li to regulate the socio-political. However, li is 
based on one’s spontaneous goodness rather than filial piety, so the final aim of 
great union would not conflict with small tranquillity, which is still focused on order 
and harmony, because humans do not need rites to restrain their behaviour, rather, 
they behave in a certain good way without knowing that is appropriate. 
Self-cultivation is the beginning of order, the small community is the 
development of it, the cosmos is the pattern that humans’ mimic, and order and 
harmony are the productions of continuity between humans and tian, which are the 
final aim and completeness of personhood in Confucianism. 
The first chapter of this thesis contributes to the historical analysis and 
interpretation of the early development of tian in ancient Chinese philosophy. Based 
on the Guoyu [Discourses of States] and mythology, humans were said to be able to 
communicate with tian, with the meaning of tian initially being determined by 
shamans, and then by the ruler. In her analysis of Confucius and Daoism, Julia 
                                                          
2 Michael J. Puett, To Become a God: Cosmology, Sacrifice, and Self-Divinization in Early China 
(Massachusetts: Harvard University Asia Center, 2002), 27. 
3 David L Hall and Roger T Ames, Anticipating China: Thinking through the Narratives of Chinese 
and Western Culture (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 13. 
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Ching indicates the continuity of humans and tian that originates from shamanistic 
experience.4 Later, in the development of the interpretation of tian, we can discern 
that its divination-related aspects were weakening, with its human-related aspects 
gaining precedence. I also recognise that, despite this continuity, humans are 
nonetheless required to focus on human affairs, rather than simply blaming or 
awaiting the process of tian, and are encouraged take responsibility for themselves 
and respect natural laws. In clarifying the historical analysis and interpretation of 
tian as it develops and is re-interpreted through ancient Chinese thought, this thesis 
establishes a firmer basis on which coherent thought about the origins of correlative 
cosmology in Chinese thought may proceed. 
Tian always follows the ‘middle way’ as a means of keeping order and harmony. 
It is seen that there is not enough evidence available to prove that there is a direct 
progression from the irrational to rational; nor that there is an idea of a totally 
material tian. I hold the view that Chinese thought focuses on a holistic picture of 
the world, and through this, it always develops towards order and harmony between 
humans and tian. 
Another contribution to existing research is the analysis of the problem of 
whether Confucius maintained certain religious elements in his thinking, by 
examining the historical relationship between humans and tian. Because Confucius 
himself does not discuss divinity at length, it seems that Confucianism sometimes 
takes tian as a natural sky. However, dignity and awe towards tian always persists, 
and Confucianism often discusses ideas of fate or mission, and opportunities borne 
from tian. I conclude that order is always the key word to be promoted, rather than 
the concept of tian itself. The meaning of tian can change based on whatever 
promotes the idea of order and harmony. 
Chapter two further investigates outstanding interpretive problems relating to tian 
concerning timing. I examine how humans can be said to connect with tian through 
self-cultivation or practice, and the possibility of doing so by analysing the heart-
mind, natural tendency, ‘appropriate time’ and ‘opportunity, appropriateness, limits 
                                                          
4 Julia Ching, Mysticism and Kingship in China: The Heart of Chinese Wisdom (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 194. 
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or fate’ (ming 命) in the specific context of tian, the correlative cosmology. I argue 
that a Confucian correlative cosmology is discernible in the practice of cultivating 
one's heart-mind and nourishing one’s refined qi (vital energy 氣), wherein one can 
complete oneself and reach the level of tian. This practice demonstrates how the 
heart-mind of tian is connected to the heart-mind of humans immanently, 
highlighting the evidence of a continuity between tian and humans in Confucian 
thought. 
Likewise, there is a continuity between tian and humans in this cosmology, but 
both tian and human beings have different positions. Because of this difference, 
another problem relating to this cosmology arises, in which one has to find an 
appropriate way of acting in order to better understand the opportunities and limits 
that are given by tian. In order to do so, we must clarify our understanding of time in 
this relation so we can better understand how to recognise the opportunities given by 
tian, and to better understand fate by being aware of the limits that humans have 
received from tian. While there is sufficient literature addressing yin-yang and the 
five phases, few commentators discuss the important limits for humans derived from 
tian. In this system, everything changes according to ‘the appropriate time, 
opportunity’ and ‘limits, fate, opportunity’. Ming in Chinese philosophy has 
different meanings, and humans therefore have different ways of cooperating with it. 
There is a tension between fate and the willpower of humans, because humans can 
act against their fate. The continuity between humans and tian can tolerate this 
tension, and so this tension would not be a counter-argument against this continuity. 
Timing is one embodiment of this kind of interaction between tian and humans; 
as such, humans have some degree of freedom. In the Tangyu zhidao [The Dao of 
Tang and Yu] and Xunzi, it is understood that tian and humans have different 
positions or jobs: good opportunity is thus up to tian while virtue is up to humans, 
but these two parts are not necessarily co-aligned. Since tian decides whether 
humans are presented with good opportunities or not, humans should instead focus 
on self-cultivation. This is because humans can take full responsibility for their 
virtue and humaneness, but tian ultimately determines whether one succeeds in 
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encountering a prosperous time or not. In these cases, the separation of humans and 
tian exists because humans must take responsibility for their actions rather than 
blaming tian. Part of this thesis consists in showing that this is a pivotal issue that 
any proper discussion of the continuity of humans and tian must address. In sum, a 
clarified understanding of timing and fate through these analyses will enhance our 
understanding of tian, and therefore a greater understanding of the functioning of 
correlative cosmology in Chinese thought. Timing as both individual fate and the 
time of tian not only embodies the continuity between humans and tian but also 
shows that there is no strict transcendence in Chinese thought. 
I will analyse how timing is essential for the idea of li. The final aim of li is order 
and harmony in all-under-tian, it is a process in which humans not only need to 
follow the proper timing to act, but all forms of li can also change with the 
development of society. 
Chapter three addresses later issues relating to correlative cosmology in ancient 
Chinese philosophy, conducting an analysis of holistic correlative cosmology and 
politics in an ideal politics which consists in ‘small tranquillity’ and ‘great union’. 
Further developing this point, I examine the importance of li in both ideal patterns. 
All forms of li guarantee order in the socio-political structures, and humans are 
willing to adhere to the way of li because it is derived from and based on their 
natural dispositions. Li, as the way humans follow, is on a higher level than rough 
dispositions, because humans still need to shape them and make them follow 
appropriate timing. I examine the two ideal socio-political structures, ‘small 
tranquillity’ and ‘great union’, how these two structures function in socio-politics, 
and why people are willing to follow these principles. 
Humaneness and li are the essences that bridge the gap between humans and tian. 
Herbert Fingarette maintains that humaneness is one kind of outside behaviour that 
is embodied in the forms of rites, and it is irrelevant to our heart-mind.5 This 
interpretation promotes the contribution of Xunzi and has influenced Western 
academia’s interpretation of the relationship between humaneness and li, and formed 
                                                          
5 Herbert Fingarette, Confucius: The Secular As Sacred (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 9-10. 
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a different attitude compared with the dominant position of inward humanness in 
Chinese academia. However, this interpretation mistakes etiquettes (liyi 礼仪) as li. 
The concept of li, however, refers to more than just outside rites. 
Chapter four describes the context of great union; even though general order and 
harmony is promoted, this does not mean that Confucianism ignores the value of an 
individual self. Rather, the person plays an important role in the socio-political 
pattern: the self is the beginning of all ethics, but I nonetheless would not take self as 
the central or final aim for Confucianism. The value of the person is also embodied 
in the way that intellectuals (shi 士) as selves have the ability to criticise the socio-
political structure. Due to its concern with dao, Confucianism is not a direct 
supporter of the monarchy in traditional China, and so should not be held 
responsible for the failure of traditional China. Instead, it is necessary to return to 
original Confucianism and discover what the true, essential idea in Confucianism is. 
These intellectuals can not only criticise existing socio-politics that go against 
dao, but they can also follow the dao, which can share the order and harmony of all 
under tian. The final aim of Chinese thought is not human-centred civilisation, 
rather, it is a shared harmony between humans and tian, once humans can follow the 
instructions (for instance, all forms of rites), and attune their dispositions to these 
rites. Hence, humans cannot share the harmony of tian if they have lost order in the 
human world, whereas on the other hand, the harmony of tian would not be 
significantly influenced by humans’ world. 
The final chapter discusses the contemporary value of Confucianism, which is the 
spirit of critique and timing in the narrative of order. Even in his own time, 
Confucius criticised the existing politics, given that he thought the idealised society 
of Zhou could fit his own time better and bring order. 
The contemporary Chinese scholar Jiang Qing goes further, maintaining that 
Confucianism can contribute to contemporary Chinese politics without needing to 
connect with democracy. Likewise, the modern Chinese scholar Jiang Qing has 
continued the ‘great union’ and Dong’s methodology, claiming that we need to build 
a governing system which is based on the holistic socio-politics of Confucianism 
12 
 
and taking the ‘great unity’ to mean ‘origin’, as transcendent evidence for a holistic 
society. Zhao Dingyang also maintains that the Chinese idea of ‘all under tian’ can 
contribute to modern international politics, as it is a bigger perspective that can reach 
beyond different territories. These two philosophers believe it is important to 
maintain the continuity of Chinese tradition and also to hold a critical attitude in 
order to adapt to the modern world. Even though they are all contemporary Chinese 
scholars, their thinking remains focused on a holistic order. 
It is remarkable how the continuity and stability of Chinese society has lasted, 
and why it has lasted so long can be explained in many ways. Because of the pre-
assumption of continuity and the requirement of order and harmony in Chinese 
culture, when Confucianism designs the ideal political and social model, it is always 
a unified and ordered socio-politics. 
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Chapter 1: The Continuity of Tian and Humans as the Fundamental Idea 
of Chinese Thought 
 
Before proceeding, we must clarify the meaning of tianren heyi (the continuity 
between tian and humans). Heyi is the continuity between two parts, such as 
knowing (zhi 知) and practice (xing 行). The continuity between knowing and 
practice means that knowing is only knowing when it is being practiced by people. 
Knowing and practice can mutually enhance the understanding of ‘learning’ (xue 學
) in Confucianism, in the process of learning, one’s knowing and practice can 
mutually affect each other: knowing can improve practice, and practice can improve 
knowing. Like the relationship between knowing and practice, the relationship 
between humans and tian is a reciprocal relation. Understanding humans is actually 
a way to know tian, while knowing tian is also a way to know humans.       
To begin with, there are a number of differing interpretations of tian worth 
considering. In Feng Youlan’s interpretation, tian has five different meanings: 
materiality, sovereignty, fate, nature and reason.6 These different meanings 
dramatically affect our understanding of the relationship between tian and human 
beings. In Graham Parkes’s interpretation, tian as nature can contribute as a new 
resource for environmental philosophy.7  
While some Chinese scholars like Mou Zongsan take tian as a transcendent 
source, Roger Ames does not agree with using this expression of a unified whole, 
arguing that there is no Being behind many beings, no reality behind appearances.8 
Chinese thinkers instead understand tian as cosmos or the ‘ten thousand things’, and 
not one ordered, unified universe, Ames is prudent in choosing not to use notions 
                                                          
6 Feng Youlan, Zhonguo zhexue shi shang [The History of Chinese Philosophy Volume one] (Beijing: 
Sanlian shudian, 2008), 46. 
7 Parkes, Graham, “Zhuangzi and Nietzsche on the Human and Nature” Environmental Philosophy 
10 (1), 1-24.   
8 David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, Thinking from the Han: Self, Truth, and Transcendence in 
Chinese and Western Culture (Albany: SUNY Press, 1998), 247. 
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like the ‘unity’ of tian and human. He instead draws on the phrase ‘the continuity 
between tian and humans’. I adopt this expression as well, because the continuity of 
tian and humans does not imply that humans are equal to or the same thing as tian, 
or that there is a supreme one behind things. With this methodological approach 
established, my main concern in this chapter is with the historical, linear 
interpretation of tian in pre-Qin texts, and what kind of narrative we can obtain 
through these interpretations.  
Robert Eno analyses the meaning of tian in classical Chinese texts, how the 
meanings of tian change and cannot have theoretical coherence.   
The extreme instability of the term "t'ien" in early Confucian texts, and the 
willingness to allow so rhetorically prominent a term to be employed without 
theoretical coherence, must reflect the force of a coherent set of core interests 
that governed formulations of doctrine and whose free expression could only 
be impeded by the friction of a fixed concept of T'ien.9 
Here, tian works as a function to cater to different contexts, since the term can have 
many meanings, it is difficult to have a fixed concept of tian. It is then inappropriate 
to translate tian as “heaven” which is a fixed concept.   
Confronting the challenge of Western systematic philosophy, most Chinese 
scholars try to build a systematic terminology to respond to it. For instance, Zhang 
Xianglong and Mou Zongsan tried to consider tian in a transcendent sense similar to 
a Western God, but this method is inappropriate from the very beginning. An 
essential thing is determine to what is the most significant trait of Chinese thought.  
 When thinking about Chinese culture, most have taken the notion of the 
continuity of tian and humans as central to Chinese philosophy. Firstly, then, we 
need to understand what tian is. I approach the notion of tian by analysing it in terms 
of a relationship between tian and humans. Secondly, by analysing the nature of 
humans, we can see how tian can be interpreted in this context.   
 
                                                          
9 Robert Eno, The Confucian Creation of Heaven: Philosophy and the Defense of Ritual Mastery 
(SUNY Press, 1990), 6. 
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1.1 The Historical Relationship of Tian and Human  
 
To understand the significance of tian in Chinese culture, one needs to analyse the 
historical development of Chinese thought and how Chinese philosophers have 
interpreted the idea. It is still debatable whether the interpretation of tian proceeded 
from irrationalism to rationalism: Xiong Shili and other Chinese scholars maintain 
that early Chinese thought progresses from superstition towards rationalism until the 
Han dynasty, taking Dong Zhongshu as representing a regression (because Dong 
interweaves supernatural power within the correlative cosmos).10 Xiong argues that 
Dong connects punishment and rewards for humans to the will of tian, and then 
turns tian into an anthropocentric figure; this is considered a regression compared 
with the more natural interpretation of tian from Confucius. This opinion dominates 
in the Chinese academic field. Actually, this is the wrong direction to proceed in, 
because rational thinking and reasons are Western terms which are used in the 
Western context, which means that it is not an appropriate estimation of Dong, who 
actually contributes a new, systematic way to describe the reaction between tian and 
humans in detail. I would rather say that it clearly explains the necessary 
requirement of Confucianism for order and harmony between humans and tian. The 
process of yin and yang, and the five phases, combines with the values of humans to 
form a holistic picture of the universe giving us an outward or macro-perspective. 
I choose one typical ancient myth in The Guoyu (Discourses of the States) to 
analyse the relationship between humans and tian, as this myth clearly delineates 
three stages in ancient times. The first stage is during primitive times, when shamans 
dictated communication with tian; the second stage occurs when the capacities of a 
shaman are delimited: everyone is now said to be able to communicate with tian. 
There are many conflicts between these different beliefs, and many economic and 
social problems thereby emerge. The third stage is a unified political and sacrificial 
system in which the ruler gains authority and is now the only figure with the 
capacity to communicate with tian. 
                                                          
10 Xiong Shili, Yuanru [The Original Meaning of Ru] (Shanghai: Shanghai shudian, 2009), 57. 
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Anciently, men and spirits did not intermingle. At that time there were 
certain persons who were so perspicacious, single-minded, and 
reverential that their understanding enabled them to make meaningful 
collation of what lies above and below, and their insight to illumine what 
is distant and profound. Therefore the spirit would descend into them. 
The possessors of such powers were, if men, called xi (shamans), and, if 
women, wu (shamanesses). It is they who supervised the positions of the 
spirits at the ceremonies, sacrificed to them, and otherwise handled 
religious matters. As a consequence, the spheres of the divine and the 
profane were kept distinct. The spirits sent down blessings on the people, 
and accepted from them their offerings. There were no natural 
calamities. 
In the degenerate time of Shao-hao [traditionally put at the twenty-sixth 
century B.C.] however, the Nine Li threw virtue into disorder. Men and 
spirits became intermingled, with each household indiscriminately 
performing for itself the religious observances which had hitherto been 
conducted by the shamans. As a consequence, men lost their reverence 
for the spirits, the spirits violated the rules of men, and natural calamities 
arose. Hence the successor of Shao-hao, Chuan-hsu, charged Ch'ung, 
Governor of the South, to handle the affairs of heaven in order to 
determine the proper place of the spirits, and Li, Governor of Fire, to 
handle the affairs of Earth in order to determine the proper places of 
men. And such is what is meant by cutting the communication between 
Heaven and Earth.11  
According to this famous quotation from the Guoyu, we can see the reason why it is 
necessary to cut the communication between tian and human. In this context, earth 
refers to our living world while tian refers to the spiritual world, which also includes 
our dead ancestors. The relationship between tian and humans changed from a unity 
to two separated parts: in the first stage we cannot say it is the continuity between 
                                                          
11  From Derk Bodde, “Myths of Ancient China “in Samuel Noah Kramer, Mythologies of the 
Ancient World (New York: Anchor, 1961), 44.  
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humans and tian, rather it is an undivided cosmos, where humans can communicate 
with tian. Humans are the ones who can accept things from a supernatural tian, but 
there is no reciprocal effect between these two. The point in this quotation is to 
emphasise that humans should focus on human affairs rather than wasting their 
energy on sacrifice, as tian may not be influenced by our sacrifice. 
Xu Xusheng maintains that at the end of primitive society, shamans were 
generally farmers or herdsmen. There were no professional religious practitioners: it 
was instead common to have a family shaman. At the end of clan society and the 
beginning of tribal union, these shamans turned into more concrete religious figures, 
and it was only these priests who could engage tian as a professional religious 
practice. In this way, the religious became a trade for few people.12  
After this development, people could no longer freely communicate with tian 
through the same form of practice. Zhang Guangzhi maintains that in this early 
period shamans served the people, and their communication between tian and 
humans could then be controlled by rulers.13 In early myths, the meaning of our 
world was controlled and dominated by shamans, and commoners could not 
communicate with tian directly: they had to rely on these shamans to interpret tian. 
In the effort to properly worship divinity and thereby have good fortune, 
communities drew on large quantities of their food stocks for sacrifice. The produce 
of farmers was diverted to this end, which led to further social chaos. In this 
dangerous context, the central authorities acted to control the interpretation of tian, 
setting up li to give rules to commoners. From this myth, we might infer that, 
compared with tian, the ruler has more acting power and must take responsibility for 
human affairs: this mythical-historical example highlights the view that humans 
should not rely on appeasing tian, because tian usually does not take part in the 
affairs of humans after this separation. Actually, we can see that the aim of the 
author in this myth is to keep order in the human world. The author is worried that 
                                                          
12 Xu Xusheng, Zhongguo gushi de chuanshuo shidai [The Period of Myths in Chinese Ancient 
History] (Beijing: Wenwu chubanshe, 1985), 76-85. 
13 Zhang Guangzhi, Zhongguo kaoguxue lunwenji [the Anelect of Chinese Archaeology] (Beijing: 
Sanlian shudian, 1999), 393. 
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humans spend too much energy on sacrifice and thereby invite chaos into our world, 
taking this as a good reason for the necessity of a ruler’s governing: humans need a 
ruler to guide them and keep good order. 
K.C. Chang’s understanding of this myth is that tian is where all the wisdom of 
human affairs lies.14 The shaman, as the authoritative intermediary between the 
human world and tian, played an important role in ancient politics. Chang goes 
further, saying that these shamans are rulers, and not only rulers, but that they also 
have other religious roles, and in three dynasties, these rulers' deeds were considered 
supernatural and magical to some degree.15 I would say that according to this myth, 
even the ancient Chinese noticed the necessity for separating tian and humans, and 
the need for a greater awareness that humans should take responsibility for 
themselves. At this stage, however, many elements of the supernatural and magic 
were still present.  
What is said here shows in a general way the forms of superstition of the early 
Chinese. From the fact that sorcerers and witches were considered necessary to 
regulate the dwelling places, positions at the sacrifices, and order of 
precedence of spirits, we may see how numerous these spirits were. The fact 
that the spirits were supposed to be able to bestow happiness, receive 
sacrifices, and to enter into human beings shows that they were regarded as 
anthropomorphic beings. And the statements that ‘people and spirits were 
confusedly mingled,’ ‘people and spirits had the same position,’ and ‘the 
spirits followed the custom of the people’; shows us that the actions of the 
spirits were looked upon as being quite indistinguishable from those of human 
beings. The Chinese of that time were superstitious and ignorant; they had 
religious ideas but no philosophy; so that the religious ideas and spirits which 
they believed in were exactly like those of the Greeks.16 
                                                          
14  K. C. Chang, Art, Myth and Ritual: The Path to Political Authority in Ancient China (Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 1983), 45. 
15 Ibid., 45–47. 
16  Youlan Feng and Derk Bodde, A History of Chinese Philosophy (Princeton University Press, 
1983), 24. 
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This is the origin of the idea of continuity between human and tian, but it is still very 
primitive and more or less remains supernaturally motivated. There are spirits, 
which are mainly dead people in tian, and then there is a concrete personal ruler (di) 
who controls and gives over to cosmos, and he severs the possible way for people to 
directly connect with tian. But tian is still dominant: Humans cannot effect tian to 
the same extent that tian effects humans.  
Those who were oppressed and terrified and facing execution announced their 
innocence to the powers above. The high Di surveyed the people. But there 
was no fragrant virtue, and the punishments sent out a smell that was rank. The 
august Di pitied and felt compassion for those among the multitudes who, 
though innocent, were facing execution. He requited the oppressors with terror 
and put an end to the Miao people so that they had no descendants. He 
thereupon ordered Chong and Li to break the communication between Heaven 
and Earth so that there would be no more descending and reaching up. 
Shangshu Zhengyi luxing 19 [The Correct Meaning of Book of Documents]17   
From this, we can tell that the anthropomorphic tian (including spirits) is prudently 
mingled with humans, that this tian is placed in a higher rank than humans, and that 
it is more difficult to have a unity with tian for commoners, as this communication 
between humans and tian was not encouraged. In this way, the cosmos is in an order. 
In the Shangshu kongshizhuang, Di orders Yi, He and Shi control different parts, and 
separates people and divinity. This difference of jobs or positions is called Juedi 
tiantong. In this way, with order established, the people know how to behave in an 
appropriate way. But this does not directly imply a naturalism. As Feng Youlan 
maintained, the focus is rather that tian and humans should have different works to 
complete. 18  
Compared with ancient Chinese who did not have the ability to distinguish tian 
and human being, this Juedi tiantong means that the ancient Chinese began to 
                                                          
17 Michael J. Puett, To Become a God: Cosmology, Sacrifice, and Self-Divinization in Early China 
(Harvard Univ Asia Center, 2002), 106. 
18 Feng Youlan, Zhongguo zhexue shi diyibu, [The History of Chinese Philosophy Volume one] 
(Shanghai: China East Normal University press), 23-24. 
20 
 
distinguish tian from humans, and also humans and spirits. This is a reconstruction 
of the Chinese culture of continuity of tian and human beings. People thus maintain 
the continuity with tian, but not through supernatural power, but rather because tian 
can affect humans in many ways and there is mutual interaction between these two. 
This interaction is mainly in the inward nature of humans, which can be interpreted 
according to the perspective of tian.  
The role of tian thus changed in human affairs: although tian still carried the 
meaning of supreme power, the influence of tian on the everyday social context 
weakened. On the one hand Confucius affirmed that he could not offend against tian 
(Analects 3.13), but he also advised reverence towards the spirits and deities, while 
keeping them at a distance (Analects 6.22). What further contributed to this stance 
was the view of the ancient politician named Zichan, who claimed that ‘the dao of 
heaven is far, but the dao of human is near’ (Zuozhuan.zhaogongshibanian 
[Commentary of Zuo]). Both Zichan and Confucius had a practical attitude towards 
tian: they did not go against the divinity of tian, but they nonetheless became more 
focused on the affairs of humans. 
As such, tian not only became a notion of authority legitimation for rulers, it also 
served to provide instructions to individual humans’ behaviour. But as the ruler 
gradually came to control the right to have continuity with tian, commoners could 
also have continuity with tian. D. C. Lau maintains that the mandate of tian is not 
only an endorsement of the ruler, but that everyone is also restrained by the mandate 
of tian, which is the reason why people should be moral.19 For Confucius himself, 
his mandate of tian was to be a teacher for the people. Confucius could 
communicate with tian by himself, rather than having to rely on shamans (Analects 
14.35). Furthermore, in the Zhuangzi, everybody can be the son of tian (Zhuangzi 
1.1), the son of tian thereby not only endorses the authority of the rulers then, but 
before Zhuangzi the son of tian could be only used to describe the ruler. In the 
Analects, Confucius did not make it clear how commoners could have continuity 
with tian, even though he noticed that individuals could have this continuity as well. 
                                                          
19 D.C. Lau trans., The Analects (London: Penguin UK, 1979), iv. 
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Mencius, however, made it clearer that humans can actually have this continuity, 
because this connection is possible through the inward heart-mind and natural 
tendency (I will explain this notion further, in the latter part of this chapter). It can 
be concluded that tian as a notion turned towards individual life. The continuity 
between tian and humans turned inward, and in this way it could balance tian’s 
political role as well, because the individual human could now communicate with 
and be endorsed by tian through cultivating his/her own heart-mind rather than 
relying on the ruler or shamans. Onozawa Seiichi notes the transition of the mandate 
of tian: that it began with the order of shamans and developed into the heart-mind of 
the people (referring to de).20  
Following this, since individual humans can communicate with tian, it follows 
that humans should return their focus to their heart-mind and from this to reach the 
level of tian, in order to have the continuity of humans and tian. 
Tian has less sense of being a super power for Xunzi, and cannot always 
guarantee order and peace in human affairs. Instead, Xunzi explained ceremony in 
such a way that it is used to inspire awe in tian through prayer in a very natural way.  
If you pray for rain and there is rain, what of that? I say there is no special 
relationship—as when you do not pray for rain and there is rain. When the sun 
and moon are eclipsed, we attempt to save them; when heaven sends drought, 
we pray for rain; and before we decide any important undertaking, we divine 
with bone and milfoil. We do those things not because we believe that such 
ceremonies will produce the results we seek, but because we want to embellish 
such occasions with ceremony. Thus, the gentleman considers such 
ceremonies as embellishments, but the commoners consider them supernatural. 
To consider them embellishments is fortunate; to consider them supernatural is 
unfortunate. (Xunzi 17.11) 
From this piece, we can infer the sentiment that there is no relation of causality 
between praying and what tian gives us, what can also be seen is that the continuity 
does not refer to a super powered connection between prayers and tian. Tian was 
                                                          
20 Onozawa Seiichi 小野泽精一, Qide sixiang [The Thinking of Qi] (Shanghai: Shanghai Renming 
chubanshe, 1990), 60.   
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transformed from a purposeful deity interacting with humans into an inscrutable one, 
but humans still have to accept what tian provides, in the sense that humans must 
follow tian because tian implies natural effects, such as weather and catastrophes. 
Even though Xunzi distinguished the human from tian, and greatly weakened the 
divinity-related aspects of tian, he nonetheless maintained the continuity of humans 
and tian: this continuity refers to the consistent relationship between tian and 
humans. On one hand, tian and humans share goodness, on the other hand, because 
of this consistency, humans must also follow the way of tian. But, when humans 
have a strong enough will tian should not impede it.  
All this evidence indicates that the idea of Jaspers’s Axial age may be correct, 
since Chinese culture’s supernatural elements seemed to weaken. This does not 
mean, however, that Chinese thought developed from the irrational to the rational, 
and this process cannot be held to be a breakthrough in this rational sense. Yu 
Yingshi holds that the breakthrough for Chinese culture came with the idea of 
immanent transcendence, which is a response to shamanistic culture. Because the 
shaman’s order is derived from anthropomorphic divinity, it is outside the human 
realm. This breakthrough weakened the role of the shaman.21 Yu is correct that the 
role of the shaman got weaker, but is it also true that Chinese culture is thereby one 
of immanent transcendence? Yu inherited the idea of immanent transcendence from 
Mou Zongsan. In contrast to Yu, Mou dismissed the importance of tian. Instead, he 
focused on the heart-mind of humans, even though he still accepted the continuity of 
humans and tian. Mou insisted on a difference between a Western God (which is 
outside this world and transcendent) and the dao of tian (which is immanent 
transcendent for him). Because the dao of tian can descend into humans as their 
heart-mind, tian and humans have an inter-related consistency consistence through 
this. The continuity of tian and humans is inwardly directedgoes to inward, the 
Chinese tian thus cannot be equivalent to a transcendent God like the West. In spite 
of this non-equivalence, and because of the challenge from the West after the May 
                                                          
21 Yu Yingshi, Lun tianren zhiji: Zhonguo gudai sixiang qiyuan shitan [Discuss the Relationship 
between Tian and Human: The Origin of Chinese Thoughts] (Taibei: Taiwan lianjing chubanshe, 
2014), 36. 
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Fourth movement, Chinese scholars nonetheless have to engage and co-operate with 
democracy and rationality. In order to reach a methodological compromise in the 
face of this non-equivalence, they therefore need to stipulate that the dao of tian is 
altogether beyond irrationality. 
Considering the problem of whether Chinese thought is theist or atheist, James 
Legge maintains that tian and shangdi endorse the idea that Chinese thought is a 
theism.22 Julia Ching believes that god is the source of things.23 Ames maintains 
that Confucianism is neither theist or mainly secular, rather it is at once atheistic and 
profoundly religious. It is a religion without a God, a religion that affirms the 
cumulative human experience itself.24 Ames also does not agree that Chinese 
thought is rational in a Western sense.   
Having read Mou’s work, however, Ames and Hall instead say that it is doubtful 
to claim that transcendence is significant in china.25 They do not, however, think 
that the absence of transcendence is a limit for Chinese culture. Tian is not 
transcendent, and yet it also does not totally lose its divinity. In this regard, even 
Xunzi had a more natural way of interpreting tian. Xunzi is particularly significant 
in his own distinguishing of the human from tian: he is one of the very few thinkers 
in ancient china who expresses a great deal of confidence about humans’ power. 
Does this mean that Xunzi spoke specifically about the separation of humans and 
tian? Is the human independent of tian, and can the human be in violation of it? 
Similarly, does this entail that Xunzi challenged the tradition of the continuity of 
tian and humans? It is rather the case that Xunzi discussed the separation of tian and 
humans in the context of responding to Mozi. Mozi argued that the Ru school was 
fatalistic, while Xunzi countered that tian and humans should take responsibility for 
                                                          
22 James Legge, The Religions of China: Confucianism and Tâoism Described and Compared with 
Christianity (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1880), 11. 
23 Julia Ching, Confucianism and Christianity: A Comparative Study, (Tokyo; New York: Kodansha 
Amer Inc, 1977), 118. 
24 Ames, Roger, “Li and the A-theistic religiousness of classical Confucianism”. In Confucian 
spirituality I, ed. Tu Weiming and Mary Evelyn Tucker, (New York: Crossroad, 2003), 165. 
25 David L Hall and Roger T Ames, Anticipating China: Thinking through the Narratives of Chinese 
and Western Culture (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), xiii. 
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their own domains: humans should take responsibility for human affairs rather than 
blaming tian. 
If we want to know whether Xunzi really meant to separate tian and humans, 
encouraging humans to challenge and conquer tian, we need to go to the original 
text to analyse the meaning of ‘fen’. “If you understand the division (fen 分) between 
tian and mankind, then you can properly be called a ‘perfect man’” (Xunzi 17.1). 
What is the meaning of fen? Does fen mean 'separation' or a different position?  
Feng Youlan claims that it has both meanings in different paragraphs.26 It is 
interesting to note, however, that according to Chao Fulin, fen means ‘position’ here, 
and that, taken as a whole, the sentence means that tian and humans should have 
different positions or functions in the cosmos.27 I adopt Chao Fulin’s interpretation 
that fen means different positions. Following clearly enough from this interpretation, 
Xunzi does not really mean to separate the continuity of humans and tian, since 
Xunzi respects the power of tian in most passages and he never intends to conquer 
or go against that power of tian, he still maintains the consistency between tian and 
humans. 
Furthermore, Xunzi merely claimed that if tian has its own pattern, and humans 
have their own social and political structure, then one who knows one’s limits (ming
命) should not blame tian: ‘Those who know themselves do not resent others; those 
who know fate do not resent heaven’ (Xunzi 4.6). Their ming is also from tian, the 
consistency that embodies humanity does not go against tian. Even with this 
consistency, Xunzi makes it clear that tian and humans are not one. This explains 
why it was necessary for Xunzi to make clear that tian and humans have a different 
pattern and structure. When Xunzi accounts for tian as a moral term, this tian is the 
source of other things (such as when one’s good natural tendency comes from tian, 
even though Xunzi mainly focused on the negative outcomes of one’s tendency). 
Because of this understanding of tian, Xunzi maintained that the acting ruler should 
                                                          
26 Feng Youlan, Zhongguo zhexueshi xinbian [Chinese History of Philosophy: Volume Two] (Beijing: 
Renmin chubanshe, 1984), 369. 
27 Chao Fulin, “Lun xunzi de tianren zhifen shuo” [“A Discussion of Xunzi’s Division of Heaven and 
Human”] Guanzi xuekan [The Study of Guanzi], 2(2001), 13-18. 
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behave like heaven as well. The ruler should be ‘like one of the great spirits and one 
of the heavenly ancestors’ (Xunzi 18.5). 
When he interprets tian as a natural principle, tian is nature, and humans can be 
bad, which is one way of being natural or uncivilised: tian and humans still have the 
natural consistency of been uncivilised. Xunzi highlights the importance of learning, 
because learning is a process of evolving from natural humanity towards being a 
civilised person.  
Xunzi certainly advanced the idea of utilising tian (which is not the same as 
conquering it): ‘how can obeying heaven and praising it be better than regulating 
(zhi 制) what heaven has mandated and using it? How can anxiously waiting for the 
correct time, be as good as responding to the time and exploiting it?’ (Xunzi 17.13). 
When Xunzi highlights the idea of zhitian, it is a process of cultivating the natural 
tian towards a civilised tian, which is more involved in the interaction with humans, 
and that is how humans can affect tian. Based on this quotation, there are many 
Chinese scholars (including even Mao Zedong), who claimed that Xunzi advocated 
the idea that humans can overcome tian. Does this suggestion really mean that Xunzi 
approved of the notion that humans can win over tian? Such scholars have ignored 
the importance of interpreting the second part of this sentence, which focuses on the 
idea that we have to act according to the proper time. 
Another intuitive criticism is that Xunzi maintained that our desires are from tian 
as well: ‘We do not need to wait to have desires, these desires are from heaven’ 
(Xunzi 22.11). If so, then how could humans overcome and conquer tian if even our 
basic desires are from tian?  
When the work of heaven has been established and its achievements perfected, 
the physical form becomes whole and the spirit is born. Love and hate, delight 
and anger, sorrow and joy are stored within—these are described as the 
emotions given to us by nature. The eye, ear, nose, mouth, and body each have 
the capacity to provide sense contact, but their capacities are not 
interchangeable—these are termed the faculties given us by heaven. The heart-
mind that dwells within the central cavity is used to control the five faculties—
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it is called the ruler provided by heaven…then one knows what one should and 
what they should not … that is called knowing heaven (Xunzi 17.4). 
Xunzi clearly discerns human affairs and knows that people have to find an 
appropriate way to utilise the mandate of tian. On the one hand, humans can effect 
tian, on the other hand, humans need to follow the time of tian, for instance, in 
adhering to the tian-derived capacities of what they can and cannot do. In simpler 
terms, utilising the mandate of tian is more akin to ‘knowing tian’ (zhitian 知天). In 
the category of following tian, one should try one’s best and respond to tian in a 
timely way.   
Tian is able to beget the myriad things, but it cannot differentiate them … the 
myriad things under the canopy of heaven and all those who belong among 
living people depend upon the appearance of the sage, for only then is each 
assigned in proper position. (Xunzi 19.15) 
From this perspective, Xunzi is similar to Dong Zhongshu. Both of them believe that 
the human is created by tian and restrained by tian, and though the human is the 
most exceptional figure derived from tian, the human has to follow the time of tian: 
this is the interaction between humans and tian. 
If one wants to understand the inward continuity of tian and human, one has to 
consider the relationship between humaneness and sincerity, because whereas 
sincerity is the dao of tian, humaneness is the dao of humans. To explain the 
meaning of the continuity of humans and tian, based on the taiyi shenghui, Michael 
Puett writes that all gods, divinity and humans are from one ancestor, and tian 
becomes the father of the ruler. But for Roger Ames, there is no singular ‘one’ (one 
shared ancestor) behind Chinese thought, and he rejects the notion of a shared 
ancestral purpose. Puett takes this idea of a shared ancestor as a sign that it is not a 
process of the weakening the divinization of nature, but rather that it is a process of 
human self-divination.28I would rather say that in Dong Zhonshu’s text tian is the 
human’s shared ancestor, but Dong still takes tian as a whole. Likewise, tian has a 
divine part, but it also has a natural part. More specifically, Dong approaches the 
                                                          
28 Michael J. Puett, To Become a God, 198-199. 
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issue of a continuity between humans and tian through the form of an analogy 
between humans and tian. When he discusses how one can have continuity with 
tian, he endorses the idea that rulers have the ability to embody the continuity with 
tian. 
Feng Youlan approaches such issues in a historical manner, claiming that yin and 
yang are primitivism, but, compared with Shamanism, is a legitimate means towards 
rational and natural ideas. Yu Yingshi applies Karl Jasper's notion of the Axial 
period to these developments, and claims that Chinese culture shifts from a magical 
shamanism to a logical cosmos based on qi, and that this was a philosophical 
breakthrough in ancient China.29 For Yu Yingshi, however, this breakthrough is 
considered transcendent, which similarly conflicts with Ames's views. 
As mentioned earlier, Yu Yingshi, based on his shared assumption with Jaspers 
(on the breakthrough of transcendence) and the weakening of deity-related aspects 
of tian, concluded that Chinese thought progressed towards rationalism. As a New 
Confucian, Yu focused on immanent transcendence, and he would thus take Dong 
Zhongshu’s correlative cosmos combining yin, yang and the five phases with 
humans and tian to build a coherent system, as a regression in thought, as being not 
rational enough. However, based on a renewed analysis of Xunzi’s ideas, it is hard 
to claim that Dong Zhongshu’s cosmology was a regression in Chinese thought. 
According to Claude Lévi-Strauss’ theory of structure, the correlative cosmology 
provides a rational and coherent meaning by depicting an ordered cosmos. 30 As 
such, it can be considered a progression rather than a regression, and it would be a 
clear way to describe an ordered pattern of humans and tian. From the perspective of 
historical development, Dong combined ideas from the different schools and 
developed a greater correlative cosmological view in order to explain the cosmos 
and our society in a coherent and ordered way. He developed the idea of ‘great 
union’ (datong 大同), and depicted an ideal social-politics called the ‘great unity’ 
(dayitong大一統). This image is not a historical institution, rather it is based on a 
                                                          
29 Yu Yingshi, Lun tianren zhji—zhonguo gudai sixiang shitan [Relationship between Tian and 
Human: The Origin of Chinese Thought] (Taibei: Taiwan Lianjing press, 2004), 135. 
30 Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Savage Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), 77. 
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correlative cosmos in which there is a mutual correspondence with humans, and it 
provides a compelling and cosmologically continuous reason why the ruler should 
apply humaneness in politics.  
 
1.2 Inward Sincerity (Cheng) and Humaneness  
 
Mencius presents a clear way of understanding how it is possible for humans and 
tian have continuity: this continuity concerns an inward turn. As the most influential 
modern scholar, Mou Zongsan attempted to use Kant’s methodology to fix the 
‘problem’ of Chinese thought. He conceived of the heart-mind as both immanent 
and transcendent, and in this way we can have continuity of humans and tian, as the 
heart-mind is itself the bridge that connects humans and tian. In the preface of 
Xianxiang yu Wuzishen [Phenomena and Thing Itself], Mou writes that the original 
heart-mind is subjective, objective and absolute. On the objective level, it is the dao 
of tian and the mandate of tian; on the subjective level, it is humaneness and the 
natural tendency of the heart-mind. Mou’s inward heart-mind is derived from 
Mencius’s understanding, but these subjective and objective elements constitute his 
own contribution to the notion. In contrast, in Confucius's understanding these two 
levels (tian and heart-mind) do not appear to be separate: ‘I study what is near at 
hand and aspire to what is lofty’31 (Analects 14.35). Zhu Xi’s commentary suggests 
that this study is self-cultivation, which is a way to practice the heart-mind, and thus 
achieves the level of tian. Mencius claimed that it is possible for commoners to 
reach the realm of tian, if they practiced self-cultivation, cultivating their heart-mind 
and nourishing their refined qi. All these ancient thinkers’ interpretation of tian is 
situated in our everyday life and our lived experience, rather than in a transcendental 
analysis. Although it is difficult to reach the level of tian in such a way, it is 
nonetheless possible for humans to do so. Both of these aspects indicate that tian is 
not an absolute objectivity. 
                                                          
31 Ames and Rosemont trans., The Analects of Confucius, 180. 
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If the immanent-transcendent distinction does not present a sufficient basis for the 
continuity of humans and tian, pursuing this continuity through human self-
divination is also problematic. Following from what was discussed earlier, Puett 
argues that the divine aspects of tian may have weakened, but this was because the 
divine aspects of humans strengthened. Based on Mencius 7A4 and 2A2, Puett 
concluded that Mencius and Zhuangzi accepted the divine power of humans.32 The 
unity of humans and tian can work, according to Puett, because of the human 
capacity for self-divinization, through which humans can connect with tian. I think 
Puett’s general approach is correct, and agree with the logic of his argument, but 
what he takes as evidence in the paragraphs Mencius 7A13 and 7B25 about divinity 
(shen 神) is inaccurate. Shen in this context, according to Zhu Xi’s commentary, 
means ‘amazing, inscrutable’ rather than divinity. In Mencius 7A4, Mencius 
maintained that we can have continuity of tian by looking inward, as we have 
sincerity in our heart-mind, and this is what we share with tian. Mencius became 
more focused on practising humaneness, but he never proclaimed that humans can 
become tian, as tian and humans are fundamentally different. 
If neither of these approaches provides an acceptable basis for continuity, the idea 
of ‘natural tendency’ may furnish such a ground. The Zhongyong (The Doctrine of 
the Mean) describes how it is possible to connect natural tendency and tian in our 
life. According to this text, our natural tendency comes from tian: this tendency 
means that human beings have a good part of tian. If one can fulfil or complete 
one’s tendency then one can have the continuity of one’s tendency and tian in one’s 
life: this is the completion of one’s moral practice. The combination of tendency and 
tiandao is the completion of the human being. Humaneness is the idealised natural 
tendency, which works as the bridge to connect tendency and tian. Because 
humaneness is based on the assumption of continuity between humans and tian, this 
humaneness is not anthropocentric. Rather, such a humanity never tries to conquer 
the natural world for the benefit of human beings. This kind of humanity instead 
tries to cooperate with other things in tian on the condition that caring has different 
                                                          
32 Michael J. Puett, To Become a God: Cosmology, Sacrifice, and Self-Divinization in Early China 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Asia Center, 2002), 134. 
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levels (to love one’s family more than strangers and so on), this type of humanity 
can then confirm to the continuity of humans and tian. 
In order to better appreciate this line of thought, it is necessary to draw on 
similarly related insights in Confucius's thought. In the Analects, Confucius not only 
frames the idea of tiandao in the realm of humaneness and natural tendency, but also 
gives concrete ways to practice it. What Confucius claimed is that acting according 
to humaneness, and practice in arts, is a means towards dao (Analects 7.6). If one 
can practice the six arts, then one can understand tiandao. This is because practicing 
the six arts can resonate with and endorse the way of humaneness, humaneness 
penetrates into our every-day concrete life, and this is a process of cultivating the 
good aspect from tian, which is natural tendency. When Confucius discusses 
humaneness, he uses the term ‘humaneness’ to resonate with tiandao. This is a 
particular understanding of tiandao: ‘What tian commands (ming 命) is called 
natural tendencies; drawing out these natural tendencies is called the proper way; 
improving upon this way (xiudao 修道) is called education (jiao 教).’33 Inwardly, 
humaneness is the final aim for one’s cultivation, it is the lofty realm of our moral 
personality when we cultivate ourselves or practice. Outwardly, humaneness can 
resonate with the higher level tiandao. Natural tendency is the good part derived 
from tian, and that is why one can be lead by natural tendency to follow the dao, it is 
the beginning of self-cultivation, and i also provides a good seed for the completion 
of humaneness. Hence, humaneness and natural tendency are not closed off from 
each other, they are themselves lofty and connected with tiandao. Sages and 
gentlemen use their morality for the Dao of governing. This is the embodiment of 
applying humaneness. 
Humans follow the way of humaneness because humaneness is from tian, and 
because humans are the only beings that can follow the way of humaneness, then 
                                                          
33 Roger T. Ames and David L. Hall, Ames: Focusing the Familiar (Honolulu: University of Hawaii 
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humans are thereby the only ones who can participate with tian.34 Even though 
animals may have the ability to care and love for their own types, the proper dao of 
sage-hood resides beyond this to further participate with tian and earth, and achieve 
harmony between these two. 
From the human perspective, humaneness is the way of approaching the 
continuity of humans and tian, whereas sincerity approaches the same question from 
tian’s perspective. From tian’s perspective, there is no humaneness, as tian does not 
have a specific preference. Sincerity, for tian, means that in the process of continuity 
(between tian and human beings) humans must engage in practice and self-
cultivation. We cannot have this continuity naturally without putting in any effort, 
especially since this is a process of (what is termed) ‘completion’. Mark Edward 
Lewis translates Confucius’s cheng as the complete and undivided focus of the 
refined energies that makes possible higher human functions.35 I think this 
translation more concretely captures the emphasis on embodiment and everyday 
concrete life better than the translation of ‘perfecting’ or ‘completing’ from Roger 
Ames. Cheng means that one is very steadfast and sincere, and Lewis's translation 
specifies the underlying conditions for this. 
‘In the world only someone of perfect cheng is considered able to complete his 
nature’36 (Zhongyong 22). In this chapter, this use of cheng means sincerity, which 
Ames has translated as 'perfecting'. When one is sincere, one can complete his or her 
natural tendency and help other things fulfil their natural tendency as well, and one 
can join with tian and earth. In chapter 25, being sincere is to be naturally complete, 
when Dao is spontaneously unfolding. ‘Completing the self is humane. Completing 
things is knowledge’37 (Zhongyong 25). Thus, from the perspective of humans, 
                                                          
34 This idea is from Dong Zhongshu’s Chunqiu fanlu [Luxuriant Dew of the Spring and Autumn 
Annals]: 人受命乎天也，故超然有以倚。物疢疾莫能为仁义，唯人独能为仁义；物疢疾莫能偶天地，唯人独能
偶天地。（《人副天数》）. 
35 Mark Edward Lewis, The Construction of Space in Early China (Albany, N.Y.: State University of 
New York Press, 2006), 18. 
36 Ian Johnston and Wang Ping, trans., Daxue & Zhongyong, Bilingual edition (Hong Kong: The 
Chinese University Press, 2012), 325. 
37 Ibid., 337. 
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sincerity is humane, while from the perspective of tian it is sincerity of tian, and 
towards other things it is knowledge. Humaneness and knowledge are the 
expressions of our natural tendency in a different context. Sincerity is from the 
heart-mind and is the opposite of hypocrisy or fake behaviour (wei 伪), and it is a 
unified singular concept rather than a duality. ‘Being true is the way of heaven; to 
reflect upon this is the way of man’ (Mencius 4A12). D.C. Lau translates cheng as 
‘true’, and so cheng may thus be seen as the fundamental condition for the existence 
of things in our world. Without cheng we would not have this world, as the dao of 
humans has to follow the dao of tian. Humans have to pursue sincerity, because 
‘sincerity, perfecting, or the true’ (Cheng) is the dao of tian. 
In 6B1 of Mencius it is claimed that ‘Our body and complexion are given to us by 
tian. Only a sage can give his body complete fulfilment’ (Mencius 7A38). Mencius 
tries to connect our natural tendency to tian; every living thing has different traits in 
our world, this is tianxing 天性 (which means the natural tendency of tian, or inborn 
natural tendency). However, if humans’ natural tendency is from tian, then humans 
have to be different from other natural things (for instance, animals and plants). For 
Mencius, natural tendency is that which can distinguish humans from animals and 
plants. The good natural tendency and a good tian have this continuity, but it still 
necessary to address how a neutral tian can have this continuity with humans.   
 
1.3 Neutral Tian and Good Natural Tendency 
 
One aim for humans to practice is to keep the continuity of humans and tian, but 
does this mean that humans need self-cultivation in order to confirm this continuity? 
This would mean that humans take the risk of returning to chaos (luan 乱), as tian 
does not share the same preferences as humans. Certainly, the continuity of tian and 
humans appears as a continuity between these two parts, but this continuity is based 
on division: humans have to have li to give themselves order, and they also have to 
be aware of the difference between humans and their surroundings. It is instead 
through practice, then, that one can say that one confirms the continuity of the 
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human and tian. The continuity of tian and humans always involves self-cultivation: 
one cannot achieve a level of continuity between tian and humans without a division 
with other things under tian. 
This division indicates a significant problem that must be addressed in 
considering tian. As Puett highlights, ‘the central tension for Mencius [...] is that 
although heaven is the ultimate source of moral patterns, it can and does arbitrarily 
act in opposition to these patterns. And yet we must accept what heaven 
commands.’38 There are only two ways to solve this problem. First, one can claim 
that tian can sometimes be humane, and sometimes not. Or, alternatively, one can 
say that tian is altogether indifferent to moral judgement. Laozi and Zhuangzi 
similarly noticed this tension, adopting the latter stance: while people should act 
according to tian, tian itself is amoral and thereby indifferent to moral judgement. 
Confucianism, however, faces the problem of having to explain a discontinuous tian, 
and this apparent tension between humans and tian is embodied not only on a 
theoretical level but also on the directly personal level of practice or self-cultivation.  
For Mencius, humaneness and appropriateness come from our natural tendency, 
which is why he has to strongly disagree with Gaozi (as yet another philosopher 
similar to Laozi and Zhuangzi in his approach on this issue), who held that our 
natural tendency is neither good nor bad but would adjust according to the relevant 
environment. Instead, humaneness and appropriateness are innate in our natural 
tendency for Mencius. Hence, relating to the described tension, Mencius has to 
explain how a good natural tendency can generate bad behaviour. Mencius here 
introduced two important notions: his understanding of heart-mind and ‘energy’. 
Using these notions he likewise argued that the emergence of bad behaviour arises 
when humans simply give up in their efforts to be good. 
Natural tendency is spontaneous kindness towards others for Mencius, and 
spontaneous kindness is derived from the care that we find in the family. Franklin 
Perkins translates xing as ‘natural dispositions’ or ‘characteristic tendencies’.39 
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Particularly for Perkins, xing refers to spontaneous reactions. Natural desires are not 
natural tendencies for Mencius, as this is only to be the same as animals.  As we 
have seen, Mencius explained that people give up on themselves or do not have 
enough confidence to be humane, and this is the reason why there are evil people 
(Mencius 4A10). Alternatively, someone may not pursue it when one’s heart-mind 
strays (Mencius 6A11). In order to avoid this, one, therefore, has to persevere in 
one's heart-mind and nourish one's natural tendency in order to avoid obsession with 
material desires. Xing can be connected with heart-mind: in Chinese this is called 
xinxing (natural tendency of heart-mind). Especially in Mencius, the natural 
tendency of humans is closer to the natural tendency of heart-mind. 
Also important in Mencius’s understanding is the environment. The outside 
environment can likewise have an effect on people's striving. ‘In the good years the 
young men are mostly lazy, while in bad years they are mostly violent. Heaven has 
not sent down men whose endowment differs so great so greatly. The difference is 
due to what ensnares their hearts’ (Mencius 6A7). Mencius then uses the example of 
barley: the place and the timing of sowing are the same, but we may have different 
outcomes when barley ripens because of rain, human effort or the richness of the 
soil. Mencius said that we can understand the outcomes of barley but we are 
confused when human beings are understood in the same situation. Human beings 
share the same natural tendency, but the outside environment may be different, and 
this forms part of the reason why people may become evil. In Mencius 6A8, 
Mencius gives the example of trees on the Ox Mountain: because people ceaselessly 
chopped trees there and cattle ceaselessly grazed on the vegetation, the consequent 
lack of trees is not the natural tendency of Ox Mountain. Mencius said that if people 
do not have enough time to nourish their ‘night energy (yeqi)’, then they may 
become bad people, but this does not mean that people have an inherently bad 
natural tendency. 
The heart-mind's relation to qi, itself a cosmological notion, facilitates a further 
grasp of the continuity with tian. Heart-mind is the seat of the refined qi which must 
be cultivated: ‘nourish it with integrity and place no obstacle in its path and it will 
fill the space between heaven and earth’ (Mencius 2A2). The gentleman is ‘in the 
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same stream as heaven above and earth below’ (Mencius 7A13), self-cultivating in 
order to grasp qi. In the human microcosm of the greater cosmos, one can practice 
one’s refined qi by cultivating one’s heart-mind, because the heart-mind is not 
outside oneself. Rather, the heart-mind is part of the body: qi is the thing shared with 
our body and the 'outside' world that is essential for Mencius’s continuity of humans 
and tian. One’s heart-mind can then generate refined qi and this qi can resonate with 
'outside' qi as well. This practicepractice is to nourish what heaven generates in 
humans’ body, as qi inside of the body can achieve harmony with qi outside one’s 
body. Lastly, and briefly, for Gaozi, however, our natural tendency is empty without 
any good seeds, good tendency or preference. On yet another side, for Mozi 
humaneness and appropriateness come from the will of tian, which is why Mozi 
focuses on the will of tian, and how tian can punish and reward people according to 
their behaviour. 
As an important figure in the Ru school during the Han dynasty, Dong Zhongshu 
explains via analogy, in a similar manner to Mencius, how a supposedly good 
natural tendency can come from tian in light of the fact tian does not necessary 
always appear as good to the human world.  
Goodness is like a kernel of grain, and nature is like the growing plant of 
grain. Though the plant produces the kernel, it cannot itself be called a kernel. 
[Similarly,] though xing [here used in its broader sense, as basic ‘stuff’] 
produces goodness, it cannot itself be called goodness. The kernel and 
goodness are both brought to completion through man’s continuation of 
heaven’s work, and are external [to the latter]. They do not lie within [the 
scope of] what heaven itself does. What heaven does extends to a certain point 
and then stops. What lies within this stopping point pertains to heaven. What 
lies outside of it pertains to jiao [teaching, culture] of the sage-king.’ Chunqiu 
fanl40 
By using the analogy of a growing plant, Dong Zhongshu instead maintained that 
tian only gives xing and other possibilities to human affairs, but is not responsible 
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for the outcome of human affairs. And as a kernel does not necessarily thereby 
produce a growing plant, tian itself as the one that gives such possibility does not 
necessarily have good tendency, as tian is not equivalent to humans. Rather, the 
human is only one part of tian, as the kernel is just one part of the growing plant. 
Tian gives humaneness to humans, but this does not necessarily mean that tian must 
itself always be humane. 
Dong also went further in stating that ‘the silk cocoon contains silk fibres and yet 
is not itself silk, and the egg contains the chicken, yet is not itself a chicken’ 
(Chunqiu fanlu).41 This highlights that even though the continuity of humans and 
tian is assumed, it does not mean that humans can be tian: they are not equal to each 
other. Furthermore, if the egg is natural tendency, then the chicken is the 
humaneness: our natural tendency always has the possibility of becoming humane, 
but the outcome may not always be positive. Our natural tendency, then, is 
humaneness. In this sentence, humaneness is just one trait of our natural tendency, 
‘is’ in this sentence is not a strict definition of what natural tendency is. Rather, the 
point is to use an analogy explain how it is possible for humans, who have a good 
tendency, to not be humane.  
The heaven-derived xing of human beings leads us to humaneness even though 
heaven itself is not humane, just as the xing of Ox Mountain leads it to grow 
trees even though heaven itself is not wooded. In shifting the relevant ground 
for human action from heaven to our own nature, Mencius makes the purposes 
of heaven irrelevant.42  
I suggest that because humans need to interact with tian, and the continuity is 
already present, this part of tian cannot be neutral to give space for the interactions. 
It is possible for an amoral tian to generate a good natural tendency for humans 
because of the mutual affection. The interactions between humans and tian produce 
order and chaos. What one can do is promote one’s good natural tendency, which 
comes from tian, and also play one’s role properly, and maintain harmony with it. 
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This interaction between tian and humans also exists in politics. In Mencius 
(1A7,1A6, 2A6) it can be seen that virtue and political success are positively 
connected. Mencius depicts the continuity of the heart-mind of tian and the heart-
mind of humans: ‘[h]eaven sees with the eyes of its people. Heaven hears with the 
ears of its people’ (Mencius 5A5). Tian embodies its heart-mind through humans, 
this continuity between tian and humans already exists, there is no need to build any 
connection between them. As the heart of tian is embodied through the heart of 
humans, rulers need to gain the hearts of humans by cultivating and displaying 
virtue. Jie and Zhou lost their ‘all under tian’ (tianxia 天下), because they lost the 
heart-mind of their commoners (minxin 民心) (Mencius 4A8). Losing the heart-mind 
of humans is therefore the reason why Jie and Zhou failed, rather than through a 
direct punishment from tian. Rulers have to guarantee the common good of people, 
rather than focusing on appeasing tian through sacrificial ceremony, which is the 
intentional connection between humans and tian. The common good for people is 
mainly their interests or profit (li 利) (Analects 4.16). For Mencius, then, when he 
argues that people should not focus on their own self-interests, the specific audience 
he intends are rulers and gentlemen. This is because rulers should take peoples’ 
interests as their own rather than focusing on their own profit and thereby harming 
people. When he cares about interests for people it is a political care for people, 
which is essential for the rulers to account for in order keep the mandate of tian. 
However, in Mencius 1B14, humaneness cannot endorse rulership either because of 
tian. As Mencius explains, this is simply because of tian: Duke Wen of Teng was a 
humane ruler, but he nonetheless had to face the difficult problem of either fleeing 
or defending himself to his death. Franklin Perkins maintains that tian explains the 
failure of virtue, not its success.43 Hence, when humane rulers succeed it is because 
tian sees and hears through the people, rather than rulers winning the will of tian 
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directly. In the case of Duke Wen as a humane ruler, it was his fate to be in such 
unfortunate circumstances. It is here that tian more closely resembles ming as 
individual fate. Confucius admitted that fate is that which is unchangeable and 
beyond control, and Mozi responded in Against Fatalism that if one accepted this, 
people would be lazy, as working hard would not change their fate. For Confucius, 
though, fate and proper behaviour are separate from each other, and the rulers should 
not stop working hard or practising because of this fate. 
Tian always endorses the success of the mandate of tian for the acting ruler in the 
context of dynasty. In Mencius 2B13 and 3B9, we can see that history develops 
according to a pattern, and in 4A7 it is said that when one follows tian one is 
preserved, whereas one who goes against tian is destroyed. For Mencius, humans 
have to submit to tian. To solve the problematic conflict of human good and 
indifferent tian, Mencius highlights the notion of ‘appropriate time, opportunity’. In 
this way he explains how Confucius, Yan Hui and Yao all had humaneness, but tian 
nonetheless promoted Yao rather than Yan Hui or Confucius. This was because tian 
has this historical pattern (shi). Because of this patterning, tian may sometimes not 
dictate peace and order, whereas humans inherit goodness from tian and may want 
to pursue peace and order. Through this tension, we can see the story of Confucius, 
who knew he would not succeed and nonetheless persisted in his efforts of 
cultivation. It would seem in cases like this that tian goes against humans. This is 
thus in accordance with humans being unable to influence tian or deviate from it, as 
earlier discussed in the case of Xunzi. Even as a most radical Confucian, Xunzi still 
insists that we need to follow the pattern of tian, so it is thus plausible that the 
human has to accept the order of tian: ‘If the way is going to prevail in the world, it 
is because circumstances would have it so; if it is not going to prevail, it is because 
they wouldn’t (Analects 14.36). One must accept what tian gives, and as in Analects 
14.35, Mencius 2B13 and Zhongyong, humans are encouraged not to resent tian: 
they should instead understand their own limits and in doing so be able to 
understand tian. 
Tian and humans interact and mutually affect each other in many ways, and the 
continuity between the two always remains. Even Xunzi noticed that tian and 
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humans have differing responsibilities, but his aim was to provide distinctions to 
structure an ordered universe, while still remaining in the narrative of tian and 
humans. Continuity means that they have a resonance and reciprocity in the way in 
which these aspects of the cosmology emerge together. They are not being unified or 
connected—they are already continuous. What happens is that a productive 
relationship between them produces depth (du 度), harmony (zhonghe 中和), and 
enhanced significance (dadao 達道).  
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Chapter 2: The Productions of the Emerged Continuity between Humans 
and Tian 
 
Since I have analysed the structure of the continuity of tian and human, we are now 
in a position to analyse what this continuity produces. This continuity negatively 
embodies through fate, which is from tian, positively as order and harmony between 
tian and humans.  
Because of the limits for humans from tian, humans cannot change or regulate 
tian, but they can cooperate with the timing of tian to their advantage. In this 
process, all forms of li have been shaped according to timing: for instance, rites of 
worship of natural things are correlative to seasons; and li as a way is not a fixed 
rule, rather, it is a general principle needing each individual to act according to their 
circumstances and situation, which is another embodiment of Chinese timing. 
Through repeated action of following the way of li, which is acting with timing, 
people receive positive feedback, and it shapes efficacy between the actions of 
timing and success. 
The time of tian can be embodied negatively as fate for humans, and positively as 
opportunity. Observing this timing also implies efficacy for humans. Li as a way to 
show its timing can include not only the forms of li between everyday relationships 
among humans, which are based on humans’ natural dispositions (and shaping 
humans’ dispositions) but also the political forms of li which aim at bringing order 
and harmony. The way of li embodies the overlap between the social and political in 
China, as well as the holistic order.    
  
2.1 Human Ming (fate) as Negative Continuity with Tian   
 
Ming embodies the continuity of humans with tian from a negative way, tian is 
inscrutable in human affairs, and this inscrutability is linked to a lack of 
endorsement of humane behaviour, as I discussed earlier. Tian does not necessarily 
endow a good human with a long life span (a long ming) or riches: these kinds of 
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ming are passive, as we find in the case of Yan Hui and Confucius, who are good 
people, but have negative ming: this highlights the tension between humans and tian. 
Confucianism held that humans have to accept whatever tian gives to them, and it 
also discusses a positive ming: for instance, ming as the responsibility of humans 
from tian. 
The mandate of tian (tianming) is connected with the emperor and the legitimacy 
of his power. Ming is more closely connected with the individual person, and in the 
Analects the meaning of ming is close to circumstance, limits and situation. Ming is 
connected with tian, because ming is the order from tian to human beings. Tian and 
humans are in one pattern, and ming and natural tendency are in another pattern. An 
analysis of ming and xing can therefore also reflect the relationship of tian and 
humans. As Mencius writes: 
The way the mouth is disposed towards tastes, the eye towards colours, the ear 
towards sounds, the nose towards smells, and the four limbs towards ease is 
human nature, yet therein also lies the Decree. That is why the gentleman does 
not ascribe it to nature. The way benevolence pertains to the relation between 
father and son, duty to the relation between prince and subject, the rituals to 
the relation between guest and host, wisdom to the good and wise man, the 
sage to the way of Heaven, is the Decree, but therein also lies human nature. 
That’s why the gentleman does not ascribe it to Decree.44 (Mencius 7B24) 
It seems that Mencius took our desires as ming as well. But here, he makes a 
distinction between xing and ming. For him, xing is more involved with human 
affairs, but ming is further beyond our control and more related to tian. 
Seek and you will get it; let go and you will lose it. If this is the case, then 
seeking is of help to getting and what is sought is within yourself. But if there 
is a proper way to seek it and whether you get it or not depends on destiny 
(ming), then seeking is of no help to getting and what is sought lies outside 
yourself. (Mencius 7A2) 
                                                          
44 D. C. Lau, trans, Mencius (London: Penguin UK, 2004), 162. 
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In this context, an external ming can be distinguished from inward natural tendency. 
Ming is also a possible limit in some circumstances for people, but neither Confucius 
nor Mencius ascribes failure to ming. This is why Confucius claimed: ‘I don’t hold 
any ill will against tian nor blame other people’45 (Analects 14.35). 
Understanding ming is important for Confucius himself: ‘Someone who does not 
understand the propensity of circumstance has no way of becoming an exemplary 
person’ (Analects 20.3). If Confucius claimed that gentlemen must know 
circumstance (zhiming 知命) then he understood the importance of limits in our 
lives. Mencius goes further in stating the idea of standing firm on one’s proper 
destiny (liming 立命), which gives a more compelling reason for why people still 
need to cultivate themselves: ‘Whether he is going to die young or to live to a ripe 
old age makes no difference to his steadfastness of purpose. It is through awaiting 
whatever is to befall him with a perfected character that he stands firm on his proper 
Destiny’ (Mencius 7A1). If our short ming or longer ming is something we cannot 
control, then we should not worry about it, and focus instead on moral practice. One 
should therefore always practice in order to be a moral person, even if one fails or 
has misfortune in other parts of life. One who can hold this attitude toward life is 
standing firm on one’s proper destiny. Similarly, for Mencius, self-cultivation 
cannot be affected by ming, as all ethics can be picked up or discarded by each 
individual (Mencius 4A10). 
Ming takes different forms, and humans therefore have different relevant ways of 
cooperating with it. When ming means opportunity, this refers to an opportunity 
from tian which is a reflection of shi. Humans should seize it, as this ming is 
predictable. Since ming is an order from divine tian, humans should thus take it as 
their responsibility: this is to have received ming (shouming 受命), just as Confucius 
received an order from tian to be a teacher. Ming can also mean the mandate of tian 
as the fate of a dynasty, which is the order from tian for the ruler. Compared with 
Confucius’s individually-received ming, this is where a particular state has received 
                                                          
45 Roger T. Ames and Henry Rosemont Jr, trans., The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical 
Translation, (New York: Ballantine Books, 1999), 180. 
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ming from tian. Ming can mean life span (shengming 生命), and a ‘short ming’ 
(duanming) conveys the sense that someone ‘was to die young’ (Analects 6.3). 
Ming is also related to appropriateness (yi 義): ‘Confucius went forward in 
accordance with the li and withdrew in accordance with what was right (yi), and in 
matters of success or failure said, ‘There is the Decree (ming)’ (Mencius 5A8). 
Mencius uses appropriateness to explain the meaning of decree in this context: one 
has to act according to li and appropriateness in any different ming (circumstance). 
For instance, Shun had a bad father: that was his ming; but Shun nonetheless had to 
show filial piety to his father, because that was to follow appropriateness. Bigan had 
a cruel king named Zhou, but Bigan had to follow the li of subjecthood because that 
constituted appropriateness. These ‘bad’ ming therefore do not give a reason to 
Bigan and Shun to deviate from acting according to appropriateness. This explains 
why Confucius claimed he did not know the decree of tian until he was fifty 
(Analects 2.4), as he noticed that tianming is connected with appropriateness, and 
that one has to think extensively about appropriateness, or what one should do. 
According to Zhu Xi’s commentary, tianming is the process of the dao of tian, 
and it gives traits to concrete events and things, dictating why things and events are 
the way they are. As Mencius writes: 
Though nothing happens that is not due to Destiny (ming), one accepts 
willingly only what is one’s proper Destiny (zhengming 正命). That is why he 
who understands Destiny does not stand under a wall on the verge of collapse. 
He who dies after having done his best in following the Way dies according to 
his proper Destiny. It is never anyone’s proper Destiny to die in fetters 
(Mencius 7A2). 
It is risky to stand under a dangerous wall, and this is a risk that can be avoided. It is 
not one’s fate to die: rather, the death is because of one’s own stupidity. Another 
example is one who does die in fetters; according to Zhu Xi’s commentary, this is 
the example of criminals, who are similar to one who dies under a dangerous wall. 
Their misfortune has not come from tian, but from themselves. Proper destiny 
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therefore relates more to the limits of human beings. Proper destiny or zhengming 
has to follow proper dao or zhengdao 正道. 
In the Analects, Confucius seldom discusses the dao of tian directly, but this does 
not mean that he is uninterested in an understanding of tiandao. Rather, he did not 
wish to discuss tiandao in an abstract way. As such, the original relevant sentence 
literally means that you cannot hear Confucius discussing natural tendency and 
tiandao (Analects 5.13). 
Based on the requirements of coherence, Zhu Xi claimed that the real meaning of 
this sentence was not common for Confucius’s disciples to hear on such a topic, so 
when they did hear it, they praised how valuable it was. It may therefore actually 
have been an important topic for Confucius. Based on Analects 7.24, Hall and Ames 
come to a conclusion that conflicts with Zhu Xi’s interpretation. They argue that it 
does not mean that Confucius had something hidden or withheld some deepest 
insight regarding the matter, but that it is instead still essential for the exemplary 
man to know fate.46 Thus although Confucius does not talk about the dao of tian 
that much, he balances this by assigning ming an important position in his thought. 
In Confucius’s account of his own life experience, the ultimate meaning and value of 
his mission in life is bound up with ‘recognizing the destiny of Heaven’ and 
‘learning to follow this destiny’ (Analects 2.4). Furthermore, Confucius says: ‘three 
things of which the noble man stands in awe: the destiny of Heaven, great men, and 
the words of the sages’ (Analects 15. 8). And finally, in the last lines of the Analects, 
Confucius says, ‘Unless one recognizes the destiny of Heaven, one cannot be a 
noble man’ (Analects 20.3). 
Zhuangzi’s understanding of ming is not in conflict with the Ru school either, 
because ming is also present in the context of our lives, and humans have to 
understand and follow it in this context too: ‘To understand what you can do nothing 
about and to be content with it as with fate’ (Zhuangzi 4.3) From this, we can tell 
that Zhuangzi noticed the tension between humans and tian as well. Even though his 
thought concerning tian is amoral, and he does not confront the problem of a neutral 
                                                          
46 David L Hall and Roger T Ames, Anticipating China: Thinking through the Narratives of Chinese 
and Western Culture (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 197.  
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tian and a good natural tendency as Confucianism does, Zhuangzi still promotes the 
continuity of tian and humans in the sense of following the fate of tian, and taking it 
as what humans cannot do. 
According to Fu Sinian’s analysis of the pattern of characters in ancient Chinese 
writing, ming is originally from the order of tian, as ming 命 consists of order 令 
and mouth 口, and natural tendency consists of heart-mind 心 and ‘birth, generation’ 
生 (this xing is also the generation of tian). In the very beginning, then, the ming of 
tian and our natural tendency is in the same category (in the sense that both of them 
are from heaven).47 Fu carefully examined the ancient development of this writing 
and illustrated that both ming and xing are from tian, but his research here cannot 
provide a clear distinction of individual ming from the mandate of tian: it can only 
generally explain that our natural tendency is from tian. 
Confucius did not deny the existence of the mandate of tian, but his mandate of 
tian is not a fixed and unchangeable concept as it was in the early stage of mythical 
time. Confucius discussed an individual mandate of tian as well, which more or less 
means the responsibility of individual people, or what one should do. For instance, 
the mandate of tian for Confucius was to be ‘a wooden bell-clapper’ (Analects 3.24), 
which suggests that his responsibility from tian was to guide the people in all-under-
tian when there was no proper dao, and to be a teacher for people. Further, Mencius 
can be interpreted as continuing the mandate of tian for Confucius, in claiming that 
he had to help in governing all-under-tian (Mencius 2B22). Hence, both Confucius 
and Mencius had the aspiration to help all-under-tian go with dao of tian, to teach 
and guide rulers and commoners. 
Since ming is the passive order from tian for humans, and humans can only 
understand and follow it, does this mean that humans can neglect self-cultivation 
and practice? ‘Becoming authoritative (ren) in one’s conduct is self-originating---
how could it originate with others?’ (Analects 12.1). Following this point, people 
pursue humaneness because they want to be a humane person from their inward 
heart-mind, rather than for some external achievement or benefits. If one is born into 
                                                          
47 Fu Sinian, Fu Sinian quanji juaner [Collection of Fu Sinian Volume Two] (Changsha: Hunan 
jiaoyu chubanshe, 2003), 631. 
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a poor family, that is one’s fate, but one still needs to practice humaneness. As 
Confucius said of one of his followers: 
He has a bamboo bowl of rice to eat, a gourd of water to drink, and a dirty 
little hovel in which to live. Other people would not be able to endure his 
hardship, yet for Hui it has no effect on his enjoyment (Analects 6.11). 
Bad circumstances do not stop Yan Hui from practising humaneness. Confucius 
suggests that people should complete the affairs of the human, and then follow the 
mandate of tian. This is why Confucius regards himself as ‘the one who keeps trying 
although he knows that it is in vain’ (Analects 14.38): he knew that his 
understanding of li would not be accepted by the acting rulers of his time. That was 
his fate, but that did not mean that Confucius should have thus stopped striving: he 
wanted to be complete in what he could do in those circumstances rather than 
awaiting the outcomes of ming. As Mencius writes: 
When something is brought about though there is nothing that brings it about, 
then it is Heaven that does it. When something arrives though there is nothing 
that makes it arrive, then it is destiny that does it. A common man who comes 
to possess the Empire must not only have the virtue of a Shun or a Yu but also 
the recommendation of an Emperor. (Mencius 5A6) 
This is why Confucius, who had virtue, could not possess a state, and why the Jie 
and Zhou dynasties had states but lost them soon, because they did not have 
excellence or virtue (de 德), and therefore were not qualified to be sage-kings. Ming 
is the outside limit of circumstances for Confucius, that which he could not change 
and had to follow. 
Since Confucianism made an effort to connect ming with appropriateness and 
humaneness, the meaning of fate was weakened. If natural tendency also assumes 
the responsibility of our behaviour, as natural tendency is the idealised good for 
Confucianism, it is not entirely a matter of decree, and people may still make a 
legitimate effort to follow the way of humaneness. Such a position would thus avoid 
the argument from Mozi that Confucianism tends toward fatalism. 
Another important aspect of ming is its role in proper timing and opportunity. 
Mencius holds that gentlemen should know how to wait until the correct time and 
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fate come, and then act. (Mencius 7B79). In this context, fate and opportunity (shi) 
are mutually interpretable. ‘Appropriate time or opportunity’ and ‘fate’ in a word is 
called shiming (时命) which means ‘opportunity’ or ‘chance’ in general. For 
Mencius, since this opportunity is from tian, one cannot then pursue it in a forceful 
way. The opportunity is like the natural growing of a plant: one should not go 
against natural law or timing and pull on one's crops in an attempt to help the plants 
grow quicker (Mencius 2A2). 
The production of continuity is then based on timing or opportunity. Timing is 
understood from the view of tian, and opportunity stands as an equivalent relation 
for humans. This notion of time is not a fixed concept.   
 
 
2.2 Timing and Opportunity for Individual Personhood  
 
Shi as opportunity from tian is not only the continuity of the mandate of tian, but it 
also serves as timing for individual humans. Humans have their own freedom and 
can make their own choices under this form of timing. 
In The Dao of Tangyu (Tangyu Zhidao of Guodian Chu Slips), it is suggested that 
the success of Yao was because of his opportunity from tian: Yao encountered a 
good ming and a good opportunity. One may have wisdom and humaneness like 
Yao, but one cannot compete with Yao’s opportunity. This text explains why 
abdication cannot succeed in the case of King Kuai in Yan. It suggests that this type 
of opportunity has nothing to do with inward virtue, but it is essential nonetheless 
for succeeding. 
There is Heaven, there is man; Heaven and man differ. Investigating 
differences between Heaven and Man, we know how to act. If he is an 
appropriate man, but the times are not appropriate, then even if he is worthy, 
he will not be able to act. But if he attained his age, what difficulties would 
face him? Shun cultivated land at Mt. Li, made pottery on the [Yellow] River’s 
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banks, and then rose to become the Son of Heaven—this is because he 
encountered Yao. (Qiongda yishi)48 
In Qiongda yishi (the relevant passage in this work literally means ‘failure and 
success depend on timing’, in part 7 of Guodian Chu Slips) there are many examples 
of how people succeed because of good opportunity. In the process of interaction 
between humans and tian: one either grasps this opportunity and succeeds or has this 
opportunity but cannot seize it and then fails. Since tian decides whether humans 
have good opportunities or not, people should instead focus on self-cultivation. This 
is because humans should take full responsibility for virtue and humaneness, while 
recognising that the autonomy of tian will control whether one succeeds or not. In 
this text, ‘whether one meets the correct time or not, that is up to heaven’ (Qiongda 
yishi). 
In the Yijing, ming is an order connected with luck from tian, and has the 
meaning of ‘unpropitious’, ‘inauspicious’ and ‘propitious’. Good ming can coincide 
with good luck or back luck depending on how humans interact with shi. Through 
interaction with ming and shi, one can coincide good ming with back luck, and vice 
versa. According to Wang Bi’s commentary on the Yijing, the hexagrams are shi. 
The sixty four hexagrams always have the meanings of unpropitious, inauspicious or 
propitious, and are concerned with what one should and should not do, and when. 
Here, ming is closely connected with shi. When it refers to an appropriate time, that 
is propitious, whereas when it is not good shi, it is that which is unpropitious, and 
humans will fail if they insist in acting against shi. With Xunzi there is a similar 
statement, but tian is replaced by right time. 
Just as whether one meets (yu 遇) with success depends on the right time, so 
too matters of death and life depends on fate. Now if a man has not met with 
the right time, even though he is worthy, how would he be able to put [his 
ideas] into practice? If he should chance to meet with the right time, what 
difficulties would he have? Thus, the gentleman broadens his studies, deepens 
his plan, practices and cultivates himself to await his right time. (Xunzi 28.8) 
                                                          
48 Cited in Yuri Pines, Envisioning Eternal Empire: Chinese Political Thought of the Warring States 
Period (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2009), 151. 
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Xunzi has a similar discussion about good opportunity as well, and he further made 
clear his ideas about what humans should do. For Xunzi, whether a sage is 
encountered or not is up to good opportunity. As such, it is possible that one may be 
intelligent but cannot enact one’s ideas. In such cases, one should focus on self-
cultivation and await the coming of a good opportunity, at which point it will be 
easy to succeed. Likewise, Confucius's gentleman (junzi) ‘remains unsoured even 
without being recognized’ (Analects 1.1). Confucius himself had to struggle on in 
adverse circumstances, and political frustration was not necessarily a sign of moral 
failure, because it is possible that these junzi simply did not encounter shi. 
Since shi is from tian, humans must be flexible and cooperate with it, and always 
act in a timely way. ‘Sensing their approach, a bird took flight, and soared about 
before alighting. The master said, “This is the hen-pheasant on the mountain bridge--
-how timely! How timely! ”’ (Analects 10.27). In one of the very few mentions of 
shi in the Analects, even a bird can be praised because of its timeliness. Hence, 
Confucius noticed the importance of shi, even though he did not significantly 
discuss it in the Analects. He maintained that the gentleman should always be 
appropriate (shizhong 时中), because outside circumstances are always changing: shi 
in this context means that which is adaptive and appropriate. One can thus do too 
much, while too little may also be inappropriate; it therefore means to go with the 
trend and not against it. As Xunzi writes: 
He handles dangerous situations, responding, changing, and adapting as is 
suitable; he modifies and adjusts at the proper time and initiates or desists with 
the proper season; through a thousand affairs and ten thousand changes, his 
Way is one. (Xunzi 8.9) 
Bigan has his heart cut out; Confucius is besieged in Kuang. … How utterly 
unpropitious that they should meet (yu 遇) with no opportunity (shi 時) … 
Devote yourselves to study, for heaven will not forget you. The sage only folds 
his hands, awaiting the approach of his opportunity. (Xunzi 26.6) 
Shi and meet, as evidence of interaction between humans and tian, constitute a 
remarkable way of embodying the will and pattern of tian, and to explain how one 
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can change bad to good luck with one’s subtle work. Most thinkers began to move 
the focus to identifying the shi to explain one’s life encounters, and this could 
provide a more refined way49 of explaining why clever and good people like Bigan 
and Confucius could have failed in spite of tian’s endorsement, and vice versa.    
 
2.3 Timing as the Pattern of Tian 
 
Because of the correlative cosmology of Chinese philosophy, one has to act 
according to numerous patterns in order to co-operate with dao. Tian has a 
processual pattern, and according to the process of the four seasons (shi 時) of tian, 
seasons change naturally and spontaneously. This process is sometimes generative, 
and at other times leads to the perishing of things. In a state mainly reliant on 
farming, the people are essentially focused on this process. From this point of 
reference, humans noticed that tian embodies itself by giving opportunities or limits 
to humans, and they then analogise this insight with other circumstances. Similarly, 
when humans have not been granted opportunities by tian it may be interpreted in 
turn as failure and chaos for humans. 
The interaction between humans and tian exists because of the tension between 
order (zhi 治) and chaos (luan 乱) in human history. This is because tian can be 
neutral regarding chaos, and while such order and chaos is only embodied as the 
time pattern (shi) for tian, humans nonetheless always want order and peace. Tian 
itself is chaos in the beginning, but if the human world requires order then this 
ordering process requires decisive effort: it is through the ordering li 
practicepracticed by humans that they are able to distinguish themselves from 
animals and other things, and become self-cultivated in turn. All things under tian 
are mutually influential, and therefore this process can change the pattern of tian as 
well. This appears as the movement of tian, which is the time of tian. Humans in this 
process are always a part of tian, as one part of this continuity. 
                                                          
49 Compared with the primitive one which maintains that virtuous people all gain reward, the idea of 
timing gives us a better way to explain the individual’s adverse circumstance.  
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If one applies this processual shi to the development of history, one can arrive at 
the conclusion formed by Mencius: ‘This is one time; that was another time. Every 
five hundred years a true King should arise, and in the interval there should arise one 
from whom an age should take its name.’ (Mencius 2B13). If this is the pattern of 
tian, even though there are some sages who were qualified, they could not become 
the ruler and give peace and order to our world because they were not born at the 
right time.  
This pattern of realistic history is not always conducive to peace and order, ‘The 
world has existed for a long time, now in peace, now in disorder.’ (Mencius 3B9). In 
Chinese, this is called yizhiyiluan 一治一亂, a notion referring to the peaceful world 
and chaos replacing each other in a cycle of patterns. This chaos will then happen 
regularly, but great chaos will lead to great peace.  
When one dynasty replaced another, the essence of governing remained the same. 
The structure of such upheavals does not resemble the revolutionary structure of 
equivalent phenomena in the West. Therefore, if Chinese society is not sufficiently 
affected by Western ideas, it may keep changing in this pattern. One emperor may 
lose the mandate of tian if he or she is not qualified (not morally perfect) to govern a 
state well, and one person among the masses who is morally perfect has the right to 
adopt the mandate of tian if he or she is qualified. The stability of society is 
maintained in this process, and it gives legitimacy to all acting emperors. As Xunzi 
says: 
What is the relation of order and chaos to heaven? I say: the revolutions of the 
sun and moon and the stars and celestial points that mark off the divisions of 
time by which the calendar is calculated were the same in the time of Yu as in 
the time of Jie. Since Yu achieved order and Jie brought chaos, order and 
chaos are not due to heaven. What about the time? I say that crops germinate 
and grow to maturity in the course of spring and summer and are harvested 
and gathered for storage during autumn and winter. This also was the same in 
the time of Yu and in the time of Jie. Since Yu achieved order and Jie brought 
chaos, order and chaos are not due to the time. (Xunzi 17.6) 
52 
 
Xunzi claimed that if inept rulers like Jie and Zhou share the same period of time as 
the sage-king Yu, it is not because the time of tian made chaos for society: it is 
rather that humans are themselves responsible for having chaos. In Xunzi’s 
argument, it is suggested that good governing is more reliant on human affairs than 
on time or tian. 
Compared with Xunzi, Mencius is more prudent about the function of tian and 
time. Even though Mencius interprets the mandate of tian in a more radical way, he 
still thinks that one not only needs to gain the heart-mind of commoners and be 
approved by tian, but also needs the recommendation of the former acting ruler to be 
the coming acting ruler (Mencius 5A5). Tian does not have any will: rather, one can 
only analyse tian by turning to an outside circumstance. There is no way to 
understand the intention of tian directly: people need to seize the opportunity and 
see whether tian approves one’s behaviour or not. 
Having understood this, there remain two ways to know tian. On the one hand, 
passively, we can understand tian by analysing the orders from tian which we have 
to follow. On the other hand, positively, we can analyse the opportunity derived 
from tian, and turn tian. In this correlative cosmology, there is an interaction 
between humans and tian: timing can be applied as good luck or bad luck, 
depending on how a person responds to it.  
 
2.4 Change: the Content of Timing  
 
In his Thinking from the Han Self, Truth, and Transcendence in Chinese and 
Western Culture, Ames and Hall maintain that time and space are interdependent 
with each other. There is thus no possibility for the concept of the eternal in the 
Chinese tradition.50 Ames maintains that wuhua, or always changing does not allow 
time to exist without things or things without time. Time penetrates everything. For 
Ames, the capacity of things’ ceaseless transformation is the meaning of time. Time 
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is essential in ancient Chinese Daoist philosophy. Time and temporalizing manifest 
themselves especially in the Yijing.  
The assumption of ceaseless change is the reason that there is no fixed entity in 
Chinese thought. ‘Temporalizing phenomena and thus perceiving them as ‘events’ 
rather than ‘things,’ the pervasive capacity of the manifest world to transform 
continuously is the meaning of time.’51 
The idea of order does not refer to all things in one pattern, rather, in the context 
of Chinese thought, it means adjust to different circumstances, and is a process 
towards harmony. The reason that the idea of order is like this is because the idea of 
shi is also embodied as change, or the ceaseless transformation. Because the idea of 
timing is concerned with changing, Chinese thought does not focus on fixed 
concepts. As Roger Ames writes: ‘Temporalizing phenomena and thus perceiving 
them as ‘events’ rather than ‘things,’ the pervasive capacity of the manifest world to 
transform continuously is the meaning of time.’52 This ceaseless transforming does 
not permit timing without things or things without timing: timing pervades 
everything, but there is no abstract timing or thing. 
Time and temporalizing manifest themselves especially in Yijing. In Yijing, the 
images of hexagrams imply ji or omens, which could offer suggestions to the ancient 
kings about the appropriate time to act. This time is certainly non-linear, time and 
the knowledge of human beings of the past and the future are interdependent on each 
other. The changing illuminates the past and interprets the future. 
The main focus of the Zhuangzi is ‘changing’ (hua 化), there are 54 paragraphs 
that mention this idea. From the story about a fish who transforms into a bird, to one 
who changes into an insect, Zhuangzi’s ‘change’ is also connected with non-action 
(wuwei 无为). ‘You have only to rest in non-action and things will change 
themselves’53 (Zhuangzi 11). In this context, ‘hua’ means ‘to follow’ and adapting, 
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but not to be against or conflict with others. In modern Chinese, ‘huajie 化解’means 
‘de-conflict’, and we can see that hua is a method of reducing conflicts and fitting 
with circumstances. This ‘changing’ is changing to fit in outside circumstance and 
doing so without harm or conflicting with it, it is thus a process of merging with 
circumstance naturally. ‘The foul and rotten may change into the rare and unearthly, 
and the rare and unearthly may change into the foul and rotten’ (Zhuangzi 22), thit 
suggests that changing is the process of a whole universal development, which 
includes the death and birth of humans, the perishing and generation of things. 
‘Having been changed, things find themselves alive; another changing (hua) and 
they are dead’ (Zhuangzi 22). In this context, changing is following time as similar 
to a life span, and changing represents all natural processes.  
The men of old changed on the outside but not on the inside. The men of today 
change on the inside but not on the outside. He who changes along with things 
is identical with him who does not change. Where is there change? Where is 
there no change? (Zhuangzi 22) 
Zhuangzi maintains that we have to ‘follow the external’ or ‘waihua 外化’ which is 
going along with the external changing circumstance. One has to keep one’s heart-
mind still, even when one confronts a difficult life or an affluent life. If one betrays 
one’s heart-mind but pursues the benefits of outside society, that is to be ‘changed 
inside’ (Zhuangzi 22). This is because, in some circumstances, we have to change 
ourselves to live in this world. In accordance with this we can follow the natural 
tendency of heart-mind. But this adaptivity and flexibility is not without principle, 
rather, the principle is that one cannot change one’s heart-mind of dao for Zhuangzi, 
this is his principle that cannot be changed. 
According to the commentary of Guo Xiang, ancient people know how to follow 
the outside circumstances, but not change their heart-mind which is inside, because 
the heart-mind should be quiet and empty. But today’s people cannot cooperate with 
external circumstances, and their heart-minds are changed.54 
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‘Worth lies within yourself and no external shift will cause it to be lost. And since 
the ten thousand transformations continue without even the beginning of an end, 
how could they be enough to bring anxiety to your mind?’ (Zhuangzi 21). From this, 
we can discern that to ‘not change’ is something inside yourself, it should still be the 
heart-mind. Also, for Mencius, even if one lives in adversity, one should still keep 
one’s heart-mind unmoving (Mencius 2A2, 6B35) and focus on self-cultivation to 
await the correct and appropriate time.  
 
2.5 The Positive Productions of Continuity: Order and Harmony  
 
From the perspective of humans, timing can mean a strategy about how to act, if we 
connect this way of acting to the value of humans, it is acting to follow li and 
proceeding towards harmony. This value is seen in Yijing:  
Retreat, prosperous and smooth. Prosperity and smoothness lies in retreat. The 
firm is at the right place and properly responds. It accords with the time. The 
little, favourable to be steadfast and upright. It is advancing and growing. 
Great indeed is the significance of retreat at the proper time.55 (Yijing.33)  
The image of ‘retreat’ goes smoothly with time, as this time concerns how people 
cooperate and act according to circumstance. Humans not only retreat in accordance 
with time but also should move on with time. This means acting when one needs to 
and withdrawing when it is the correct time. It is the highest realm of life for 
Confucianism when one can act according to timing. ‘He was the sort of man who 
would hasten his departure or delay it, would remain in a state, or would take office, 
all according to circumstance… Confucius was the sage whose actions were timely’ 
(Mencius 5B1). What is opposite with timing, and what Confucius warned that 
humans should avoid, is to ‘speculate, claim or demand certainty, [to be] inflexible 
and self-absorbed’ (Analects 9.4), these four actions do not appreciate timing. 
Such timing acts according to outside circumstance, and it can be practiced in the 
process of individuals’ self-cultivation. Even though timing gives each individual 
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space to act according to each one’s circumstance, the key principle of dao does not 
change. The value of timing is embodied in the unchangeable dao and different 
individuals. 
Timing also connects with ‘zhong’ (middle, appropriate): ‘The ignorant can be 
prosperous and smooth if he acts in accordance with the proper time and follows the 
principle of the central way’56 (Yijing. 4). The middle way follows timing, changing 
with timing, and can bring order and harmony to humans’ world. This middle way of 
behaviour includes one’s way of speaking, emotions and so on:  
[My] master only spoke at the proper time, no one grew tired of what he had to 
say; because he only laughed when he was happy, no one grew tired of his 
laughter; because he only took what was appropriate for him to take, no one 
ever grew tired of his taking. (Analects 14.13) 
Confucius praises a consciousness of timing in behaviour. Timing is not only a rule 
that one should follow when one cultivates oneself, but timing is also important in 
governing a state. It is important to work to follow the timing in an agricultural 
country: ‘put the common people to work only at the proper time of year’ (Analects 
1.5).  
When timing and appropriate behaviour are combined together, it is order and 
harmony: 
The way of the initiating is change and transformation, So that each being 
obtains its true nature and destiny. And the union of great harmony is 
preserved. This is what is favourable and upright. The Initiating is high above 
all beings.57 (Yijing. 1) 
Harmony can not only refer to the appropriate behaviours that humans have, and 
ordered socio-politics inside the state, but also the harmonious relationship between 
Tian and humans: 
When joy, anger, sorrow and happiness have not yet arisen, we call this ‘the 
centre’ (zhong 中). When they have arisen, but are all in the centre and 
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regulated, we call this ‘harmony’ (he 和). The centre is the great foundation of 
the world. Harmony is the all-pervading Way of the world.58 (Zhongyong 1)  
This idea of ‘harmony’ in the context of appropriate behaviour also embodies the 
idea of timing in dealing with humans’ relationship with humans. This timely 
behaviour can be embodied in concrete rites when one cultivates oneself. ‘When 
one’s food and drink, clothing and dress, dwelling and home, activity and repose 
follow the dictates of li, they are harmoniously measured’ (Xunzi 2.2). Basically, to 
achieve harmony, one needs to follow what is an appropriate or middle way. 
Yizhuan59 embodied the main principle of order in the context of ‘middle way’: 
Greatly luminous, from beginning to end. Each of the six stages completes 
itself in its own time. As mounting on six dragons soaring in the sky.  
Commentary on the Symbol: Heaven acts with vitality and persistence. In 
correspondence with this [time]. The superior person keeps himself vital 
without ceasing.60 (Yijing.1) 
Even though time is important for Confucianism, it is not its ultimate aim, what is 
more important is order and harmony. ‘Tian’s favourable weather (tianshi 天时) is 
less important than Earth’s advantageous terrain (shi 势), and Earth’s advantageous 
terrain is less important than human unity (renhe 人和)’ (Mencius 2B1). Here, timing 
as an objective description of season or weather is less important than the harmony 
(he, in Lau’s translation, becomes unity, I would instead state that harmony is better) 
in humans. The time of tian and time of earth contribute to the harmony of humans 
which is the value of time. 
Harmony not only means the harmonized relationship between humans and tian, 
but also the harmonized interrelationship between people. ‘Achieving harmony is 
the most valuable function of observing ritual propriety’ (Analects 1.12). Li plays an 
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important role for Confucianism, not because its forms, but rather because li is the 
outside embodiment of humaneness: ‘Through self-discipline and observing ritual 
propriety one becomes authoritative in one’s conduct’ (Analects 12.1).  
‘What has a person who is not authoritative got to do with observing ritual 
propriety?’ (Analects 3.3). Li is important because it is the embodiment of 
humaneness, if a person does not follow the way of humaneness from their heart-
mind, it is useless for one to follow all different forms of li. Li and humaneness are 
correlative with each other: without forms of li, one cannot really practice the way of 
humaneness; without the company of humaneness, li is empty and useless. Different 
forms of li cover how to deal with one’s relationships properly; with friends and 
family members, or how to treat other people, how one should behave properly in 
funeral and marriage, the proper rites towards tian, earth and other things, and also 
what the appropriate rites in politics are. Some of these rites towards tian and earth 
are sacred concerning awe and reverence, the other li is more or less appropriate and 
timely emotional expressions towards ones’ ancestors, family members and other 
things (Analects 3.12); not all li is sacred. What is appropriate is the most significant 
for the essence of li. 
The Master on entering the Grand Ancestral Hall asked questions about 
everything. Someone remarked: “Who said this son of a man from Zou village 
knows about observing ritual propriety? On entering the Grand Ancestral Hall 
he asks questions about everything.” When Confucius heard of this, he said: 
“To do so itself observing ritual propriety.” (Analects 3.15)  
Because different forms of li exist, for Confucius, it is not important to know all 
forms of rites, rather, one should always have a modest heart-mind, as Mencius 
highlights, ‘the heart of courtesy and modesty [is the germ] of observance of the 
rites’ (Mencius 2A6). The correct way to follow li endorses not only one’s 
behaviour, which should follow a proper way, but also, more importantly, one’s 
attitude and intention should be modesty and sincerity, because the forms of li can 
always change with different circumstances and situations. 
The idea of harmony does not mean that people require sameness, it is rather that 
sameness is opposed to harmony. ‘Exemplary persons seek harmony not sameness; 
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petty persons, then, are the opposite’ (Analects 13.23). Harmony can be used to 
describe an ideal society with all difference contained inside it. It is similarly 
described in Zhongyong: 
The ten thousand things are nurtured at the same time, and yet are not contrary 
to each other. Small virtue flows like a stream; large virtue is genuinely 
transforming. These things are what make Heaven and Earth great (Zhongyong 
30).  
Inspired by the idea of ceaseless changing, and that all different things not only not 
conflict with each other, but can also nonetheless keep order and harmony, this 
harmony itself is change without confliction. Once order and harmony have been put 
in the most important position, all other things can find their relative positions too: 
this is a macro-process that order has formed: 
 Being in the “the centre” is the great foundation of the world; being in 
“harmony” is the all-pervading way of the world. Reach “the centre” and 
“harmony,” and Heaven and earth are in their positions and the ten thousand 
things are brought forth. (Zhongyong 1)  
When expresses their desires and emotions, they should be in accordance with the 
middle way, one can then find a point to balance different desires. For instance, 
Confucius praises ‘pleasing without being excessive’ and being ‘mournful without 
being injurious’ (Analects 3.20). This concerns how one should appreciate the 
enhanced significance of following the middle way.   
In summary, the interaction between tian and humans is not only embodied in 
inward humaneness and sincerity, but also in shi. The continuity between humans 
and tian not only refers to people in general, but also to the individual person. Hence 
this continuity of tian and humans means a harmony not only between these two 
parts, but also a harmony internal to humans. 
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Chapter 3: Li: The Structure of Order   
 
The overlap between the idea of li and order inside states or under tian can be 
embodied in the ideal images of integrated societies. That people within this society 
spontaneously follow their own dispositions, without even applying all forms of 
rites, does not mean that li is not important in this society. Rather, having a modest 
and sincere heart-mind is to follow the way of li without noticing li itself. The way 
of li is derived from following and also shaping humans’ dispositions, and through 
this process, following the way of li can bring order and harmony not only inside 
one’s family, but also all under tian.     
 
3.1 Two Ideal Unified Sociopolitical Patterns  
 
In the first two chapters, it is seen that Chinese thought turned inward and that the 
idea of humaneness is knitted into the continuity between humans and tian. In the 
process of knowing tian, it is also seen that humans can specifically act to follow 
such timeliness and avoid conflict with tian. This timely behaviour is embodied in li, 
as a process of self-cultivation. Li not only plays a significant role in determining 
proper relationships with others, but is also important in the process of ordering the 
world. Hence, there is a significant overlap with time in li. 
The Chinese scholar Zhang Desheng maintains that Chinese have an ideology of 
order, which is why they require harmony.61 Because of the presumption of the 
continuity of tian and humans, there is also a continuity between the ancient Chinese 
cosmos and politics. Based on the cosmology of a specific continuity of tian and 
humans, the relevant ideal society is that of a highest level, ‘Grand Union’. This 
functions as an ideal socio-political structure that can play a role in critiquing the 
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existing political system if the existing one is not good enough, and if not, the 
political level should nonetheless reach the level of ‘Small Tranquillity’.  
When the Great Dao was pursued, public and common spirit ruled all under 
the heaven [tian xia wei gong]; they chose men of talent, virtue, and ability for 
public service. . . They did not treat only their own parents as parents, nor treat 
only their own sons as sons. Provision was secured for the aged till their death. 
. . . People showed kindness and compassion to widows, orphans, childless 
men, and those who were disabled by disease, so that they were all sufficiently 
provided for. . . Possessions were not wastefully discarded, nor were they 
greedily hoarded. . . In this way selfish schemings were discouraged and did 
not arise. Robbers, thieves, and rebellious traitors were unknown, and doors 
remained open and unlocked. Such was the Great Union (Book of Rites).62 
The highest level of ideal politics occurs ‘when the great dao prevails, [and] all 
under tian is for the public’ (Book of Rites). On this level, people complete 
themselves and fulfil their good natural tendency; they take the good of the great 
community normally called ‘all under tian’ as their own good, and there is no 
conflict between self-interests and the interests of the larger community. People also 
take themselves as one part of the harmonious cosmos, this being called ‘Great 
Union’. In the highest level of social and political structure, order is from 
spontaneous good. There is still a problem, however, of how a primitive time can 
have spontaneous order. Actually, ‘great union’ as an ideal structure did not exist in 
ancient times for Confucius, it was only an ideal description that humans could 
participate with tian, with there being harmony between humans and other things in 
the universe. This is so when understood from the wider perspective: because there 
are no political states, it may seem chaotic, but everyone nonetheless has their own 
position and cooperates well within this state of affairs. People will not only care 
about their immediate relations, but will extend their care to other people as well. In 
this society, Confucius did not even mention the ruler's position: this is because it is 
unnecessary to have a ruler in the Great Union. In the ideal pattern of the ‘Great 
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Union’ there is a process that completes humaneness, and everyone can thereby 
overcome the harmful aspects of self in order to cooperate with others. On this level, 
people still have filial piety and other ethics, but humans following the idea of li 
comes only from their spontaneous dispositions. As such, the focus is more about 
participation with tian and having continuity with it; humans cannot even know they 
are following the way of li, because in such a society all forms of concrete rites do 
not need to exist, as humans act spontaneously in the way of li. On the level of small 
tranquillity, filial piety is more focused, and it is more related to realising and 
completing the self. This is a way to understand humaneness and a way to prepare 
for having the great union.   
However, in the beginning of small tranquillity, Confucius mentioned Yu 禹, 
Tang 湯, Wen 文, Wu 武, the king of Cheng 成王, and Duke Zhou 周公 as rulers 
who lived in ‘small tranquillity’. We can thus infer that people still needed a ruler in 
this society. When we still need a ruler to govern, the primitive level of ideal politics 
persists; but if we want to progress to the Great Union, we have to achieve the ‘small 
tranquillity’ first.  
‘When the Dao is hidden, take all under heaven as one family’ (Book of Rites). 
This is called 'Small Tranquillity' (xiaokang 小康). Because in this big family, caring 
and loving inside of the family is still the priority, and people cannot extend this 
loving to others and participate with tian. When people still need to fulfil their 
natural tendency, they cannot expand this good to others, and there will then be a 
conflict of interests between the self and the expanded community. On the level of 
xiaokang, which existed in ancient times and was more achievable, Yao, Shun, and 
Yu were the ideal kings for Confucius: they were moral examples for the people 
because they were morally like sages, and they were also successful kings. They 
held the dao, and implemented dao in their times. Confucius and Mencius praised 
these kings in their works, and took them as their moral model exemplars. On 
Mencius’s understanding, they retained their thrones because of their innate 
virtuosity. On this level, rulers need be both outside rulers and inward sages. 
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The Great Union as an ideal will prevail in times when people do not have an idea 
of states (historically, they instead only had the idea of all under tian), and xiaokang 
already existed in Yu’s time, when all people fitted well in their positions. Confucius 
therefore thought that the ideal highest level politics should have the perspective of 
all-under-tian rather than individual states. 
For Liu Qingping, ‘great union’ is only a description for a primitive clan society 
that combined primitive democracy and consanguinitism, and between ‘great union’ 
and ‘small tranquillity’, small tranquillity is to be more preferred for Confucianism, 
as Yu and other sages are praised widely.63 Firstly, without giving evidence, Liu 
assumes that Confucius’ great union is the primitive society. Second, when only 
based on the work of some sages, there is insufficient evidence to prove that small 
tranquillity is better. It is further problematic that he concludes that Confucianism 
does not have the idea of a public moral, since Confucians only focus on private, 
extended family members. Actually, the great union embodies the public love and 
caring which instantiates humaneness, when people care not only about their own 
parents and sons; small tranquillity, however, embodies the virtues inside of the 
extended family, which is the private sphere, when people only care about their own 
parents and sons. It is not necessary to have a tension between great union and small 
tranquillity, because humaneness as spontaneous compassion is not a concrete ethic. 
Rather, it is embodied in all other virtues, and it is a public feeling towards 
everything, including strangers. The private virtues only exist in the private field, 
and thus these two socio-political patterns can exist in parallel and do not harm each 
other. 
This ‘great union’ as the ideal political and social pattern is a unity allowing 
difference within rather than oneness. ‘Division is the direct outcome of ritual, the 
outcome of division is ‘category’ (lei 类), from these ‘categories’ one can have 
holistic ordered unity.’64 The division and unity of li, then, are two sides of one coin, 
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and the final aim of division is unity. Because the division of li aims at giving order 
rather than separation, the final image is harmony and a holistic all-under-tian. 
The similarity between small tranquillity and great union is order: the order in 
great union is spontaneous and humans have it without even having knowledge 
about it; the order in small tranquillity is derived from li, li is thereby the key notion 
to connect these two ideal socio-political structures.     
 
3.2 How Can This Socio-political Pattern Give Order?  
 
In the time of the ‘great union’, order is derived from the spontaneous good, but it is 
not easy to achieve, since people may simply relinquish the pursuit of goodness. In 
contrast, ‘small tranquillity’ is more realistically achievable. This kind of order is not 
derived from a natural organic development, rather, it is involved in self-cultivation, 
which means that people need to practice and follow li.  
Further, in ‘small tranquillity’, people still need an exemplar to follow: 
Heaven and earth give birth to the gentleman, and the gentleman provides the 
organizing principle for heaven and earth. The gentleman is the triadic partner 
of heaven and earth, the summation of the myriad of things, and the father and 
mother of the people (Xunzi 9.18).  
Here, Jun is a sage-king (junwang 君王) rather than a gentleman, as the ruler for 
humans, and is to help tian give order to human affairs. The relationship between the 
ruler and his commoners is like father and son: he gains his authority in this way as 
well, and he can serve as a good model to the commoners. As commoners are not 
capable of ordering themselves, they need a ruler to bring order to society.   
The way that rulers bring order is through good examples, and it is thereby 
necessary that rulers are capable of being good, as rulers are those who people 
follow: ‘when the ruler is benevolent, everyone else is benevolent; when the ruler is 
dutiful, everyone else is dutiful; when the ruler is correct, everyone is correct. 
Simply by rectifying the prince one can put the state on a firm basis’ (Mencius 
4A20).The idea is that the ruler needs to cultivate himself beginning from his own 
body:  
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The Master said, “If his self/body is correct (zheng 正), then his commands 
will be carried out without his even making them. If his self/body is not 
correct, even should he command others they will not obey. If someone could 
correct his own self/body, then what problem would there be to his devotion to 
governing? If he cannot correct his self/body, then what has he to do with 
correcting/governing other people?”65  
In this socio-political structure, if one begins to self-cultivate, it is a way of taking 
part in political practice and developing order. 
Practice of the body is the first step towards beginning to govern a state. 
According to its understanding as the small correlative cosmos, one has to cultivate 
oneself, and it is here that we can see the connection with li. One cultivates one’s 
body by participating in li and by being aware of the division of society, and by 
doing so properly, one can have an ideal whole. If everyone can act properly in such 
a way it is called order. ‘Governing effectively is doing what is proper (zheng 正). If 
you, sir, lead by doing what is proper, who could dare do otherwise?’ (Analects 
12.17) The reason that the ruler has to be zheng is that if he is not proper, he will 
lose authority: his commoners will not follow his orders.  
In the Book of Rites, there is no clear description of how to achieve order. Xunzi, 
based on the assumption of a continuity of humans and tian, maintains that humans 
should be divided from tian as well. Unsurprisingly, in the social and political 
structure he maintains that the reason why people can live together in order is 
because of the possibility of division. Division is reliant on practicing the concrete 
forms of li, and when people follow li, there are then orders in grouping, because 
this division (fen 分) is based on li and ‘proper acting’ (yi 義). It is dangerous if the 
people simply focus on grouping and not on division, because people will then fight 
and argue with each other (Xunzi 9.19 and 9.20). Sato Masayuki maintains that 
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‘division’ for Xunzi is an ethical rule to fairly divide resources among human 
beings.66 People can have groups with divisions, these divisions give rules and 
guide people to live a well-organized life with the proper manner of co-operating 
with others. This maintains human beings in order, and other animals cannot do this, 
even though they may live together. In Xunzi's use of this term, we can tell that this 
grouping (qun 群) does not simply mean ‘groups’67, rather, it is an ordered and co-
operating society with li. Li in ‘groups’ not only helps distinguish people from 
animals, but Xunzi also uses li to set orders for society and politics.68 ‘Accordingly, 
the ancient Kings acted to control them with regulations, ritual, and moral 
principles…this is indeed the way to make the whole populace live together in 
harmony and unity’ (Xunzi 4.14). That people live harmony and unity in the 
community is the final aim for Xunzi, and this unity is the completion of li and self-
cultivation. 
Facing the tension between filial piety and loyalty in Mencius, Xunzi developed 
his understanding of ‘group’ in a more stable way in order to replace the family’s 
position in Analects and Mencius.69 Although Xunzi puts the family inside of the 
‘group’ in a less fundamental way (compared with Confucius and Mencius, who 
place filial piety in a more important position for political ethics to dismiss the 
tension), he still thinks that filial piety is important for ethics. Although Xunzi has 
the reputation of claiming that humans’ natural tendency is bad, if humans are totally 
bad then people may ask how it is possible for them to adopt the rule of li, realise 
they are good and then be willing to practice them. Numerous commentators have 
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described the complexity of Xunzi’s position. Robert Cummings Neville, for 
example, writes:  
Mencius’s mistake, according to Xunzi, was to believe that desires could grow 
their needed semiotic focus from within. Because Xunzi believed that the 
semiotic or ritual elements derive from human contributions (e.g., the ancient 
kings) rather than the biological impulses given by Heaven and Earth, he 
rejected Mencius’s theory of internal exfoliation of virtue as simply wrong. 
Moreover, by expecting people to become rightly related to others and nature 
simply by letting their natural impulses grow uncorrupted, Mencius’s theory in 
practice would lead to adult babies, selfish and aggressive, envious and 
hateful. Or it would smuggle in ritual training disguised by romantic 
posturing.70 
Sato Masayuki maintains that Xunzi’s aim is to end chaos and rebuild an ordered 
society.71 Xunzi relies on li to rebuild order, and also to guide humans to goodness. 
The final aim for Xunzi is therefore the same as Mencius, but their methods of 
achieving it are a bit different. 
Donald Munro maintains that both Mencius and Xunzi share the idea that natural 
tendency has constancy which is a potentiality for repeating action, action that will 
emerge if conditions permit, and that the constancies are not in conflict with 
Mencius.72 The difference is only that Xunzi is more focused on a realistic form of 
natural tendency, rather than an idealistic one like Mencius. Mencius tries to guide 
humans to realise and complete their inward tendency of goodness, whereas Xunzi’s 
method is to restrain other tendencies which conflict with goodness; goodness is 
then embodied when one is actually successful in restraining one’s superfluous 
desires. 
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Eric Hutton discusses bad natural tendency in more detail. He maintains that 
Xunzi believes all human beings have desires, and without correct guidance these 
desires will involve people in chaos and fighting.73 Xunzi, then, does not mean that 
human beings have a bad natural tendency that is inborn; rather, natural tendency is 
a process that people can develop due to external reasons or a lack of restraint.  
James D. Sellmann also holds the idea that natural tendency is not fixed, and he 
even rejects using the term ‘natural tendency’ (xing 性), as it may mislead 
interpreters. ‘That the very quality of human character is not fixed, and because it 
varies with time and context, requires a flexible art of rulership that accommodates 
and fulfils the interests of masses.’74 
Unlike scholars who focus on the concept of natural tendency and try to solve the 
problem of bad natural tendency, Chen Lai makes a two parallel-line account to 
describe two different kinds of ‘badness’ for Xunzi. Desires and the heart-mind have 
a tension in Xunzi’s ideas: humans can respond both to our heart-mind and to 
desires, so our consciousness is not only controlled by our disposition but by desires 
as well. For Chen, there are two different ‘likes’(hao 好 as a verb means like, and as 
a noun means good) and ‘dislikes’ (wu 恶 as a verb means dislike, and as a noun 
pronounced ‘e’ means bad): one is the ‘like’ and ‘dislike’ for our disposition and 
natural desires, the other is ‘like’ and ‘dislike’ for our heart. 75 For Chen, then, even 
though human beings have a bad natural tendency, they can still practice good li, 
because they have heart-mind to help them distinguish bad and good. The real 
problem is that human beings cannot satisfy all their desires, rather than that these 
desires themselves are bad or good. The problem of bad natural tendency may thus 
be dismissed in this way. 
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The process of self-cultivation is to inspire and nourish the good part of one’s 
natural tendency, and includes participating with tian and bringing order to the 
whole cosmos: ‘What the gentleman holds on to is the cultivation of his own 
character, yet this brings order to all under heaven.’ (Mencius 7B32) 
This process of self-cultivation is like following a path, one cannot be a sage or 
gentleman by practicing only one ethic: ‘He followed the path of morality. He did 
not just put morality into practice’ (Mencius 4B19). Humaneness is a general 
principle for people to follow humaneness rather than a concrete ethic one can 
practice. Also, from this we can tell that humanity and appropriateness are not norms 
that allow human beings to simply have them or to practice them for good fame. 
Humanity and appropriateness are processes that need each individual’s completion 
rather than being fixed states. All forms of rites as the concrete embodiment of 
humaneness and appropriateness are both organic and instrumental. It is li that gives 
basic structure and order to the internal family and external politics, and thus the 
discussion shifts to why people can choose and follow the way of li for a thousand 
years without the power of coercion.  
 
3.3 Dispositions and the Way of Humaneness and li  
 
Li, historically, did not need to be forcefully applied in society, and ancient Chinese 
thinkers give good reasons for this: most significantly, because li as the idea of 
appropriateness is derived from our dispositions. 
Based on the relationship between humans and tian, it is timing that humans have 
to follow. Timing can embodied in forms of rites, not only giving guidance to how 
to live a proper life, but also promoting order and a harmonious world. 
Humanness and li are correlative: there is no li without humaneness, and there is 
no humaneness without li. In contemporary life, it is pointless to follow all forms of 
rites, because those rites may be out of date and become unsuited to the modern 
world. In spite of this, the way of li which refers to the modest and sincere heart-
mind is still necessary, and needs to be followed in modern world. The forms of rites 
can be adapted with time, because the forms of rites are based on humans’ natural 
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dispositions. ‘Thus, the meaning of ritual is to nurture. The meat of pastured and 
grain-fed animals, rice and millet, blends and combinations of five flavors, are what 
nurture the mouth’ (Xunzi 19.2). Humans’ basic desires are first order, as they 
maintain their lives. Satisfying this first level, which cannot distinguish humans 
from animals, the second level is dispositions: humans can have dispositions towards 
others they love, these are also natural and necessary. The third level is li, which 
aims at regulating all these desires and dispositions in different levels, and 
maintaining harmony. Without this regulation, humans cannot be civilized by their 
natural dispositions, but likewise, if humans only follow the forms of rites without 
involving in their natural disposition, order and harmony will be obstructed: 
When one’s basic disposition overwhelms refinement, the person is boorish; 
when refinement overwhelms one’s basic disposition, the person is an 
officious scribe. It is only when one’s basic disposition and refinement are in 
appropriate balance that you have the exemplary person (Analects 6.18). 
It depicts how one should be balanced to follow one’s disposition and the forms of 
rites: the way of li should be based on both dispositions and refinement, and find an 
appropriate balance point.  
Although dispositions and natural tendency are interconnected, Xunzi 
distinguishes these two. It would appear that disposition (qing 情) is more connected 
with what is appropriate, for instance, qingli zhizhong 情理之中 which means to have 
an appropriate scope. Likewise, dispositions have an aspect of appropriating or 
timing.  Xunzi also endorses that what becomes the model is derived from 
dispositions:  
Now the state of becoming a teacher and the creation of a model are the result 
of accumulated effort and are not something received from one’s inborn 
nature,76 for inborn nature is inadequate to establish by itself a state of good 
order. ‘Inborn nature’ is what it is impossible for me to create but which I
                                                          
76 The original text is: 而师法者，所得乎情，非所受乎性。Which means the things which can be 
followed is from dispositions (qing 情) rather than one’s desires (xing 性). Here, xing is more 
close to desires rather than natural tendency. We can see that rites are based on one’s dispositions 
and play a role to regulate them.  
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 can nonetheless transform. ‘Accumulated effort’ consists in what I do not 
possess but can nonetheless create. It is by fixing the mind on the goal, 
devising ways and means to realize it, and effectuating it through the 
habituation of custom that the inborn nature is transformed (Xunzi 8.21). 
Once humans can follow the way of li for a long enough time, they will 
automatically use proper action in different circumstances. Unlike Mencius, who 
takes xing as a good tendency which can help people spontaneously choose what is 
good, Xunzi’s xing is more or less akin to desires. Eventually, Xunzi and Mencius 
choose to take disposition (qing) and natural tendency as following the way of li. 
But Xunzi especially emphasises the importance of accumulation, because he 
believes that one cannot spontaneously follow the way of li by merely following 
one’s dispositions. When one follows the way of li and keeps accumulating one’s 
dispositions, one can reach the level of humaneness, which is to have continuity 
between humans and tian: ‘When everything is unified and there is no duality, one 
can communicate with the Spiritual Intelligences and form a Triad with Heaven and 
Earth’ (Xunzi 8.21). This is a description of how humans and other beings can 
achieve harmony by following li, and the idea of humaneness is implied in this as 
well, because humaneness emphasizes how the self and others interact with each 
other and co-exist as a whole body. This is the level of humaneness which refers to 
the continuity between things; the other level is the humaneness borne from 
sympathy, and these two levels depict the process and aim of self-cultivation: self-
cultivation begins from one loving people who are close to oneself, and then 
expanding this love to others, and then to other things, in order to reach the level of 
continuity between humans and tian. This level of continuity is the achievement of 
self-cultivation.   
 
3.4 Heart-mind and the Way of li   
 
For Xunzi, li is also derived from distinguishing (bian 辨) between human beings 
and animals. Bian is the one ability that heart-mind has, which concretely means 
human beings’ ability to distinguish things: for instance, the different roles between 
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father and son, the difference between man and woman (Xunzi 5.9). Human beings 
realize these distinctions and then have divisions (fen) for different relationships; li 
then becomes important in our ordered life (Xunzi 5.10). That is why li is valuable 
for human beings to live in an ordered group. Since li is from the heart-mind’s 
ability to distinguish things, it explains why people have desires and are self-centred, 
but they nonetheless still accept li and other regulations. 
The ability to distinguish from the heart is a response to a dynamic dao of tian 
that also serves as the key to making possible the communication with tian. Human 
beings know the movements of the four seasons and plan according to the 
appropriate time, know the movements of yin and yang to act properly, and then 
develop relevant different kinds of rites to cooperate with an ordered life. 
Human beings use bian and fen to give structure and order to society, and this 
process is called li. ‘The Rituals contains the model for primary social distinctions 
and the categories used by analogical extension for the guiding rules and ordering 
norms of behaviour’ (Xunzi 1.8). Different with Confucius and Mencius, who 
approach li from inward humaneness and appropriateness, for Xunzi li is derived 
from the division of events; this can resonate with his specific relationship between 
tian and humans. The essential way to complete the continuity between tian and 
human beings consists in participating in li. 
Heaven and earth are the beginning of life. Ritual and moral principles are the 
beginning of order. The gentleman is the beginning of ritual and moral 
principles…Thus, heaven and earth give birth to the gentlemen, and the 
gentlemen provides the organizing principle for heaven and earth. The 
gentlemen is the triadic partner of heaven and earth. (Xunzi 9.18) 
The continuity between tian and humans is embodied in li, but in Xunzi’s case he 
did not make it clear whether commoners can have continuity with tian, while 
‘gentleman’ here clearly denotes the ruler. Li reflects that the human world endorses 
order, and the ruler can set up rites. These rites refers to social and political 
principles. Li have efficacy as well, which resembles tian, if human beings have to 
follow its rules. 
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When the world observes their precepts, there is order; when it does not, there 
is anarchy. When it observes them, there is safety; when it does not, there is 
danger. When it observes them, there is survival; when it does not, there is 
annihilation (Xunzi 19.7).  
This is how li accumulate authority and power. Just as tian can complete events, li 
can help people complete themselves as well. 
Order and chaos are the ideas of humans, these are interpretations of all-under-
tian from the perspective of humans. Humans need to use their heart-mind to 
distinguish order and chaos, to understand the timing of heaven and to follow the 
way of li. Having this kind of heart-mind is knowing heaven: ‘[understand] the 
division between Nature (tian) and mankind, then you can properly be called a 
“Perfect Man”’ (Xunzi 17.1). 
According to Xunzi the heart-mind can reflect things like a mirror, and it can also 
provide judgements about what is right and wrong. With the practice of following 
the way of li, the good can further be identified. The heart can know the world, but it 
must itself first be clear like the surface of still water.  
The human mind may be compared to a pan of water. If you place the pan 
upright and do not stir the water up, the mud will sink to the bottom, and the 
water on top will be clear and pure enough to see your beard and eyebrows and 
to examine the lines on your face. But if a slight wind passes over its surface, 
the submerged mud will be stirred up from the bottom, and the clarity and 
purity of the water at the top will be disturbed so that it is impossible to obtain 
the correct impression of even the general outline of the face. (Xunzi 21.11)  
For Xunzi, the highest level of heart is ‘emptiness, unity and stillness (xuyi yijing 虛
壹而靜)’ (Xunzi 21.8). On this level, the heart-mind is not blocked or covered: rather, 
it is absolutely clear, and human beings can thus restrain the unnecessary desires, 
and choose to practice li. In this realm, one can reflect all events, and then 
communicate and participate in harmony with tian. This is how Xunzi explains 
knowledge of dao: he describes the experience of knowing tian rather than telling 
people how the heart can know tian directly. In this tension between humans and 
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tian in Xunzi, it seems that there are some inward elements of the heart as well: the 
heart bridges the gap between human and tian. 
When the heart can reach such a level that our old perception does not block or 
disturb our new perception, emptiness (xu) is achieved. When our inside perceptions 
do not disturb each other, that is unity (yi). When the movements of heart do not 
disturb or harm our observation of stillness, that is stillness (jing).  
What do men use to know the way? I say that it is the mind. How does the 
mind know? I say by its emptiness, unity, and stillness. The mind never stops 
storing; nonetheless it possesses what is called emptiness. The mind never 
lacks duality; nonetheless it possesses what is called unity. The mind never 
stops moving; nonetheless it possesses what is called stillness (Xunzi 21.8). 
Xunzi may have inherited the idea of the empty heart-mind from Zhuangzi, but he 
also criticised Zhuangzi for being blinded by tian and being insensible to humans. 
Besides Zhuangzi, Xunzi also inherited the idea of heart-mind from Mencius. Xunzi 
therefore tried to combine the ideas of both the Ru school and Lao-Zhuang. The 
difference between Xunzi and Lao-Zhuang is that Xunzi still takes gaining new 
knowledge as important, even though they all hold that emptying the heart-mind is 
important. For Xunzi, emptying the heart-mind aims at knowing more without bias.  
Similar to how wuwei does not simply mean doing nothing, having an empty 
heart-mind does not mean that one stops thinking. Rather, for Xunzi, it means to not 
store and focus too much information, as this information may mislead you or make 
you stubborn and unable to acquire new knowledge. This is why Laozi and Zhuangzi 
claimed that it is better to go back to the state of an infant, as an infant does not store 
information, and by doing so they can actually learn faster and easier. In this way, 
the empty heart-mind can help people to better understand tian.  
The heart/mind that dwells within the central cavity is used to control five 
faculties—it is called “the lord provided by nature (tian).” The mind takes 
advantage of things not belonging to human species and uses them for the 
nourishment of humans—these are termed “the nourishment provided by 
nature.” The mind calls what conforms to properties of its category “fortunate” 
and what rebels against the properties of its category “cursed”—this is called 
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the “rule of order in nature.”… When his conduct is minutely controlled, his 
nourishment minutely moderated, and his life suffers no injury—this indeed is 
called “understanding nature” (Xunzi 17.4).    
Xunzi analyses humans’ natural tendency based on the possible bad outcomes, but 
he gives heart-mind an ability to control one’s other organs and regulate one’s 
different desires. This seems to lead to the conclusion that the way of self-cultivation 
is to cultivate one’s heart-mind to maintain an open-minded way without bias: this 
heart-mind not only has the epistemological ability of recognition, but also the moral 
ability to make a distinction between bad and good. Different from Mencius, who 
takes heart-mind as the foundation of good, for Xunzi it seems that heart-mind only 
plays a role that can regulate one’s behaviour and recognize what is good.  
What do I mean by what men hate? Baseness and recklessness, contention and 
plundering, and a rapacious appetite for profit are such. What do I mean by 
what men like? Ritual and moral principles, polite refusals and deference to 
others, and loyalty and trustworthiness are such (Xunzi 16.4)    
Although Xunzi does not directly refer to heart-mind here, because heart mind 
evidently serves as the organ with ‘a discriminating intelligence’ (Xunzi 23.19), it 
makes humans make the choice to be good and follow the way of li. 
For Xunzi, the heart-mind can also understand tian or dao (Xunzi 21.7), because 
the heart-mind knows dao, it can always follow the dao, and this further suggests 
that the heart-mind replaced shamans as the bridge connecting tian and humans. 
Human beings should always follow dao and tian, but because they only emulate 
one part of tian and dao, different schools have different interpretations of them. 
Zhuangzi already discussed (in the ‘Discussion on Making all Things Equal’) how 
different schools hold different opinions, but it is difficult to state which one accords 
with the way things really are, as people criticise others from different standpoints 
who do not agree with their own ideas. From this state of affairs, or argumentative 
stalemate, nothing will become clearer, as people are stubborn in what they already 
hold, which will produce fighting and chaos. 
Xunzi adopted Zhuangzi’s notion of ‘fasting the heart-mind’ and turned it into 
‘emptiness’ in order to say that although the different schools are blinded by their 
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own ideas and insensible to other ideas, emptiness (xu 虚) does not interfere with 
what is being received by the heart-mind, and the emptiness of our heart-mind can 
thus be of benefit in allowing us to gain new knowledge and knowing tian. 
In modern Chinese, emptiness is connected with the heart-mind, and in modern 
Chinese ‘xuxin 虚心’ means to not self-satisfy, and to always be humble in order to 
gain new knowledge. ‘Unity’ (yi 壹) means that one should focus when one studies 
new things: ‘yixin 一心’ in Chinese literally means ‘one heart-mind or absorbed’. 
‘Jingxin 静心’ literally means to ‘quiet one’s heart-mind or calm the heart-mind’. 
But, as Xunzi said, one has to confront the tension between emptiness and storing, 
unity and duality, stillness and moving. Storing, duality and moving are natural 
events that we cannot avoid, but we should not let these events block the way for us 
to gain new ideas and be flexible.  
Although Mencius did not present an explicit way to understand tian, he noticed 
that one could understand tian by instead analysing the heart-mind. 
For a man to give full realization to his heart is for him to understand his own 
nature (xing), and a man who knows his own nature will know [tian]. This 
retention of his heart and the nurturing of his nature are the means by which he 
serves heaven (Mencius 7A1).  
If one exhausts one’s heart, one can know xing and tian because they share one 
pattern or principle. Zhu Xi comments: 
Xin is the clairvoyance of humans, that is why it has many different patterns 
but it can nonetheless give an appropriate response to different circumstances. 
Xing is the pattern of xin, tian is where this pattern comes from. If humans 
have this kind of heart-mind, then one can know everything (tian).77  
From the perspective of principle or pattern, it is tian; from the perspective of 
embodiment, it is natural tendency, and from the perspective of preservation or 
storage, it is heart-mind. Therefore tian, natural tendency and heart-mind are a unity.  
                                                          
77 Zhu Xi, Sishu zhangju jizhu, [The Commentary on the Four Books] (Beijing: zhonghua shuju 
chubanshe, 2003), 349. 
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Xunzi therefore still takes the continuity of humans and tian as the structure of 
his idea; his division between human and tian is actually the beginning of the 
process of continuity, as the human has to have a singular heart and then practice 
their ‘emptiness, unity and stillness’ to know tian, and participate in the movement 
of tian. Finally, Xunzi’s notion of heart moved to an inward direction from the level 
of perception. 
Xin reshapes our rough dispositions through the ability of distinguishing and 
understanding, playing an important role to regulate desires. Xin gives the possibility 
of letting humans act according to timing, which then allows them to live in an 
ordered and harmonious society. 
Timing is the significant content of the way of li. In the case of how to follow 
different forms of li, Confucius suggests that humans should use their heart-mind to 
make the proper judgement and choice that follows timing: 
The use of a hemp cap is prescribed in the observance of ritual propriety. 
Nowadays, that a silk cap is used instead is a matter of frugality. I would 
follow accepted practice on this. A subject kowtowing on entering the hall is 
prescribed in the observance of ritual propriety. Nowadays that one kowtows 
only after ascending the hall is a matter of hubris. Although it goes contrary to 
accepted practice, I still kowtow on entering the hall (Analects 9.3).  
When Confucius makes a decision about how to follow the way of li; in either 
following or being against what the majority does, Confucius follows the way that 
he thinks is appropriate. What is more important for Confucius is the idea of li rather 
than the concrete rites, these concrete rites can always change and adapt with 
different period of time. What is important for Confucius is the inward sincerity of 
heart-mind.  
According to A. C. Graham, Mencius and Zhuangzi shifted attention inward to 
the heart-mind in ‘the discovery of subjectivity’78. But this subjectivity does not 
have the same meaning in China as it does in the West. Chinese thinkers noticed an 
inward heart, but this idea of heart-mind is far different to Descartes’s purely 
                                                          
78 A. C Graham, Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China (Chicago: Open 
Court, 1989), 95. 
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thinking subject: Chinese thinkers always propound the continuity of heart-mind and 
the body. One cannot talk about the body without the heart, and vice versa, it is the 
same in the case of humans and tian. Hence, the narrative beginning with ‘correcting 
heart-mind’ progresses to having to ‘be sincere in one’s will’, ‘cultivating one’s 
body’, ‘completing and giving order to one’s family’, ‘giving order to the state’ and 
then ‘completing all under heaven’ (Daxue.10). 
 
3.5 Order, li and Self-cultivation  
 
Li brings order to the socio-political, and human beings accept the way of li. In the 
non-transcendent context, it is a question of whether gaining order is a natural 
process or an outcome of education. ‘When human character is perceived within a 
temporal setting as an achievement in process, human social order, especially the 
state, is understood primarily as a historical achievement.’79 
Disagreeing with the idea of an organic theory which holds that humans are 
political and social animals by nature, James D. Sellmann argued that social and 
political order in the pre-Qin context was not a consequence of natural development. 
Rather, the state should be seen to reflect a spontaneous order developed out of the 
habit of humanity and sympathy. Nor, however, is a solely instrumental theory 
appropriate as an explanation, as Pre-Qin thought lacks the explicit idea of a 
contract. Sellmann thus proposes an organic instrumental theory.80 As the source of 
li is involved in both dispositions and the ability of the heart-mind, in addition to 
Xunzi promoting the importance of accumulation and study, organic instrumental 
theory can explain the process of gaining order. 
Humans’ heart-minds can only distinguish things, but also have the will to 
practice themselves by following the way of li spontaneously. Such practice and 
learning is essential for Confucianism, it is learning how to follow li, it ‘disciplines 
[one’s] behaviour through the observance of ritual propriety’ (Analects 9.11, 6.27). 
                                                          
79 James D. Sellmann, Timing and Rulership in Master Lu’s Spring and Autumn Annals (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 2002), 67. 
80 Sellmann, Timing and Rulership in Master Lu’s Spring and Autumn Annals, 71. 
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Do not look at anything that violates the observance of ritual propriety; do not 
listen to anything that violates the observance of ritual propriety; do not speak 
anything that violates the observance of ritual propriety; do not do anything 
that violates the observance of ritual propriety (Analects 12.1).  
The refined natural emotions of humans come forth first, and li comes after that, 
‘observing ritual propriety itself comes after’ (Analects 3.8). 
Xunzi developed Mencius’s idea about achieving order through li, and he points 
out that achieving order is also a way to participate in the continuity of humans and 
tian. ‘Heaven has its seasons; earth has its resources, and the human has his 
government (zhi 治)’81 (Xunzi 17.2). But Xunzi does not describe further details 
about the ordered cosmos.  
In Master Lu’s Spring and Autumn Annals, there is a correlative relationship 
between cosmos order and li of cultivation. Li is based on natural tendency and 
because the highest level of self-cultivation is in participation with tian, and gives 
order to tian, natural tendency is thus the beginning of everything. In this 
cosmology, humans and cosmos are correlative: the order of humans’ world is the 
beginning of ordered tian. 
Great fame and significant titles cannot be aggressively sought. They must be 
acquired by according with the right Way. The means to put things in order 
(zhi) does not lie in the things, but lies in people. The means to put people in 
order does not lie in them, but lies in the rulers. The means to put the rulers in 
order does not lie in them, but lies in the Son of Heaven. The means to put the 
Son of Heaven in order does not lie in the Son of Heaven, but lies in his 
desires. The means to put the desires in order does not lie in the desires, but 
lies in the character (xing 性). Xing is the root of the myriad things. It cannot 
be lengthened; it cannot be shortened (in degree). Going with what is 
                                                          
81 Seasons are shi, zhi 治, I think it is better translated as order, because zhi especially means 
ordered and harmony government. 
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inherently so, and recognizing it as so, these are the natural degrees (shu) from 
heaven and earth.82  
As li is based on a correlative cosmos, practicing li not only endorses the harmony 
among human beings but also contributes to an ordered cosmos. Given the division 
between human and tian, one can live in harmony within tian by practicing li. ‘The 
chilly winds come. The white dew falls. The cicada of the cold chirps. Then, hawks 
sacrifice birds. This is the time to begin the practice of punishments and 
executions.’83 
For the Ru school, the way to complete and fulfil oneself is to cultivate oneself: 
one can then give order to one’s family, and then one can give order to all under 
tian. Self-cultivation then assumes an essential role in the political order. If each 
individual self maintains self-cultivation, then all-under-tian will have order easily. 
Hence, the ideal political model relies on the completion of self-cultivation. Also, 
this self-cultivation focuses on extension, letting all humans take the responsibility 
of humaneness. This expansion is from the self to one’s family members, and then to 
respect one’s neighbour, and then strangers. Confucianism maintains that this 
cultivation can and should be completed and practiced by everybody (everybody has 
the ability), ‘from the son of heaven to commoners, all need to take self-cultivation 
as the foundation’ (Daxue).  
According to Graham Parkes, when people practice rituals, they will have the 
feeling of awe and humility.84 If I may expand on this a little bit further, the 
fundamental reason that humans have this feeling of awe is because such li is based 
on humaneness in Chinese thought, and this humaneness always has the basic 
assumption of obeying and following tian. Humaneness is derived from tian as well. 
As Zhang Xianglong maintains, tian is the original source of all philosophical 
                                                          
82 Sellmann, Timing and Rulership in Master Lu’s Spring and Autumn Annals, 50. 
83 Ibid., 56. 
84 Graham Parkes, “Awe and Humility in the Face of Things: Somatic Practice in East-Asian 
Philosophies” Eur. J. for Philosophy of Religion (Autumn 2012): 69-88. 
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questions.85 All such Chinese thinking patterns are from tian, and thus humaneness 
in the Chinese context, as Parkes holds, is not human-centred. Rather, because 
humans are from tian they are thereby indebted to tian. Li also give efficacy: if 
people follow them, they will gain luck, if not they will have disaster. This, then, is 
why humans are in awe in the practicing of li. 
Under this thinking pattern, Chinese thinkers extend such awe towards tian and 
parents, and ultimately to the ruler, in order to structure a coherent political system. 
This state is more or less intended to function like a large and harmonious family. 
There is also the concept of all-under-tian, which is different from the state. For 
Mencius, one can have a state without humaneness, but one cannot have all-under-
tian without humaneness (Mencius 7B13). D.C. Lau translates tianxia as Empire, I 
would advocate that all-under-tian is a better term, because tianxia is an ideal 
political term for the Ru school. It is believed that if the ruler applies humaneness in 
his governing and gains the commoners’ heart-mind, they will attain tianxia 
(Mencius 4A3, 4A9). Even Legalism discusses the gaining of the heart-mind of 
commoners as well, although for Legalism the method of gaining such a heart-mind 
is quite different from the Ru school.  
Dong Zhongshu developed a similar structure for the world of tian affairs and the 
world of human affairs: the analogy of a continuity between humans and tian works 
not only in the context of the human’s body but also in the context of the human’s 
emotions. Humans and tian share the same emotions, and since tian is good, Dong 
maintained this as the reason explaining how humans can be good.  
Beneficence, rewards, punishments, and executions match spring, summer, 
autumn, and winter respectively, like the fitting together of a tally. Therefore I 
say that the king is co-equal with Heaven, meaning that Heaven has four 
seasons, while the king has four ways of government. Such are what Heaven 
and man share in common.86 Chunqiu Fanlu 
                                                          
85 Refer to appendix for a translation from Zhang’s book: Haidegeer he zhongguo tiandao 
[Heidegger and Chinese Tiandao], he clarifies that heaven is the source for Chinese thought.  
86 Youlan Feng and Derk Bodde, A History of Chinese Philosophy (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1983), 48. 
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For Dong the correspondence between human and tian is based on yin and yang: 
both humans and tian have yin and yang. Yin and yang interact with each other, and 
this process is the movement of humans and tian. This is a correlative cosmos model 
based on the idea that members of the same categories affect each other. Dong then 
applied this correspondence to political practice: when there are natural disasters or 
strange natural phenomena, it is because the ruler has not performed adequately; 
when the weather is good, it is suggested that the ruler is good. 
The constant principle of Dao of heaven is the succession of Yin and Yang. 
The Yang is Heaven’s beneficent force, while the Yin is its chastising 
force…heaven has its own feelings of joy and anger, and a mind which 
experiences sadness and pleasure, analogous to those of man. Thus if a 
grouping is made according to kind, Heaven and man are one.87 Chunqiu 
Fanlu  
Even though Dong’s structure of continuity between human and tian puts tian on a 
supreme level, and gives authority to the ruler, Dong still thinks that the power of 
the ruler should nonetheless also be restrained by tian, as tian can show its will 
through natural disaster or strange natural phenomena. When there is a natural 
disaster or strange phenomenon, it is an instance of the humaneness of tian for 
Dong, because it means that tian is not satisfied with the ruler: tian is thereby being 
humane to its humans. The commoners’ will embodied tian’s will, and tian rewards 
or punishes the ruler depending on whether the ruler supports or violates the 
commoners’ will. In this way, it seems that Dong’s understanding of the meaning of 
tian has many different perspectives and functions, but he still takes tian as a whole, 
and it seems that he does not clearly take this as a problem. This, however, is not 
only a problem that can be traced to Dong, or even relegated to Chinese philosophy 
in general. In Chinese thought, tian always has both sacred and secular parts, in a 
holistic manner.  
This examination of various ideas from ancient Chinese thinkers and modern 
contributors shows that the continuity of human beings and tian exists in socio-
                                                          
87 Yu-lan Fung, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy (Washington, D.C.: Free Press, 1997), 193. 
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political patterns as well. One can achieve small tranquillity by following the way of 
li, and achieve great union by following the way of humaneness, and then by 
participating with tian in harmony. Even though human beings have spontaneous 
goodness towards others, this does not necessarily lead to good outcomes, and Xunzi 
and Mencius rather focus on how to have good and ordered socio-political patterns 
instead of what is the good or the bad itself. Li as an overlapping point not only 
helps people with self-cultivation in their realm of life, but also gives order to 
society and politics. It is recognized that even though Xunzi’s philosophy has a bad 
reputation of ‘bad human natural tendency’, Xunzi’s discussion of heart-mind still 
gives humans a good reason to follow the way of li. A question arises here whether 
the individual or self will be dismissed if people are overly focused on order or 
harmony, and this is the topic of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4: Towards Order and Harmony between Person and 
Community    
 
Person is the subject of practice or self-cultivation and the concrete context of li. 
Person is actually the beginning of order and harmony, rather than the centre of it. 
Self-cultivation is the first step towards order, involving different relationships with 
others in the community, and selfhood interweaves the concrete structures of order 
inside the community.   
 
4.1 Person as the Beginning of Self-cultivation   
 
One’s natural tendency is inward, and disposition is outward appearance. Both 
natural tendency and disposition give people reasons to be good. Zhu Xi claimed 
that the body of the heart-mind is natural tendency, the application of heart-mind is 
dispositions, and he also uses the metaphor of water to demonstrate this relationship 
between these three: heart-mind is akin to water, with natural tendency resembling 
water that is still, and disposition resembling water that is flowing. Heart as the 
perceptive organ for the self not only has the function of what Mencius called ‘the 
heart of shame’ and ‘the heart of empathy’, but can also regulate natural tendency 
and disposition: the process of function in one’s heart-mind is the process of self 
cultivation, one’s self cultivation is not only involved in bodily being there and 
acting as such, but is also involved in sincerity.    
   Disposition for Feng Youlan (who is influenced by Western thought) is mainly 
negative, this is why he maintains that humans should overcome the refrain of 
disposition which mainly brings on pain and worry. This negative disposition is 
derived from Zhuangzi. Unlike Zhuangzi, who maintains that we should be 
‘disposition free’, Feng concludes that we need to maintain ‘no self’ in this way to 
avoid such pain. But this freedom from disposition does not mean that one is 
emotionless, rather, it is that one should use knowledge to control one’s emotion. 
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   Meng Peiyuan and Huang Yushun maintain that Feng only focuses on the ‘small 
self’ which mainly takes disposition as a personal negativity. However, disposition 
can actually be positive. This positive disposition is the spontaneous goodness 
towards others, such as loving one’s parents and, as in the example, saving the child 
who falls into the well. This kind of disposition is the most fundamental for 
Confucianism rather than filial piety. Because this positive disposition is the root for 
Confucianism, one can expand this disposition to all kinds of things and tian. 
If the order of society is based on li, then humans only need to follow the 
framework of li. The process of following li in this sense is a process that completes 
one’s personhood. Confucianism does not explicitly discuss the topic of subjecthood, 
but we can still discover how Confucianism views this topic by analysing the 
relevant words, and seeing whether it is person-focused. These words, for instance, 
are ‘body’ (shen), ‘wants’ (yu), ‘like’ (hao 好), ‘dislike’ (wu 恶), ‘heart-mind’ (xin 
心) and ‘I’ or ‘me’ (wo 我, wu 吾), this person is not separate mind and body, rather, 
it is a whole idea with all desires and other elements inside. Self-cultivation is 
xiushen 修身: one needs to take care of one’s behaviour to reach a higher realm of 
life, all of these behaviours are completed by one’s body with a particular emphasis 
on the body’s heart-mind88. Wants or desires, for Confucianism, can include not 
only our desires for refined foods and wealth but also humaneness (Analects 7.30) 
and li (Mencius 6A10). When Confucianism uses the term ‘wo’, it is either 
describing a subject that can have behaviours, or an egoistic self which needs to be 
overcome (Analects 9.4). What people really enjoy are li (Analects 1.15) and 
humaneness (Analects 4.6), and this understanding of person in Confucianism is 
highly connected with li and humaneness, to the point where following the way of li 
and humaneness is the process whereby each person attains selfhood. This is a 
process of denying and overcoming some part of the self in order to realise the better 
part of ‘selfhood’, and while this process will conclude at the end of each 
                                                          
88  See Analects 1.4: ‘Daily I examine my person (shen 身) on three counts. In my undertakings on 
behalf of other people, have I failed to do my utmost?’ Body in this connection not only involves 
one’s physical body but also one’s reflection from one’s mind.    
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individual’s life span, the idea of humaneness and li will persist with other peoples’ 
lives. 
The self develops its perspective on society when one participates in socio-
political action. One can also be integrated into a holistic selfhood when one 
cultivates oneself: those two different perspectives can be integrated in li, because li 
not only plays a role in giving order in the socio-political pattern, it also works in 
one’s self-cultivation to improve one’s realm of life. Li shapes the person in both the 
cultural and socio-political spheres, and from analysing li, one can see how the 
person can realise greater personhood through playing one’s roles inside the family 
and society. 
The process of self-cultivation is also a process of self-critique: it always 
maintains a tension between one’s realistic situation and ideal personhood. The 
process of cultivating oneself is not only a process towards critiquing oneself, there 
is also a continuity between the realistic situation of the person and the ideal 
personhood, because cultivating oneself is a process of the development of the 
potential goodness from the person, and when one fulfils one’s potential goodness, 
one can release greater personhood. If sages and gentlemen seem as if they have no 
potential choice that comes from themselves or are called ‘selfless’, it is because 
their realm of life has reached such a level that their action can always follow li, and 
these actions are also derived from their heart-mind. The process of their action is 
also to follow the way of choice, but this choice is based on self-soing. Even though 
it seems that sages and gentlemen only follow the way of li, rather than their own 
desires and wills, it is rather the case that li is based on the natural feeling of humans, 
for instance, caring for parents and other family members. The reason that people 
need to follow li is therefore because they need to regulate their different feelings 
and desires, and follow the middle way. For Confucius himself, ‘from sixty [his] ear 
was attuned; from seventy [he] could give [his] heart-and-mind free rein without 
overstepping the boundaries’ (Analects 2.4). The process of self-cultivation is a 
process of following one’s heart-mind, and a process strengthening the goodness of 
oneself. 
As Yang Guorong writes: 
87 
 
When one identifies oneself in relation to society, it is based on the realisation 
of oneself: the process of identifying with society is completed by self. Then 
the process of one identifying oneself with society and the process of one 
having one’s idea of “oneself” are actually two perspectives of one process.89  
These two different perspectives depict how ‘self’ cannot be separated from concrete 
society, and how society cannot be separated from each concrete ‘self’. There is no 
abstract self in China, the self is always understood through society. 
Since it seems as though Confucianism does not give people the free will to make 
their own choices (because people have to follow the strict roles and li when they are 
dealing with their relationship with others), there could arise the problem of a 
weakening of the self in the modern world, as Confucianism is a form of thought 
which can cooperate with time, and a thinking that contributes to politics and society. 
It will therefore be valuable to consider a new, contemporary way of approaching 
the self in Confucianism. Zhang Desheng argues that because Confucianism focuses 
on order it is easy for it to have a structural bias, that is, that it sees roles rather than 
individuals.90 This way, the individual and concrete father can die, but the role of 
father can keep going, and when only order is preferred, individual’s rights may be 
dismissed in several ways. Is it true, then, that because order is preferred in 
Confucianism, it cannot guarantee private rights? 
When there is no dao, individuals should keep an independent character rather 
than staying inside the monarchy and losing oneself: this serves as one way to keep 
their dignity. Confucius endorsed a singular self and individual value, for instance, 
that ‘[e]xemplary persons make demands on themselves, while petty persons make 
demands on others’ (Analects 15.21). The exemplary person has a strong heart-mind 
and can reflect inwardly for self-support rather than relying on some outside power, 
and this self is therefore self-dependent and endorses self-ability. This is why 
Mencius likewise maintains the importance of being an independent ‘great man’.  
                                                          
89 Yang Guorong, Lunli yu cunzai [Ethics and Existence] (Shanghai: Huadong shifan daxue 
chubanshe, 2009), 20-21. 
90 Zhang Desheng, Rujia Lunli yu Shehui Zhixu [Confucian Ethics and Social Order] (Shanghai: 
shanghai renming chubanshe, 2008), 115. 
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A man lives in the spacious dwelling, occupies the proper position, and goes 
along the highway of the Empire (tianxia). When he achieves his ambition he 
shares these with the people; when he fails to do so he practices the Way alone. 
He cannot be led into excess when wealthy and honoured or deflected from his 
purpose when poor and obscure, nor can he be made to bow before superior 
force. This is what I would call a great man (dazhangfu 大丈夫). (Mencius 3B2) 
This great man has an independent character and the strong will to serve for the dao. 
The value of an individual is not a matter of wealth, it is concerned with how people 
can control the desire for material things and become masters of themselves. Xunzi 
makes this clear when he discusses how one should cultivate oneself. 
If the mind is serene and happy, then colors that are less than ordinary can 
nurture the eye. Sounds that are less than average can nurture the mouth. 
Robes of coarse cloth and shoes of rough hemp can nurture the body. And a 
cramped room, reed blinds, a bed of dried straw, plus a stool and mat can 
nurture the bodily frame. Thus, even without enjoyment of all the beautiful 
things of the world, he can nurture his happiness. With no position of authority 
and rank, he can nurture his reputation. In the case of such men, were they 
given the whole world, although it might mean much to the world, it would 
mean little to their peace and happiness. This indeed may be called “oneself 
and making a servant of things.” (Xunzi 22.17)      
For Xunzi, making oneself a servant of things is not valuable: one should rather 
strengthen oneself, and be the master of things. In any case the gentleman should 
serve for the dao, not for wealth or other private interests, and doing so one can be 
independent. Like Confucius, Xunzi maintains that studying and learning is for 
oneself or one’s own sake: ‘the learning of the gentleman is used to refine his 
character’ (Xunzi 1.10). Xunzi not only values the cultivation of self, but he also 
values individual life. 
Thus men prize nothing so highly as life and enjoy nothing more than peace. 
Among the things used to nurture life and bring about the enjoyment of peace, 
they consider nothing as important as ritual and moral principles. (Xunzi 16.4)  
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The self needs to complete the aim of ‘[bringing] peace and contentment to the aged, 
to share relationships of trust and confidence with [one’s] friends, and to love and 
protect the young’ (Analects 5.26). Confucians always stress ethics and self-
cultivation as originating from the self and as the centre of ethics. As Mencius said: 
‘All under heaven has its basis in the state, the state in the family, and the family in 
one’s own self’ (Mencius 4A5). When Confucius discusses practice and learning, he 
maintains that it is ‘for [the] self’ (Analects 14.24). Herbert Fingarette writes that the 
self is inside of li: ‘[Confucius] talks of what it is to be man, and he sees that man is 
a special being with a unique dignity and power deriving from and embedded in 
li.’91 
Self-cultivation begins ‘through self-discipline (keji 克己) and observing ritual 
propriety’ (Analects 12.1), and having both is called humaneness. On the basic level, 
human beings love and care for their own family: this is appropriate behaviour for 
Confucianism. Confucians also highlight the need to have another level, which is 
keji, literally meaning ‘to overcome oneself’ which is to overcome the ‘small self’ or 
the desires from oneself which are not good for one to follow the way of 
humaneness, and expand one’s love and caring to more people outside their families 
which is called ‘bigger self’. One can thereby expand familial love to other people or 
even to other things. This love, however, is not equally expanded towards different 
people or things, as people have different emotional responses towards different 
people and things.  
A gentleman is sparing (ai 爱) with living creatures but shows no benevolence 
towards them; he shows benevolence towards the people but is not attached 
(qin 亲) to them. He is attached to his parents but is merely benevolent 
towards the people; he is benevolent towards the people but is merely sparing 
with living creatures. (Mencius 7A45) 
Qin as the love inside one’s family is biased and only based on clan and lineage; in 
this respect Mencius distinguishes between humaneness and Qin. For him, 
humaneness is closer to a natural sympathy towards people which is beyond qin, and 
                                                          
91 Herbert Fingarette, Confucius: The Secular As Sacred (New York City: Harper & Row, 1972), 76. 
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it is more specific than the spontaneous feeling of sympathy, because humaneness is 
always combined with appropriateness92. Also, it seems that Mencius mentions that 
qin is the beginning of humaneness and loving other things, and so one cannot skip 
qin and go to the level of humaneness. 
All moral values in Confucianism are derived from self-cultivation, but this self is 
not equivalent to the self of Western individualism. Rather, Confucianism builds its 
holistic social and political structure beginning from the first person’s spontaneous 
feeling. For Confucianism, this structure begins from the self but assigns values in 
the relationship with others in a community, people in this structure have to 
overcome themselves (keji) or go beyond self-love, which is too close to only loving 
one’s own family to cooperate with others. 
When Confucius discusses ‘no self’, he is critiquing an ‘existent self’ rather than 
a holistic self: ‘he was not self-absorbed’ (Analects 9.4). The reason for such 
criticism is to realise oneself and to achieve completion in oneself, rather than being 
a straightforward dismissal of selfhood:  
It is not worth talking to a man who has no respect for himself, and it is not 
worth the trouble to make a common effort with a man who has no confidence 
in himself… Benevolence is man’s peaceful abode and rightness his proper 
path. It is indeed lamentable for anyone not to live in his peaceful abode and 
not to follow his proper path (Mencius 4A10).   
Hall and Ames uses the notion of focus and field to explain the relationship between 
self and expanded union: ‘the focus-field model results from understanding one’s 
relation to the world to be constituted by acts of contextualization. The self is focal 
in that it both constitutes and is constituted by the field in which it resides.’93 This 
shows in a clear manner how the self can cooperate with others, and that there is no 
tension present as there is in Western individualism. Yu Yingshi and W.M. 
                                                          
92 ‘Benevolence is man’s peaceful abode and rightness is his proper path.’ Mencius 4A10 
‘Benevolence is the heart of man, and rightness his road.’ Mencius 6A11 
93 David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, Thinking from the Han: Self, Truth, and Transcendence in 
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Theodore De Bary maintain that the self or individual of Confucianism should be 
understood through personalism rather than individualism. 
Confucius proceeds from a moral and individual perspective rather than an 
epistemological perspective. The individual in Confucianism is always connected 
with other people. Self-cultivation is always based on improving the relationships 
with other people in a community. ‘They cultivate themselves by bringing accord to 
the people’ (Analects 14.42). 
The content of self-cultivation is also included:  
Daily I examine my person on three counts. In my understanding on behalf of 
other people, have I failed to do my utmost? In my interactions with 
colleagues and friends, have I failed to make good on my word? In what has 
been passed on to me, have I failed to carry it into practice?’ (Analects 1.4).  
This self-cultivation is a process of self-completion, but the ‘self’ here embodies the 
value from connections and having relationships with other people in a harmonious 
community. 
For Confucianism, self is not an abstract form of completing or perfecting oneself, 
rather, it is a process that both begins with one’s life and ends in one’s life, as the 
individual has limited life span. As Yang Guorong puts it: ‘Confucius finds value in 
the continued individuals’ life and the continued history (continued culture).’94 It is, 
then, difficult to concede that Confucianism has a transcendent outlook, since the 
ideas of Confucius rely on each concrete individual in their own circumstance: hence 
Confucius was not interested in discussing the question of life after death. But this 
does not mean Confucianism does not concern itself with the value of limited life. 
Rather, for Confucianism, people not only have the perspectives of individuals but 
also the view of groupings or the community: in the history of humans, even though 
individual humans die, the idea of filial piety exists in life, and this idea of caring 
exists in each human’s concrete life.  
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92 
 
One issue raised by Hans Georg Moeller is that the family is incapable of being 
the root for modern society, which goes against the continuity between humans and 
tian:  
While social systems such as the family still exist, they are no longer the ‘root’ 
of social life – to use an old Confucian metaphor. Functional differentiation is 
based on the non-hierarchical co-existence of a multiplicity of social systems, 
and individuals cannot but divide themselves into multiple social agencies if 
they want to take part in contemporary social life. Therefore, the vision of 
‘organismic unity’ seems not to be ‘unimaginable’, but simply structurally 
impossible – at least for today.95 
Liu Qingping also maintains that Confucianism is mainly focused on a family virtue 
rather than a public one, which could therefore be a problem for modern society and 
politics.96 One can respond to these criticisms by highlighting that even though 
Confucius espouses filial piety in a very important way, that does not mean that filial 
piety is the root for other forms of ethics or humaneness; ‘As for filial and fraternal 
responsibility, it is, I suspect, the root (本) of authoritative conduct’ (Analects 1.2). 
Here ben is translated as ‘root’: if filial piety is the root of humaneness, there would 
be a tension between filial piety and general humaneness when people need to make 
to a choice between loving family members and loving strangers, and it may also in 
this way conflict with a modern social structure if filial piety is the root.97 But ben 
also has the meaning of beginning or origin. Taken this way, the whole sentence 
would instead mean that filial piety is the beginning rather than the root of 
humaneness, implying that the position of filial piety is more important than 
humaneness for Confucius. This explanation is also compatible with ‘correlating 
one’s conduct with those near at hand [which] can be said to be the method of 
                                                          
95 Hans-Georg Moeller, “New Confucianism and the Semantics of Individuality. A Luhmannian 
Analysis”, Asian Philosophy 2004(14): 25–39. 
96 Liu Qingping, “Lun kongmeng ruxue de xueqin tuantixing tezheng” [The Character of 
Consanguinity in the Analects and Mencius], Zhexuemen, 2001(1): 73-82. 
97 This tension is from ‘love one’s self and one’s family’ and ‘love strangers’, loving one’s self and 
family is from filial piety, loving strangers is from humaneness.   
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becoming an authoritative person’ (Analects 6.30). As for most people, parents are 
the first people with whom they begin their spontaneous goodness, which belongs to 
the ‘small self’. After this initial point, they can show their more general 
humaneness to strangers, which belongs to the ‘bigger self’. Filial piety is then the 
beginning of humaneness rather than the root of it. 
In the context of the continuity between tian and human beings, the self cannot be 
equivalent to the self of Western individualism; rather, this view of self shows that 
Confucianism begins its thought from daily life, and then expands to participate with 
tian. Rather than defining a clear line with others, the self in Confucianism always 
tries to inter-relate with others in a proper time and to follow a proper way (li). 
One should always try to perfect oneself: this has been elaborated as ‘creative 
transformation’ by Tu Weiming. This creative transformation is fundamentally 
derived from li. Herbert Fingarette instead promotes the importance of li also, 
balancing humaneness and li in his theory, and making it clear that li can endorse 
dignity for individuals within the community. Tu Weiming has criticised Herbert 
Fingarette for weakening the role of inward humaneness, and because of this it is 
easy to turn li into a totally empty form.98 Even though Tu Weiming still takes 
humaneness as the most foundational idea for Confucianism, and disagrees with 
Fingarette, who holds that there is no inward self in Confucianism, he still admits the 
importance of li, and maintains that li should always be accompanied by 
humaneness.99 Li and humaneness are correlative: humaneness without li is too 
abstract and empty; li without humaneness only leaves empty forms. Humaneness 
produces the inward possibility for human beings to accept following the way of li, 
and to complete themselves; li gives human beings a road to walk in the direction of 
both humaneness and to complete oneself and participate with tian. 
Self-cultivation is learning the realm of life for one’s own sake, but Confucianism 
is concerned not only with self perfection but also with serving others. In this way, 
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self-cultivation is always based on building a better relationship with others in a 
community, rather than being a merely isolated cultivation. 
This self does not endorse the tension between the self’s and others’ values; 
rather, it is a process of the self finding its ordered group, and then finding its value 
within this community. But this does not mean that the individual does not have any 
meaning; it is rather that this system endorses both self and group values, as one has 
to self-cultivate to keep harmony in society. Self-value and dignity are embodied in 
moments when one wants humaneness, and humaneness is dependent upon one’s 
own will, ‘no sooner do I seek it than it has arrived.’ (Analects 7.30) Self also has a 
strong will from inside: ‘common peasants cannot be deprived of their purposes’ 
(Analects 9.26). 
Confucius’s encouragement of one’s working or even sacrificing oneself for 
humaneness is more or less a means of promoting the expansion of group value; but 
this group should cooperate with dao, likewise, one should not serve the ruler 
without dao. In this respect, it is important to highlight that humans’ dignity is also 
embodied when they choose not to serve.100 
The self of Confucianism is close to the concept of self in communitarianism, 
insofar as the Confucian self is always concrete in the context and relationship with 
others. This does not mean, however, that Confucianism promotes the view that 
individuals should sacrifice their individual good for common good: it is always 
important to complete oneself, and sometimes family obligations have priority 
compared with serving authority. 
Even though the self of Confucianism is always in context, this self is also based 
on a universal assumption of human nature, that human nature is good. This self or 
individual, even though it can be independent, is different from the self in 
communitarianism (which is more focused on sociology). Even though 
Confucianism may not intend to be a universalism, it still holds an assumption of 
unified natural tendency. Confucians not only take each family, ethnicity, state and 
culture as one community, but also our lived world as a holistic all-under-tian.  
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Because all people have spontaneous kindness, they will thus take other people’s 
suffering as their own, and aim for the creative perfecting of all-under-tian. It is only 
when everything is in harmony in all-under-tian that it can be taken that self-
cultivation has been completed.  
 
4.2 Between Private and Public within the Community 
 
The notion of self also has some relation to the Chinese word si 私, which has the 
meaning of selfishness or the private part of the self. Si is a state in which one’s love 
only exists in one’s family and one cannot expand this love to others; the opposite 
word is gong 公 which means ‘selfless’, or the part that one can sacrifice for public 
interests; at a stage where one can expand one’s love to others.  
If one approaches Confucianism from the West, it may appear not to have a 
private sphere since Chinese traditional thought does not promote the idea of the 
absolute individual.  For Chinese scholars, however, they critique Confucianism for 
not having the idea of a public sphere, because it is too focused on ethics in small 
groups. 
Even though Confucianism did not discuss the topic of such a public and private 
problem directly, there are examples about the tension between private and public 
concerning rulers, caring about the family (qinqin 亲亲) and respecting morally 
superior people (zunxian 尊贤). It thus seems that Confucianism noticed, in some 
respect, this problem. As Mencius writes: 
Tao Ying asked, ‘When Shun was emperor and Kao Yao was the judge, if the 
Blind Man killed a man, what was to be done?’ ‘The only thing to do was to 
apprehend him.’ ‘In that case, would Shun not try to stop it?’ ‘How could 
Shun stop it? Kao Yao had authority for what he did.’ ‘Then what would Shun 
have done?’ ‘Shun looked upon casting aside the empire as no more than 
discarding a worn shoe. He would have secretly carried the old man on his 
back and fled to the edge of the sea and lived there happily, never giving a 
thought to the empire.’ (Mencius 7A35) 
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Mencius noticed the tension between filial piety (si) and justice (gong), and also that 
Shun (as a ruler), if he insists on arresting his own father, goes against filial piety. 
Mencius’s answer could be explained as either avoiding a response to this tension by 
saying that Shun gives up the throne, or that Mencius took filial piety as more 
important than being a ruler and serving other people. In this paragraph the focus is 
on Shun rather than his father, who has killed one person. From this perspective, 
Shun cannot disturb the judge as a ruler (the son of tian), but also, emotionally, he 
cannot discard his father and allow him to be arrested by the judge. This does not 
mean that Shun could not distinguish justice from injustice: his decision to flee from 
the judge means that he noticed he could not use his public political power to protect 
his guilty father. Deng Xiaomang analyses the example from the focus that Shun’s 
father killed people and harmed other peoples’ interests. He maintains that the idea 
of covering for a criminal father can lead to the problem of corruption, 
Confucianism therefore needs to take responsibility for corruption101.  
Guo Qiyong and Ding Weixiang instead mainly focus on how Socrates also has 
the idea of protecting the father as well, and how both traditional Chinese and 
Western legal systems share similar ideas on avoiding the use of family members’ 
testimony when it involves a matter of one’s own family members.102 Even though 
Socrates and Confucius share the idea of covering for the crime of one’s father, this 
is not sufficient to support the conclusion that Confucianism does not need to take 
responsibility for corruption. This is because, fundamentally, rightness and li for 
Confucius are weighed more important than law. 
 Another interpretation is from Huang Yushun, who maintains that in the case of 
covering for one’s father who stole a sheep the problem is about one’s immediate 
emotional response to one’s father. This turns the argument about whether Shun’s 
choice is right or wrong to a neutral one: understood as such, it would then not be a 
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legal or moral failure for Confucius.103 In this case, Huang dismisses the logical 
problem of a Confucianism that conflicts with the legal system. Huang turns the 
public problem into a private problem which has nothing to do with the law. 
Confucianism does not go against public law, which is why Shun avoids using his 
public power, as it is a private problem for himself rather than the whole state. It is a 
description of a son’s natural spontaneous response to one’s father, just like the case 
of spontaneous caring for a child who falls into a well. 
Also, in Natural Tendency is from Fate (Xingzi Mingchu 性自命出), if one’s 
actions are from one’s natural disposition, even though they may be exaggerated, 
this should still not be taken as bad.104 If one loves one’s family too much and goes 
against others’ interests it is understandable for Confucianism, as this emotional 
spontaneous response is the foundation and root for Confucianism rather than filial 
piety, filial piety and other concrete ethics are formed based on our natural 
dispositions. 
Humaneness and li as a general principle are embodied in the process of self-
cultivation, and cannot be reduced to filial piety or other concrete ethics. Even if all 
these ethics embody the idea of humaneness, these ethics are not equivalent to 
humaneness: as filial piety is the beginning of humaneness, the final aim is that one 
should expand the love inside one’s family to other people: ‘take all-under-heaven as 
one family, take China as one person’ (The Book of Rites)105. This highly integrated 
culture is dominant even in modern Chinese culture: for instance, senior college 
students call junior students younger brothers or sisters, and children call their 
parents’ friends aunts or uncles. Even though the idea of family is significant in 
China, I would rather take it as a beginning of Chinese thought rather than the 
foundation, because it can conflict with the idea of harmony world if each person 
only loves their own family members. 
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According to Huang Yushun, humaneness has two perspectives, the public and 
the private: the private is loving and caring inside the extended family, while the 
public is humaneness towards the whole world.106 On the public level, people have 
to overcome private love, and pursue humaneness. Huang’s humaneness is not 
biased towards the public sphere, rather it should serve the function of justice in 
society. Huang’s interpretation seems like a solution for the problem of possible 
confliction between filial piety and modern society. This is so on the condition that 
we only approach the private question on the private level, and the public question 
on the public.  
Fundamentally, legalism takes the state as the private tool for the ruler, on the 
practical level, then, it is difficult to put the regulation of ‘private’ and ‘public’ 
to the ruler. Rather, there is only the ruler’s own desire which is taken as 
‘public’ needs. ‘Private’ for Xunzi is mainly the ruler’s own emotional desires 
and kinship based on lineage or personal connection, ‘public’ is general public 
rules or needs of the state which are beyond these lineage or personal 
emotions.107   
Xunzi maintains that the private interests for commoners are public for the ruler, but 
the rulers’ interests are private ones that need to be restrained. 
For Western tradition, the family’s value is less important than the love for God, 
because loyalty to the unity and the interest of the state needs to be guaranteed. The 
interests of the family are thereby normally dismissed. For instance, in Plato’s ideal 
republic, pursuing family interest is seen as bad.108 For Western culture, there is 
always tension between private and public. But in the Chinese tradition, family 
interests or obligations inside the family are normally higher than other obligations 
or interests. 
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This does not mean that Confucianism is only fit to promote small communities. 
Bai Tongdong states that Confucianism is not against contributing to the private 
field, but also that its approach will actually contribute to public benefits. This is 
because this caring for family members is the beginning of contribution to the 
public.109 To serve one’s parents is the beginning and foundation to serving others 
and the state for Confucianism. 
Confucius himself transferred politics to the ethics of the family when his student 
asked why he did not participate in politics: ‘It is all in filial conduct! Just being 
filial to your parents and befriending your brothers is carrying out the work of 
government’ (Analects 2.21). For Confucius, it seems that there is no clear line 
between private moral practice and public political practice: these two are 
correlative and interrelated with each other.   
 
4.3 The Final Stage of Self Cultivation: Towards the Dao  
 
Even though self is the beginning of self-cultivation, having harmonious 
relationships with others is the completion of it (Analects 5.26). The process of self-
cultivation is a way to follow humaneness and li, these two are the dao of humans. 
Through this process, the dignity and value of humans can be embodied. 
Because Confucianism takes dao as superior to one’s political or social position 
(shi 势), the value of Confucians is also embodied in the spirit of critique. In an 
expanded community, Confucians serve as the moral model that can influence other 
people and build an ideal harmonious community. The reason people follow and 
admire them is that Confucians can always follow the dao. 
The Ru model themselves after the ancient kings; they exalt ritual and moral 
principles; as ministers and sons they are careful to esteem their superiors to 
the highest degree. Should a ruler of men employ them, they exercise power 
and influence in his court in an appropriate fashion. Should he not employ 
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them, then acting sincerely they withdraw and organize the people, being 
invariably obedient in their roles as subjects. Although they be impoverished 
and beleaguered, starving and freezing, they will certainly not use the same 
perverse way out of avarice…were Ru to reside in this court, the government 
would become refined; were they to occupy subordinate positons, popular 
customs would be refined. (Xunzi 8.2) 
Xunzi uses Confucian intellectuals to balance the tension between state and society: 
ideally, these intellectuals should help promote the interests of states and commoners 
through acting according to dao and humaneness. 
Mencius noticed that in real society, a moral person cannot always be in both a 
high social position and a moral position, he therefore promoted the moral position.  
Benevolence, dutifulness, conscientiousness, truthfulness to one’s word, 
unflagging delight in what is good- these are honours bestowed by heaven. 
The position of a Ducal Minister, a Minister, or a Counsellor is an honour 
bestowed by man. Men of antiquity bent their efforts towards acquiring 
honours bestowed by heaven, and honours bestowed by man followed as a 
matter of course. Men of today bend their efforts towards acquiring honours 
bestowed by man, and once the latter is won they discard the former. Such 
men are deluded to the extreme, and in the end are sure only to perish. 
(Mencius 6A16) 
Daniel A. Bell maintains that Chinese politics requires meritocratic rule, which 
means that those who occupy positions of power should possess the appropriate 
virtue and ability.110 Bell is here focused on the role of intellectuals who can 
contribute to politics. As Yu Yingshi said: ‘There is no definite connection between 
the gentlemen’s (junzi’s) social position and their ideal moral representation. Rather, 
the universal moral or virtue can go beyond specific position.’111 The good name of 
gentlemen transferred from focusing on one’s position on politics to one’s position 
                                                          
110 Daniel A. Bell, Beyond Liberal Democracy: Political Thinking for an East Asian Context 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 34. 
111 Yu Yingshi, Zhongguo sixiang chuangtong de xiandai quanshi [The Modern Interpretation of 
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of morality, gentlemen and petty men that are not merely determined by their social 
position. This separation between social position and morality also solves the 
problem of an asymmetric social structure, which means that moral people may not 
have a high social position. 
‘In point of position, you are the prince and I am your subject. How dare I be 
friends with you? In point of virtue, it is you who ought to serve me. How can you 
presume to be friends with me?’ (Mencius 5B7). On the political level the ruler is 
higher than his subject (shi) but on the level of virtue, his shi is higher than him: this 
tension between a morally higher minister and his ruler always exists, since the 
traditional political reality is based on lineage. 
A person’s virtue cannot always be endorsed through political positions. Mencius 
does distinguish between higher and lower position, and he accepts this distinction, 
but his focus is dao rather than position (shi 势). That is the main difference between 
his philosophy and Legalism. Mencius claimed that it is necessary for a ruler with a 
higher political position to respect their ministers with lower political positions: this 
is called reverence (xian), and it is highly encouraged to be a ruler of reverence. 
‘Wise kings in antiquity devoted themselves to goodness, forgetting their own 
exalted position. How should wise gentlemen in antiquity be any different? They 
delighted in the Way, forgetting the exalted position of others’ (Mencius 7A8). Even 
though the ruler has a higher political position, the minister is encouraged to ignore 
the higher political position and be free from flattery, this is called the xian of the 
minister. From this point, Mencius holds the idea that ruler and minister should be 
equal in the perspective of dao, and the minister should be independent as he only 
serves dao. 
Since rulers may not have great virtue, it is then necessary for shi or Confucians 
to work for them. These Confucians do not just serve the ruler, but more importantly, 
since self-cultivation for Confucianism is not only inside but also needs to be 
expanded to others, they need to serve the dao and complete their ideal political 
position to finish their moral practice. 
Confucians have the responsibility to carry dao in the community, but this is not 
like a priest’s role, because it is a process necessary to complete themselves and be a 
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good example for others. ‘Scholar-apprentices cannot but be strong and resolved, for 
they bear a heavy charge and their way is long. Where they take authoritative 
conduct as their charge, is it not a heavy one? And where their way ends only in 
death, is it not indeed long?’ (Mencius 8.7) 
Likewise, Xunzi says that a person should “follow the dictates of the Way rather 
than those of one’s lord” (Xunzi 29.2). For Joseph Chan, Dao-based politics is a 
brand of political perfectionism, which, according to the contemporary literature of 
political philosophy, means that under certain conditions it is appropriate and 
legitimate for the state to promote the good life.112  
‘To follow the mandate of one’s commission for the profit of one’s lord is called 
“obedience.” To follow the mandate of one’s commission but not for the profit of 
one’s lord is called “toadying.”… One should follow the way and not follow the 
lord’ (Xunzi 13.2). Intellectuals were the bureaucrats, or potential bureaucrats, of the 
Ru school. The conflict between central government and local governments was 
always the main problem for the emperor, so the emperor could use intellectuals 
who were selected by him against local governments. These intellectuals believed in 
the tiandao. Ideally, they sought to use dao to restrain the unlimited power of the 
emperor. If they thought tianxia lost its dao, they could become hermits and reject 
working for the government. During the Wei Jin period, there were many 
intellectuals who felt disappointment over their government, and they chose to live 
life as hermits to avoid involvement in politics or acting against the social general 
principle (which they called the li, this li is only a form of fixed li). These kinds of 
intellectuals were called famous intellectuals (mingshi 名士), because as intellectuals 
they had the courage to defend Dao against political powers. 
These Confucian intellectuals also needed to go beyond all private interest, they 
could then care about all-under-tian rather than their own individual benefit, making 
it further possible for them to complete the ideal socio-political pattern (serve for 
dao). ‘The Master said. “The scholar-apprentice who cherishes worldly comforts is 
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not worthy of the name”’ (Analects 14.2). Through this tension between dao and the 
power of emperor, the value of intellectuals can be revealed. 
Even though Confucius himself respects these yinshi who choose not to serve for 
the states, he still insists that intellectuals should have the aspiration to serve the 
state and complete their ideal political pattern, rather than only focusing on inward 
self-cultivation. Hence, serving the state is the appropriate thing for Confucians to 
do (Analects 18.7), Mencius also mentioned that serving the state (shi 仕), for 
intellectuals, is like farming for farmers: farmers cannot give up farming their land. 
(Mencius 3B3) 
Also, however, Confucius maintained that whether serving or not serving, one 
has to follow the dao, ‘It is a disgrace to remain poor and without rank when the way 
prevails in the state; it is a disgrace to be wealthy and of noble rank when it does 
not’ (Analects 8.13). ‘Yuansi inquired about shameful conduct, and the Master 
replied, “To receive a stipend of grain when the way prevails in the state and to be 
still receiving this stipend when it does not, is shameful conduct”’ (Analects 14.1). 
Similarly, Bo Yi and Shu Qi died because they rejected eating the food from King 
Wu of Zhou to defend the dao. 
For Confucius, serving or not serving is determined by whether the dao is 
prevailing or not, which means that intellectuals serve according to the appropriate 
time and opportunity. But according to Yuri Pines, intellectuals are not economically 
independent, they can only, and must, serve the state as a means of living.113 De 
Bary also argues that the weakness of Confucians is that they cannot establish any 
power on their own, as Confucians themselves were insecure in that highly 
dependent political system.114 But in the community of Confucians, they possess the 
dao, and act according to it: this actually developed a good reputation for them, and 
these Confucians can gain fame and influence other people as well. These 
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Confucians also can work in other careers in life as well, and even for Confucius 
himself, pork was accepted as tuition fees (Analects 7.7). 
Mark Lewis argues that Zhanguo “schoolmen” or intellectuals were economically 
independent of the state and could make their living not only as administrators but as 
teachers, technical masters, or retainers of a powerful patron. This economic 
independence was essential to the ensuing intellectual autonomy of the shi masters 
and their disciples.115 Because of this independence, Confucians could have more 
freedom in choosing whether or not to serve the ruler. 
As intellectuals are morally superior to the acting rulers, and also possess the dao 
(except for some career-seekers), there are also intellectuals like Confucius and 
Mencius who took serving states as their mission. These intellectuals did not need to 
serve just one state: there are many states in the Pre-Qin stage, they had freedom to 
serve the state that they thought deserved their service. 
There was a famous debate between the intellectuals who worked for the central 
government and the intellectuals who did not. This historical event was documented 
in Discourses on Salt and Iron, written by Heng Kuan, which ended in the Western 
Han dynasty. In this debate, intellectuals who were pro-government held a 
perspective derived from legalism, whereas intellectuals who were not working for 
the government used the ideas of the Ru school in stating that the government should 
not strive to pursue its own interests or profit from commoners. 
Who, then, could speak for the people? Legalists would claim that they promote 
the common good of people as well, but that commoners do not know what is good 
for themselves, so they need ordering from the government:   
Nowadays, those who do not understand how to govern invariably say, “You 
must win the hearts of the people!” If you could assure good government 
merely by winning the hearts of the people, then there would be no need for 
men like Yi Yin and Guan Zhong—you could simply listen to what the people 
say. The reason you cannot rely upon the wisdom of the people is that they 
have the minds of little children. If the child’s head is not shaved, its sores will 
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spread; and if its boil is not lanced, it will become sicker than ever. But when 
it is having its head shaved or its boil lanced, someone must hold it while the 
loving mother performs the operation, and it yells and screams incessantly, for 
it does not understand that the little pain it suffers now will bring great benefits 
later.116 (Hanfeizi 50.11)  
It seems as though Legalism does not necessarily reject the common good, and Han 
Feizi and Dong Zhongshu117 instead agree that commoners do not know what is in 
their own interests. However, for legalists, commoners effectively need rulers to 
decide what is good for them, while for Dong only intellectuals can represent the 
heart-mind of humans. 
Confucian intellectuals as intellectuals that possess dao can go beyond the tension 
between private and public, self and great union: not only can they go beyond their 
own social structure to participate in politics, but they can also speak for the people, 
as they have a general ethics. They can not only restrain the unlimited power of 
rulers for commoners, but also adopt the role of teachers in influencing commoners 
to act according to li.  
 
4.4 Two Traits of Person: Roles and Flexibility 
 
Flexibility (quan 權) as a skill against non-flexible rules means that one should act 
according to the concrete circumstance rather than fixed principles. The idea of 
flexibility supports the notion that individuals not only play their socially-related 
roles (because each individual has his own values in each concrete circumstance), 
but also endorses the significance of selfhood, because all behaviours and actions 
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follow both the way of li and humaneness and adapt to the individual’s concrete 
circumstances.   
Is that prescribed by the rites that, in giving and receiving, man and woman 
should not touch each other?’ ‘It is,’ said Mencius. ‘When one’s sister-in-law 
is drowning, does not one stretch out to help her?’ ‘Not to help a sister-in-law 
who is drowning is to be a brute. It is prescribed by the rites that, in giving and 
receiving, man and woman should not touch each other, but in stretching out a 
helping hand to the drowning sister-in-law one uses one’s discretion (quan 權) 
(Mencius 4A17). 
In the story of Shun, Shun makes his own dramatic choice based on his concrete 
circumstances rather than insisting on one ethic alone and putting himself in a 
dilemma (Mencius 7A35). But that does not necessarily thereby imply that Mencius 
has a relativistic view about morality. Rather, when he discusses the case of saving 
one’s sister in law, it is a case against li, but it is still in the sphere of humaneness: 
one must still act to save the other’s life. In the case of Shun, who carried his father 
and fled, such an act is still in the realm of filial piety. As Yang Guorong writes: 
‘Flexibility plays a role that adjust dao and makes it works better rather than goes 
against dao itself.’118  
The forms of li is always changeable: ‘Day and day, [they keep] changing, and 
keep changing again’119. Li is not static and unchangeable for Confucians: ‘Introduce 
the calendar of the Xia dynasty, ride on the large yet plain chariot of the Yin, wear 
the ceremonial cap of the Zhou, and as for music, play the shao and wu’ (Analects 
15.11), ‘The Yin dynasty adapted the observances of ritual propriety of the Xia 
dynasty, and how they altered them can be known’ (Analects 2.23). 
This tolerance concerning flexibility and the focus on circumstance means that 
morality has a relative perspective, because morality is completed by each 
individual, but each individuals’ ethics is connected with concrete circumstances. 
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Xunzi noticed this problem: ‘Bigan and [Wu] Zixu were loyal subjects, but their 
lords would not use them. Confucius and Yan Hui were wise, but their generation 
left them in dire poverty’ (Xunzi 27.116). It is seen that the value of Bigan, Zixu, 
Confucius and Yanyuan is not dismissed simply because they cannot complete their 
role or ethics.  
[L]ove and hate are tempered, and joy and anger made to fit the occasion. 
They are used to make inferiors obedient and to make superiors enlightened. 
Through a myriad transformations nothing becomes disorderly; but if one is 
divided in his loyalty to them, he will be brought to ruin. Surely it is true that 
the rites are indeed perfection! Establish them and exalt them, make of them 
the ridgepole, and nothing in the world can add to or subtract from them 
(Xunzi 19.7). 
Even though li is based on humans’ natural feeling or dispositions, it is still 
important to shape one’s dispositions by following the timing and adjusting oneself 
to current circumstance. Xunzi highlights that li is perfect and cannot be added to or 
subtracted from, but this does not mean that the forms of li cannot be changed. 
Rather, the general idea of li and the timing of li cannot be dismissed. 
When Mencius writes: ‘rightness is the road and the rites are the door. Only a 
gentleman can follow this road and go in and out through this door’ (Mencius 5B7), 
the fundamental meaning of following li here is following the direction of rightness, 
which is always correlated with li, as Confucius maintained. Humaneness and 
rightness are unchangeable, then, but all the outside forms are dynamic and can 
adapt to historical change. 
Li, compared with laws, may constitute a better way to govern states; while as 
legalism cannot contribute more than Confucianism simply because it appears too 
narrowly focused on laws:  
Ancient Chinese law only set what people could not do, rather than giving 
people rights; commoners only had responsibilities for the ruler, and it was not 
reciprocal. This is the extreme dictatorial form of governing which is called 
law governing (fazhi 法治). Further, ancient Chinese people were punished if 
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they violated ritual; when there were elements of punishment in ritual, then 
ritual could be seen as custom law.120 
Legalism thus has the appellation of ‘legal’, but it is more dangerous than 
Confucianism, as legalistic law is only a strengthening of power for the monarchy. 
Li has a similar function to law in ancient times, but in difference with ancient 
Chinese law, people accepted li naturally, as li was based on natural tendency and 
began from spontaneous goodness. Unlike legalism’s forceful and artificial 
application of laws, people accept li passively. Even though Confucianism is more 
focused on li and education, it nonetheless does not reject the modern law system. 
This is especially true for Xunzi, who maintains that we should apply both li and law 
to maintain order. 
The idea of rang (讓 deferring to others) is one concrete correlative virtue of li, 
and also deferring, or modesty, is what Confucius takes as the beginning of li:  
The Master said, “If rulers are able to effect order in the state through the 
combination of observing ritual propriety and deferring to others, what more is 
needed? But if they are unable to accomplish this, what have they to do with 
observing ritual propriety?” (Analects 4.13).  
Deferring to others, embodied in everyday life, is to always abdicate things to others, 
and to be reluctant to accept others’ things. If this virtue is expanded to politics, then 
the abdication system should be ideal for Confucians, but Mencius was reluctant 
about this idea after the perishing of the state of Yan121 (Mencius 1B17 1B18 and 
Mencius 2B17). The political reality was based on lineage, and the failure of Yan 
demonstrated that it was against timing to have an abdication (potentially creating 
disorder in society), which shows that the principle and the request for order and 
harmony in the socio-political comes as the first order in Confucianism rather than 
modesty. 
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For Confucius, that Guanzhong did not die cannot be seen as an action against 
loyalty, because it is a way to be flexible (tongbian 通变), if he did die, he would not 
be able to help Huan to become a leader in all-under-tian. Hence, to be flexible and 
serve lord Huan was a wise way to be humane. 
Confucians state that flexibility (wu gu, Analects 9.4) and timeliness particularly 
pertain to circumstances in which moral decisions must be made. Moral discretion, 
flexibility, and timeliness are important qualities that a gentleman ought to develop. 
Hence, Mencius praises Confucius for being timely in action rather than stubborn 
and inflexible (Mencius 5B.1).  
Yao, Shun and Yu as the model of abdication are widely praised in the Ru texts, 
but after king Kuai in Yan abdicated and passed on his throne (to his minister who 
was named Zizhi), Xunzi and Mencius discarded their abdication system to adapt to 
the new political circumstance.122 Xunzi and Mencius were aware that linear 
succession was better for their time, and an abdication which did not follow the time 
would lead to disaster,123 as with king Kuai in Yan. 
Xunzi noticed the political shift, stating that ‘the feudal lords get old, but the son 
of [tian] does not. That there have been cases of abdicating a state, but no case of 
abdicating all-under-heaven’ (Xunzi 18.5). This appears in Xunzi’s polemics against 
those supporters of the abdication who, like the authors of the Tang Yu zhi Dao, 
claimed that the rulers of the past abdicated due to their advanced age and its 
accompanying physical deterioration (Mencius 2B8).  
In summary, it is not fair to say Confucianism does not promote the idea of (an 
individual) self, because self-cultivation is the beginning for Confucianism. 
Selfhood is always involved in the relationship with others, and the contribution of 
each self is important, because the idea of Confucianism is embodied in all concrete 
individuals. But the process of completing oneself is a process of overcoming some 
part of one’s selfishness as well, so that one can then participate with others, the 
myriad things, and tian. In an ordered and harmonious society, it is unnecessary to 
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turn the self into an empty form: rather, each selfhood has its own judgement in its 
own circumstance. Also, Confucians noticed the tension between self and 
community: in Chinese it is called private (si) and public (gong). The idea of self 
does not always benefit the public, and the interests of the public are not always 
good for all individuals. Facing this problem, Confucians suggest that one should 
consider how to make judgements and decision based on one’s own circumstance. 
The advantage of Confucianism is that it is concerned with both self and an ordered 
community. 
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Chapter 5: Order, Harmony and the Spirit of Critique  
 
The continuity between humans and tian —person and world, mind and body, inside 
and outside —is the condition for self-cultivation, which exemplifies the value of 
human life. This holistic view shaped Chinese socio-political structure: even though 
humans play a significant role in having continuity with tian through self-
cultivation, the Chinese cosmos is still tian and dao-centred rather than 
anthropocentric. Both tian and the natural tendency of humans endorse following the 
way of li and appropriateness.     
As I discussed in chapter one, some political forms of li originally came from 
shamans’ ceremonies that aimed at communicating with tian, and they were turned 
inwardly to sincerity and modesty. In particular, some forms of li were derived from 
our natural dispositions, for instance, filial piety. The way of li is the essential 
foundation for building a holistic socio-politics, and also allowing people to have 
enough freedom to make their own judgements and choices in different 
circumstances. Li as a process is completed by all different individuals, and the spirit 
of li is continued by all Chinese today.    
How to fit traditional values into the modern world is a valuable thing to 
understand. The most valuable aspect that Confucianism can maintain today is the 
spirit of critique: the continuity between tian and humans does not ground an 
endorsement of power for monarchy, rather, it encourages a critical attitude towards 
monarchy, reflecting on the ideal social-political order and a restraint of the power 
of the ruler. The continuity of humans and tian is not out of date or not valuable in 
modern days; it can play a positive role in the modern world, especially regarding 
the process of completing humaneness, as humaneness is not only a process to 
complete oneself, but also to benefit others in the community. This process of self-
cultivation beginning from the self not only critiques that which is self-centred but 
also critiques behaviour which dismisses self-interests and values.  
What, then, is the new contribution of Chinese culture to the world? It should be 
the development and extension of a continuity of humans and tian, which serves as 
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the resource for all Chinese thought, and also as a unity that has profoundly shaped 
the specific Chinese socio-political order which can contribute a new narrative to 
Western world.  
 
5.1 Creative Transformations of Confucianism in the Modern World  
 
When confronting ideas from the West, Chinese intellectuals try to find answers in 
their own traditions, in order to keep the continuity of culture, even though they may 
combine Chinese thought with Western ideas. In 1898, Kang Youwei wrote the 
work Kongzi gaizhi kao ([Reformed Confucius] 孔子改制考). It is the first theoretical 
foundation for modernization in China. His theoretical aim is to facilitate the 
universal harmony datong of all-under-tian as one community (weigong 為公) 124. 
Even though some scholars found evidence that Kang plagiarized Liao Ping’s ideas, 
Kang is—unlike Liao—an intellectual who was significantly involved in and 
affected Chinese history with his ideas. Kang was inspired by the success of the 
Meiji restoration; he had an awareness that China had to change its society in the 
frame of the Ru school. He pointed out that the time of Yao, Shun and Yu was a time 
of democracy. He stated that technology will benefit society and should be 
developed rather than merely viewed as a tool to fight against Westerns.  
In 1919, during the May Fourth Movement, science and democracy were widely 
discussed in Chinese society. Most young Chinese thinkers accepted these Western 
ideas. Both liberalism and early communism were extremely opposed to the Ru 
school, and for most Chinese scholars, it became an inferior Chinese culture that 
should bear the responsibility for the successful invasion of the Western countries. 
This period gave rise to many extremists, among which were some scholars who 
suggested that the Chinese should use Roman letters instead of Chinese script. The 
Ru school as nationalism or populism was relegated to the outskirts of this 
                                                          
124 This all-under-heaven as one community will replace Chinese traditional empire. Kang was 
influenced by Western thinking, and he is the first to try to find reform information in the Chinese 
tradition. 
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movement. This is why judgement concerning Kang Youwei changed from that of 
being a reformer to a conservative in one night.  
Confronting the difference between Western culture and Chinese culture, Liang 
Shuming cannot agree with the idea from Hu Shi that the process of modernization 
is a process of Westernization; Liang maintains that the Renaissance should be a 
revival of Chinese culture rather than an endorsement of Western culture.125 
Liang argues that Chinese thought has some special characteristics missing from 
Western thought, and that this make it valuable. If it is only similar to Western 
thought and can do no more than function as a novel re-interpretation for 
Westerners, then Chinese thought would still be inferior.126  
In light of this, the Chinese intellectuals of the Ru school have to defend Chinese 
culture in its historical context. Some liberals in China take Chinese traditional 
culture as a possible way forward for the modern Chinese government. This 
constitutes a process of dialogue and a combination of Chinese tradition and 
Western ideas. Even the most conservative Chinese intellectuals have to adapt to a 
modern society and situation, while the most liberal Chinese intellectuals cannot 
ignore the power of tradition. 
Feng Youlan and Xiong Shili structure their own philosophy by using Western 
ideas to solve problems in Chinese philosophy. They both attempt to develop 
Chinese philosophy by making up for any perceived deficiency in Chinese thought 
through the adoption of Western ideas. They hope to modernize Chinese philosophy, 
and they have had a greater influence on the development of academic philosophy in 
China, compared to thinkers who have focused exclusively on Western thought. 
However, the value and meaning of these attempts have not been as successful as 
Sinicized Buddhism. 
The separation of nostalgia and value, according to Lin Yusheng, is not a good 
idea. While Chinese intellectuals appear to reject tradition, their idea, which takes 
thought or culture as the way to solve all the problems of a country, is a typical 
                                                          
125 Liang Shuming, Dongxifang wenhua jiqi zhexue [Western and Eastern Cultures and Their 
Philosophies] (Beijing: Shangwu yingshuguan, 1999), 215. 
126  Liang, Dongxifang wenhua jiqi zhexue, 22. 
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outcome of Chinese traditional monism and intellectualism.127 Hence, while many 
intellectuals criticise the Chinese tradition, they cannot separate themselves from it. 
Lu Xun, who gave up studying medicine in Japan, wrote novels that criticised the 
personality and traditional thought of the Chinese in order to enlighten people. For 
him, the Chinese are sick in their thought rather than the body, and if one wants to 
save China, one has to change the thought of the Chinese.128 The intellectualistic-
holistic mode of thinking assumes that Chinese traditional society and politics are 
directed by singular holistic, traditional thought. Such an assumption has led to the 
iconoclasm of intellectuals in the May Fourth Movement. Following this, 
intellectuals rejected all the values in traditional Chinese thinking in the context of 
holism. In this situation, Chinese traditional thought as holistic thinking mingled 
with Chinese traditional politics and economics has to be totally discarded. The main 
problem of the May Fourth Movement is that it was against tradition in the mode of 
tradition. If the spirit of critique in this movement is to be maintained, Chinese 
intellectuals must creatively transform Chinese tradition to adapt to the new 
environment. 
Chinese traditional thought could not respond creatively to the new cultural and 
political situation. These intellectuals thus planned to discard the whole field of 
Chinese traditional thought, since this thought was the main barrier to reviving 
China. Hence, some radical intellectuals proposed that the Chinese should give up 
all Chinese traditional practices. Lin Yusheng wrote: ‘Chinese intellectuals are 
always trying to solve the problem through analysing culture and thought’129. The 
idea is that there has to be a cultural and thought-based revolution first, and that 
social and political change can come afterwards.  
Lin creatively explains that the fundamental problem was in Chinese thought: 
with the breakdown of culture and social order as a result of collapse of Qing 
                                                          
127 Yusheng Lin, The Crisis of Chinese Consciousness: Radical Antitraditionalism in the May Fourth 
Era (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979), 48. 
128 Lu Xun, Luxun wenji diyijuan [The Collected Work of Lu Xun Volume One] (Haerbin: 
Heilongjiang renming chubanshe, 2002), 8. 
129 Yusheng Lin, The Crisis of Chinese Consciousness: Radical Antitraditionalism in the May Fourth 
Era (University of Wisconsin Press, 1979), 29. 
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dynasty, the cultural-intellectual approach evolved into a holistic mode of thinking 
and became a weapon for iconoclastic totalism.130 Chinese traditional thought was 
attacked on the whole because of the unified social-political structure, and as an 
organic whole, it was taken as a disease of traditional China that needed to be cured. 
This kind of totalistic critique of traditional thought from a fundamental level does 
not appear in other cultures because Chinese culture is holistic. Lin called the 
behaviour ‘totalistic iconoclasm’131, which is a total break from the past social-
political structure. He further thinks that this kind of holistic idea need to be 
pluralistic during modernization.132 
Even though the idea of ‘great union’ is holistic, this does not imply that great 
union cannot fit with modernization, because the pluralistic can exist in this union. 
The union does not mean a unified oneness. This ‘great unity’ according to Jiang 
Qing can give not only legitimacy of tian but also the legitimacy of peoples’ heart-
mind to Chinese government.133 This is because the meaning of ‘great unity’ for 
Jiang is a metaphysical origin for Chinese politics rather than a unified and 
centralized empire.134  
Meanwhile, the Communist party controlled the whole cultural field, endorsing 
research in philosophy only from the view of Marxism, while beginning to destroy 
all the traditions from 1950 to 1980. After 1980, because of an opening up in the 
area of economics, people began to have more cultural freedom. After a long period 
of repression, conservatives in China underwent a significant rebound. 
Intellectuals have tried to connect modernization to tradition, theorising about 
how to respond to the modern world. Since the collapse of Marxism the government 
has begun to give up the idea of planned economics, and they now they need a new 
                                                          
130 Ibid., 29. 
131 Ibid., 5. 
132 Cited from Lin Yusheng’ creative transformation from Chinese tradition in Karl-Heinz Pohl, 
Chinese Thought in a Global Context: A Dialogue Between Chinese and Western Philosophical 
Approaches (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 77. 
133 Jiang Qing, Zhengzhi ruxue [the Political Confucianism] (Beijing, Sanlian shudian, 2003), 313. 
134 Jiang, Zhengzhi ruxue, 328. 
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theory to adapt to the new situation in China. In this regard, traditional Chinese 
thought is presented with one possible way to prove its legitimacy of governing. The 
Chinese government is also eager to revive traditional thought, since it is the soft 
power of modern China and has great support with the masses. On the one hand, 
many Chinese intellectuals are aware of the great political value of traditional 
thought, and they have begun asking what kind of role traditional thought should 
play and how such thought works in modern politics. On the other hand, people have 
become confused about their faith. Since the collapse of Marxism, they need to find 
a place to set their heart-mind, and another prevalent question is how traditional 
thought will contribute to this problem.   
Chinese thought has typically been integrated into actual history and politics 
rather than merely having been relegated to a museum or appropriated by 
businessmen in modern China. If a revival of Chinese thought is necessary, because 
of the image of ‘great union’ and perspective of all under tian, it needs to be 
practiced by the whole world rather than merely in China, and it needs to return from 
a museum to our real life. Chinese thought will not be revived if it only remains the 
subject of study by intellectuals in a university or used by many only in 
mercantilism.  
With the development of Chinese economics, modern Chinese people have 
gained more confidence about their own cultural inheritance, which has led to a 
nostalgia for Chinese traditional philosophy135. The Chinese government has noticed 
this trend and begun to use more of the Chinese tradition, which is a better fit in 
China compared to the imported ideas of Marxism for facilitating their ideology. 
This also caters to the request of both the new left wing and extreme right wing136 in 
modern China. Lately, the central government has endorsed research stating that it 
people not only need to have more confidence in Chinese culture, they also need to 
have greater political confidence.137 
                                                          
135 This nostalgia never faded except during the Cultural Revolution.  
136 Since China takes Marxism as authority, the right wing is pro-democracy and pro-liberalism.  
137 Guo Fengzhi, “Dangdai zhongguo jiazhi guannian de wenhua zixin” [The culture confidence of 
modern Chinese value], Guangming ribao, August 5, 2015, 13. 
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Chinese scholars are aware of the trend to revive Chinese traditional philosophy, 
and have begun to contribute to the relevant research on how to use China’s own 
tradition to compete with Western universal values. Many scholars have given up 
their study of Western philosophy for Chinese philosophy. For instance, Zhao 
Tingyang developed an all-under-tian regime to deal with international relations.138 
All-under-tian as a regime is a perspective which has no centre inside (which does 
not put any role, principle or state as a universal ideal), and can go beyond the 
politics based on each individual country, compared with international politics, 
which still has an equal level inside different countries. The regime of all-under-tian 
can give order to the world, because it is a highly holistic and integrated ideal of the 
world. On the level of world, we need a structure to put all states inside with an 
order that is an all-under-tian regime. As I discussed before, this does not mean that 
all people should have same opinions about the world; rather, it just means they 
should focus on their own self-cultivation and then harmony in the community can 
be achieved spontaneously. All-under-tian as a world structure cannot be split into 
two or more, it is an integrated and ordered whole: ‘If we put the individual’s rights 
into a supreme level, and nothing can compete with them, then logically there is no 
way to have a holistic political world, thus one world is separated into many.’139   
The concept of country or state is not clear in Chinese traditional texts, rather, all-
under-tian is widely used. The ethics of the family are connected with the ethics of 
states. Even today, ‘country’ in Chinese is ‘guojia’, literally meaning ‘state family.’ 
According to this logic, emperors should care for their people as they care for their 
offspring.  
With the popularity of pragmatism, Chinese intellectuals began questioning 
whether traditional thought still had value. In this enlightenment, Chinese 
intellectuals who studied abroad began to criticize Chinese tradition through the 
perspective of Western thought, but they assumed their aim was to be the agent of 
the masses rather than improving themselves through self-cultivation. To be the 
                                                          
138 Zhao Tingyang, Tianxia tixi--shijie zhidu zhexue daolun [All Under Heaven Regime—the 
Introduction of World Political Regime] (Nanjing: Jiangshu jiaoyu chubanshe, 2005), 24. 
139 Zhao, Tianxia tixi--shijie zhidu zhexue daolun, 24. 
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agent of the masses, these intellectuals needed to become sages. To cater to the 
requirements of the masses, humanism was understood as patriotism in China. Based 
on this, Deng Xiaomang states that people who criticized the Chinese tradition in the 
May Fourth Movement are populists and have political ambitions.140 These 
intellectuals took this enlightenment movement as a tool to save China, without 
devoting enough attention to which ideas to use (and how to use them) to save 
China. As such, it did not really matter whether the idea was Marxism, Legalism or 
Ru school: these could all be put into practice to save China. Li Zehou states that in 
the May Fourth Movement, saving China prevailed over an enlightenment.141 
Hence, Chinese intellectuals tend to be more practical, and this is why they only 
focus on democracy and technology rather than freedom and human rights. The 
sense of the problem for Ru intellectuals is in terms of country rather than the 
awakening of individual people. As such, this enlightenment has not yet finished.  
Deng Xiaomang has provided a new critique which he thinks is an inheritance of 
the spirit of the May Fourth Movement. This new critique, which mainly criticises 
Confucianism (Deng claims it should take responsibility for the problems of today’s 
China142), tries to transform the sense of this problem from an emphasis on saving 
the country to the universal quality of human nature. Because all the intellectuals are 
influenced by the Ru school in some ways, the spirit of criticism should be 
ubiquitous. In order to be a productive form of criticism, this self-criticism needs not 
only to be based on an understanding of Western thought, but also to have the focus 
on solving the problems in Chinese thought.  
Is it true that the continuity of humans and tian is more primordial, and not suited 
for the modern world? Chang Kwang-chih argues for ‘the Chinese pattern as one of 
                                                          
140 Deng Xiaomang, “Jicheng wusi, chaoyue wusi” [“Inherited from the May Fourth Movement 
and Beyond”.] In Xin pipan zhuyi [The New Criticism], edited by Deng Xiaomang, (Wuhan: 
Hubei jiaoyu chubanshe, 2001), 11-14. 
141 Li Zehou, Zhongguo xiandai sixiangshilun [The study of Modern Chinese history of thought] 
(Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 2008), 21. 
142 Deng, “Jicheng wusi, chaoyue wusi”, 14. 
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continuity and the Western pattern as one of rupture.’143 In this way, the problem of 
whether continuity and harmony between humans and tian is further primordial 
turns on the difference between the West and the East. For Chang, this continuity 
exists in both China and the West. However, if it is maintained in China but broken 
in the West, this does not then mean that the idea in China of continuity between 
humans and tian is more primordial. Rather, it only means that Chinese thought has 
continuity with its past historical reality. 
Compared with Western thinkers who focus on the dao of regime, as with Plato 
and Aristotle in discussing different types of regimes, Chinese thinkers seem to 
focus more on the dao of governing. What kind of regime is better for modern 
China? A regime upheaval is more restrained by historical conditions, and it will 
also have dramatic changes in culture, social structure and authority. Instead, if we 
change the dao of governing, it will produce less of an upheaval in people. In 
ancient China, even though there was no dramatic change in regime, there were 
nonetheless different dao(s) of governing, and through this variety the Chinese still 
developed an effective system to restrain the unlimited power of the ruler. 
Chinese scholars have many means of co-operating with or responding to this 
new modern context: Feng Youlan and Hu Shi studied in America with the aim to 
move Chinese thought further or present something new. This continuity is 
nonetheless novel in the sense that Feng devised new perspectives with which to 
interpret Chinese traditional thought. He tried to use the structure and terms of 
pragmatism to re-organize Chinese thought. Feng not only implemented Western 
philosophy in China or Chinese traditional thought, he also wanted to have a form of 
Chinese thought which had both Chinese tradition and Western, modern ideals. The 
character of Chinese thought is kept in this way. Feng’s interplay introduces notions 
which are new for the West, like the realm of tian and earth (tiandi jingjie 天地境界). 
Feng realised that China needs a philosophy which can keep both the Chinese 
character and can also be modernized in order to resonate with the modern world, 
                                                          
143 Chang Kwang-Chih, “Ancient China and Its Anthropological Significance,” in Archaeological 
Thought in America , edited by C. Lamberg-Karlovsky (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989), 155–166. 
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rather than the traditional or pre-modern one. For Feng, it is not jiezhejiang if one 
only uses traditional words or language systems to explain Chinese thought. 
Feng’s statements can be narrow, because he thought if one does not use modern 
and Western systems to interpret Chinese thought, the ideas cannot be creative and 
valuable. He nonetheless highlighted the necessity of combining Chinese cultural 
character and modern Western thought to facilitate cooperation with Chinese society 
and political modernization. Confucianism should not only be open-minded to 
responding and contributing to Western philosophy, but should also keep the 
Chinese character. Feng’s jiezhejiang should also include those who use ancient 
Greek thought to interpret Chinese thought, as it is a new contribution to both 
Chinese thought and Western thought. The most important point is that we need to 
find a new perspective and new way to approach philosophical problems and have a 
better understanding about both West and East.  
 
5.2 The Critical Attitude of Confucianism Based on Ideal Socio-Political 
Order  
 
The crisis of Confucianism began from the idea of Joseph Levenson, who maintains 
that Confucianism has been museum-ized in China, as the Communist party takes 
Marxism as its ideology. With the changing of the Chinese world, there is a break 
between traditional values and modern ones. Moreover, Confucianism as the 
Chinese’s own cultural character seems more or less like a thing that can damage or 
block the process of modernization. For instance, Liu Zehua and Yuri Pines both 
assume that Confucianism and Legalism took the ruler as the centre of monarchy 
and became the tool for government. Their assumption would lead one to conclude 
that Confucianism is useless in the modern world, and it should be abandoned, as 
feudalism was abandoned. Their mistake, however, is that they do not distinguish 
Confucianism from Legalism in this regard. Yuri Pines and Liu Zehua maintain that 
the Confucianism always took monarchy as central in their thought. 144 Even 
                                                          
144 Yuri Pines, Envisioning Eternal Empire: Chinese Political Thought of the Warring States Period 
(University of Hawaii Press, 2009), 25–54. Liu Zehua was Yuri Pines’s supervisor when he 
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though they still give Confucianism a very important position in traditional politics, 
it seems that as a consequence Confucianism cannot contribute to modern politics 
after the end of the last empire in China. If so, then there is a break in continuity 
which is a valuable opportunity for showing the worth of Confucianism. Instead, as 
the ideas of the Confucianism are flexible and adaptive (in keeping with the original 
continuity of tian and humans). They should therefore remain dynamic and suitable 
for modern society and politics as well. 
As I discussed earlier, Confucianism serves dao rather than any monarchy. Also, 
the principle of timing makes it possible for Confucianism to develop in accordance 
with modern circumstances. This principle of timing can be embodied as the spirit of 
critique, because of this spirit, even though Confucianism and Western ideas are 
quite different, it can still adapt (or at least not conflict) with modern values.  
The critical attitude of Confucianism is not only embodied in the sphere of self-
cultivation, but also in the political sphere. Self-cultivation is a process of self-
critique, as people have to follow the way of humaneness, but they always have their 
own unnecessary desires. Politically, Confucianism holds the idea of a public sphere 
which also serves as justice for commoners. In this process, the interests of 
commoners can be guaranteed, and it does not conflict with the idea of the free 
market, as Confucianism promotes the interests of commoners rather than the ruler. 
Because self-cultivation is intertwined with the beginning of li, li also embodies a 
spirit of critique. Li, as a way, not only works in the social and cultural field, but also 
in politics—li critiques the humans’ behaviour to approach the socio-political order, 
and it is also a way to critique the outcome of human natural tendency. The idea of 
‘great union’ as the highest level of socio-political order in Confucianism, is a 
critique for historical events as well, even though it is unrealistic to attain. 
This critical attitude is not only embodied in the process of self–cultivation and 
the ideal of ‘great union’, but also in the process of interpretation of the ideas of 
Daoism from the background of Confucianism. This is the case with Wang Bi 
                                                                                                                                                                   
studied in Nanjing, Yuri Pines’s opinion about Chinese monarchy is heavily influenced by Liu. 
See Liu’s book: Zhongguo de wangquan zhuyi [Chinese Monarchism], (Shanghai: Shanghai 
renmin chubanshe, 2000).  
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(226CE-249CE), who is not only famous for his commentaries on the classical texts 
of Daoism (Laozi and Zhuangzi) but also made commentaries on the Analects. Wang 
noticed the problem that li not only refers to external, concrete rites and practices, 
but that they also need an internal support, initially motivating people to act in 
accordance with them. He therefore rebuilt Confucianism by introducing the idea of 
the self-so (ziran) of Daoism to li, and he maintains that humans follow the way of li 
because it is the way of ziran. So li is turned into a natural response from humans 
inside. 
Wang’s commentaries about ritual in one paragraph of the Analects are as follows:  
Joy, fear, sadness and happiness are the self-so of humans, because the 
feelings are the natural response to the outside circumstances, humans then 
sing songs and write poems as a way to know humans’ will and customs. 
Seeing the customs, they adjust them based on this. It is because of the 
customs that rules are set, and the level of ritual is reached.145 
The difference between Wang and other Daoists is that he does not dismiss li. Rather, 
he endorses that li needs to come from our inner nature. This is a critique and a 
rebuilding of Confucians’ value concerning li. 
Consciously or unconsciously, Chinese intellectuals always try to connect 
traditional values and modern ones in order to maintain this continuity of order.    
Jiang distinguishes political Confucianism from politicalized Confucianism, 
maintaining that politicalized Confucianism only supports the monarchy and 
becomes a tool for the ruler, but political Confucianism changes within the concrete 
historical context: it can always adjust its direction according to the historical 
context.146 For the Ru school, there is a greater focus on promoting the common 
                                                          
145 Wang Bi, Wangbi jixiaoshii [The Collected Work of Wang Bi’s Commentaries] (Beijing: 
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146 Jiang, Zhengzhi ruxue, 109. 
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good, as commoners’ interests are public. There is less of a focus on private 
interests, such as those of the ruler.  
Jiang maintains that modern China still needs ‘great union’ politics. This is a 
process of connecting the dao of humans with the dao of tian, rather than a 
centralization of authority, and to achieve a continuity between the two.147 This kind 
of politics considers not only human beings’ interests, but also considers harmony 
with tian. Jiang understands politics in the context of a continuity of humans and 
tian, and he also takes humaneness as the reason why tian and humans can resonate 
and maintain harmony with each other.   
Confucianism holds the unity of the philosophy of life and political ideas: one 
cannot separate self-cultivation from political philosophy, and vice-versa, as life 
philosophy is the foundation of political ideas. In this new period, Chinese have 
identified the necessity of reviving Confucianism, but it is unclear which elements 
need to be revived and how to revive them. There are mainly two ways to approach 
Chinese traditional thought: the first one is keep the cultural and social aspects, but 
discard the political part, as it is useless in the modern world; the second is to further 
develop the political part, as it is the only way to revive Confucianism.148   
Mou Zongsan (who moved to Hong Kong in 1949) is an important contributor to 
Neo-Confucianism. He maintains that the inward value of the Chinese tradition does 
not necessarily contradict democracy and technology. Rather, it can converge with 
democracy. Chinese society was never on the road toward democracy because of its 
philosophical ideals and its social, historical conditions, which were not always 
compatible due to the complexities of historical circumstances.  
Because of the dramatic changes in Chinese socio-politics, all Chinese scholars 
need to give their opinion about democracy since the end of the Qing dynasty. Mou 
maintains that we cannot lose our cultural traditions in the modern world, but we 
will need to adjust them as well. For Mou, we need to generate a new outward king 
                                                          
147 Jiang, Zhengzhi ruxue, 372. 
148 Jiang Qing holds this idea, as he thinks that Confucianism needs to be accepted by the central 
government, and then people will follow and express respect spontaneously. Likewise, 
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from the inward sage, this outside dao of king is democracy and technology. He uses 
the self-negation of good consciousness/benevolence (ren) to produce the rational 
subject, and then deduces that we can have democracy and technology indirectly. 
Sages and gentlemen use their morality (de) for the dao of governing (zhidao 治道). 
This is the embodiment of applying benevolence.  
Both Mou Zongsan and Zhang Xianglong attempt to conceive how to incorporate 
Chinese philosophy with the modern world, and better reveal the value of Chinese 
philosophy, because doing so will help Chinese people to find their cultural identity 
in the modern world. Zhang argues that Mou Zongsan’s inward sages cannot 
generate outward democracy through the negation of ren. This pan-moralism is 
problematic. Zhang also advocates a constitutive context which is changeable, but 
Mou’s benevolence, as immanent transcendence, is unchangeable. Mou himself 
notices this problem as well, which explains why he developed his self-negation 
theory (in order to allow for something new).  
In this context, Chinese philosophers’ comparison of West and East is not only a 
comparison but also, more importantly, a way of thinking used to defend Chinese 
traditional culture. This is why conservatives and liberals are not in total 
disagreement: they share the same idea of reviving China based on Chinese 
tradition. This is because they know people cannot separate from their own tradition. 
Therefore, Chinese philosophers’ perspective of comparative philosophy is 
fundamentally different from sinologists, missionaries and various Western 
philosophers. 
Mou Zongsan examines political thought in Chinese and concludes that even 
though ancient Chinese thought often discusses how to give order to a state, it is 
predominantly concerned only with adjustment of the same regime, rather than 
questioning how to change that regime dramatically (to democracy, for example).149 
In ancient Chinese thought, Confucianism, Daoism and Legalism mainly only 
discuss the way of giving order to states. Hence, Chinese thought only discusses 
how to govern a state rather than discussing changing the regime of the state, as was 
                                                          
149 Mou Zongsan, Zhengdao yu zhidao [The Dao of Regime and the Dao of Governing] (Taibei: 
Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1987), 1. 
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the case with Western thinkers. Such a state of affairs explains why for thousands of 
years China did not change its regime form. Rather, Confucians focused on the 
expectation of a sage-like ruler to govern the state, and the provision of adequate 
Confucian-ministers to help the ruler.  
In his Zhengzhi ruxue [Political Confucianism], Jiang Qin disagrees with Mou’s 
statement that New Confucianism cannot generate a new outward king in the 
modern world.150 This is because New Confucianism only focuses on extreme 
immanence, transcendence, and the self-cultivation of each individual rather than 
society, thereby becoming more abstract, without considering modern China’s actual 
history and life situation; this leads to the inaction of New Confucianism. This 
abstract form of Confucianism obstructs what is important for Confucianism, that 
one can practice the idea of Confucianism in everyday life not only in self-
cultivation, but also through politics.  Jiang maintains that the Ru school not only 
teaches students how to become better people, but also teaches the need to persuade 
the leader to use benevolence in governing the state. The main aim of the Ru school 
should be political practice, and the outward king does not necessarily depend on the 
inward sage, as Mou maintains.  
The Ru school used tiandao to posit the legitimacy of traditional politics, and 
moral guidance for the masses. With the collapse of the traditional political 
structure, the position of the Ru school became awkward. Modern democracy and 
science, however, have challenged both the inward sage and outward king. Because 
the traditional society and politics have changed dramatically, a question arises: do 
we still need Confucianism in the modern world? If so, how can Confucianism be 
adjusted to fit in with the modern world? 
When Chinese confront the challenge from the West, there are mainly two 
responses. The first is to focus on politics (or ‘outward kings’), trying to give a 
modern interpretation to the Ru school and give a possible modern politics based on 
the structure of the Ru school. The second is to try to put the Ru school in a position 
                                                          
150 Jiang, Zhengzhi ruxue, 13-16. 
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of pure philosophy and compare the Ru school with Western philosophers. In this 
way, a new and modern philosophical meaning would be given to Confucianism.   
Jiang Qin presents the Dao of the sage-king (wangdao 王道) system as a 
replacement for Marxism and as an indigenous ideology for China. He maintains 
that Chinese have to revive rujiao (儒教 the religious branch of Confucianism, 
which had political power during different empires, the second word jiao means 
education) when confronting the challenge of Western civilization, rather than 
taking the Ru school rujia (儒家 the thinking of Confucianism, the second word jia 
means family) for comparison with Western thought. Once Chinese begin to take 
rujiao as their faith, and the government takes it as the official ideology, the 
communist party will have the political legitimacy of the regime151.  
Jiang Qing claims that the biggest obstacle in reviving the Ru school is not the 
Communist Party. It is Christianity, and if the Chinese cannot revive Confucianism 
in society and politics, they will turn to Christianity.152 The Ru school needs to 
compete with liberalism to embrace the elite, and to compete with Christianity to 
embrace the common people. For Jiang, since the collapse of Marxism, Christianity 
may become the mainstream faith. The future of Chinese culture is a battle between 
Christianity and Chinese tradition. 
However, traditional philosophy, especially the Ru school, has never really been 
in the centre of political power, as most emperors are inwardly Legalist and 
outwardly Ru school. It may therefore be difficult for the Ru school to begin to 
manage modern Chinese politics. Both the Chinese government and the people of 
China have tried to determine the best way to incorporate Chinese tradition into 
modern society. 
Facing the critique from the West that Chinese should accept its universal values, 
Jiang maintains that the problem is not about how to pursue democracy, but how 
China can retain its own character. Chinese culture does not need to combine with 
                                                          
151 Even though the Communism party has some economic achievements, and enforces political 
order, people in China, including elements of the party, still question the political validity of the 
regime. 
152 Jiang Qing, “Guanyu Chongjian Zhongguo Rujiao de gouxiang” [“Thinking about How to Revive 
Confucianism”] Zhongguo rujiao yanjiu tongxun, 2005(1): 3-8. 
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democracy when it confronts the challenge of Western culture.153 For Jiang, if 
Chinese culture can achieve democracy, it will lose its own uniqueness. In such a 
case, it would be valuable to keep a distance from democracy. However, 
Confucianism has always been open to interpretation, and willing to accept other 
cultures, as it has a precedent of borrowing ideas from Daoism and Buddhism to 
strengthen its own ideas and to compete with its rivals.  
Unlike Mou Zongsan, who tries to bridge the gap between inside sage and outside 
king, Jiang Qing separates these two parts. He distinguishes a Confucianism of lived 
experience from a Confucianism of politics. The structure of a Confucianism of life 
is from the inward to the outward, and from humans to tian, using life to explain the 
whole world. The Confucianism of politics is more open; it does not deny heart-
mind and natural tendency, but it is more focused on the structure and events of the 
world from the perspective of world. It admits that the world can have independence 
outside of life, rather than using heart-mind and natural tendency to dismiss this 
world. To avoid the tension between filial piety and political duty, Jiang maintains 
that we should separate political morals and individual morals as well.154 Even 
though political Confucianism discusses morals and virtues, it takes the inward sage 
and outside king as a parallel relationship, and claims there are two different ethics.  
In the Western perspective, Chinese culture has not kept continuity with 
traditional thought since the May Fourth Movement. In modern Chinese politics, the 
Chinese government does not accept universal values and freedom; they favour 
traditional ideas. While the authority does not want to go back to traditional 
feudalism, it does want to know how traditional thought can contribute to modern 
Chinese politics. In the recent past, if there were any political or societal problems, 
scholars would tend towards solutions that could be found in Western thoughts or 
theories. But nowadays, there is a greater realisation that such solutions must be 
pursued in Chinese thought or thinking patterns. 
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128 
 
For Zhao Tingyang, human rights are falsities if they only exist in the context of 
individual states and if one’s rights have been protected through the sacrifice of 
another person’s rights in another state. He therefore claims that the Western 
political system is not universal and cannot prevail, because its methodology is 
based on the assumption of individual states.155 Because the Western value system 
is based on a small political entity (one state), it can only solve the problem of 
individual rights in one state. It cannot solve the problem of all human beings, and it 
cannot solve the problem of international structure because of its narrow perspective. 
Zhao concludes that Western politics is a discontinuous system; the system cannot 
promote order on the scale of the world as a whole. From the perspective of all-
under-tian, even though there are close and distanced relationships, nothing is 
further or less ‘outside’ than anything else. 
On the issue of how revive the Ru school, Jiang Qing holds that the Ru school 
cannot separate from politics: it has to be revived in a revolution through applying 
the ideas of Confucianism in the upper-level politics of China.156 If it is urgent to 
revive the Ru school, then the most efficient way to do so is to maintain the centre of 
power, which Jiang calls the ‘upper way’. It also needs the ‘downward way’ to 
cooperate with it, which is to build the community of Confucianism.  
Jiang maintains that a good government needs three ways to guarantee 
legitimacy: 1) a sacred tian, 2) following the history in a particular place, 3) the will 
of the people. He states that the way of humane authority caters to these three 
rules.157  He argues that the Chinese government not only needs to improve the 
income of people, but it also needs sacred tian as legitimacy to support their proper 
governing. Likewise, governing has to follow and keep the continuity of Chinese 
specific history. Historically, Confucianism dominated the social-political realm for 
a long time, and Jiang therefore claims that the Chinese government should follow 
the history of humane governing to maintain the historical continuity and legitimacy. 
                                                          
155 Zhao, Tianxia tixi--shijie zhidu zhexue daolun, 24. 
156 Jiang, “Guanyu Chongjian Zhongguo Rujiao de gouxiang”, 3-8. 
157 Qing Jiang, A Confucian Constitutional Order: How China’s Ancient Past Can Shape Its Political 
Future (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 28. 
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This humane governing can not only benefit the government by giving it legitimacy, 
but it can also balance and achieve harmony within these three dimensions of 
legitimacy.  
In confronting the challenge from Western culture, Jiang Qing maintains that 
democracy is not the only way to solve the problem, unlike Mou Zongsan and other 
Chinese scholars who claim that Chinese thought has to cooperate with Western 
value to fit in modern world. Jiang is confident that Chinese thought, especially 
Confucianism, can by itself contribute to the modern world. Jiang distinguishes 
between the political Ru school, which holds a mission of critique, and the 
politicized Ru school which totally becomes a tool for the rulers.158 Political 
Confucianism still takes great union as the ideal image to critique an imperfect 
reality, unlike politicized Confucianism, which focuses on the apotheosis of 
emperors. If Confucianism loses the former spirit of critique, it will lose its key 
value and become a fixed rule.  
The attitude of critique in Confucianism has also been embodied in the principle 
of shi. Shi means that one has to act with the trend that is going to happen, like a 
wise man or sage. It is essential to hold a critical attitude towards social-political 
reality, and so these people should be the pioneers in their times. For instance, the 
most famous example is Confucius, who reformed the content and forms of rites in 
his time. Following in the footprints of Confucius, Mou, Jiang and other modern 
scholars have done much valuable work in trying to critique social-politics, and to 
find a better way to interpret it or give an alternative for Chinese people. For a long 
time, Chinese socio-politics has been holistic: it is always flexible and can adapt to 
the needs of people and historical circumstance, and it can always make an efficient 
shift to fit in the world. Confucianism never determined a fixed state, because of the 
principle of shi, it is always a process towards the ideal social-politics.   
 
5.3 A Phenomenological Approach to Confucianism  
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Zhang Xianglong and Huang Yushun both focus on the philosophy of life in 
Confucianism. They both believe that Confucianism should return to an original 
position where there is no dualism or metaphysics involved. The origin for Zhang is 
tiandao, while for Huang it is ‘life’. This ‘life’ includes everything, and it goes back 
to a time when people did not distinguish themselves from tian159. This is the 
continuity of tian and humans, and the human in this instance is equal to tian for 
Huang.    
Zhang Xianglong maintains that Western philosophers approach ultimate 
questions, or Being, though forms or concepts. They split subject from object, 
universal from particular, phenomena from substance, and language from their 
representations. According to these concepts and the way they frame the world, he 
has a vertical hierarchy for them from up to down. However, some philosophers, 
such as Kant and Heidegger, are said to escape from this to a degree. Zhang applies 
Heidegger’s terminology to reconstruct tian and dao, to clarify how Chinese 
philosophy has a specific way to ‘approach the ultimate horizon in our mundane 
life’.160 Tian is the ‘time’ of tian, which means that action should be taken at the 
appropriate time. Zhang argues that this is similar to Heidegger’s temporalizing. 
Therefore, he argues that the ultimate reality of tian is time, which he believes is 
more fitting than Heidegger’s theory of time, since human beings are capable of 
leaps in the temporal realm of tian. The cultivation or practice for the temporal 
realm of tian is maintained in the horizon of phenomena without restraint from 
objects.  
In Zhang Xianglong's text on time in Chinese philosophy, he gives an example 
outlining how to understand the Chinese notion of time through a phenomenological 
approach (see appendix). Zhang asks (and in his own manner, answers) an important 
question that I now deal with: how is it possible to seize and measure shi? Shi is 
complex and not easy to observe directly, but we can see its incipient movement (ji
                                                          
159 Huang Yushun, “Juditiantong: congshenghuo ganwu dao xingshang goujian” [“Separation of 
Heaven from Humans: from Inspirations of Life to Rebuilding Metaphysics”], Zhexue dongtai 
[the trend of philosophy] (2005): 8-11. 
160 Zhang Xianglong, Haidegeer yu zhongguo tiandao [Heidegger and Chinese Heaven and Dao] 
(Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 1996), 234. 
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幾), and this can give us a clue about potentially forthcoming events. We can then 
act appropriately, and seize the opportunity. 
   In Yijing, the images of hexagrams imply ji 幾 or omen, which could suggest 
when the appropriate time to act is to the ancient kings. According to Zhang 
Xianglong, the time that comes from ‘the ultimate changes’ is certainly non-linear. 
Time and knowing of the past and the future are interdependent. The changes 
illumine the past and interpret the future. Time is intimately linked with a person’s 
understanding of his or her existential situation. Therefore, Time itself has 
intelligible, ethical, and aesthetic meaning.  
All beings are seeds of one another, yielding back and forth their different 
forms, beginning and ending like a circle, so that no fixed groupings apply. 
This is called Heaven as the Potter’s Wheel. It is Heaven as the Potter’s Wheel 
that we see in their Heavenly Transitions. (Zhuangzi 27) 
Heidegger’s notion of time is ceaseless becoming: ‘time is "abstract" negativity. As 
"intuited becoming," it is the differentiated self-differentiation that is directly to be 
found, the concept that "is there," that is, objectively present.’161 Zhang Xionglong 
connected Heidegger’s interpretation of time with Chinese ji 幾, which refers to 
many different aspects of time, including: ‘nearly,’ ‘probability,’ ‘imminent,’ and its 
homophonous cognate, ji 機, which could mean ‘pivot,’ ‘opportunity,’ ‘clever 
device,’ ‘machine’ and ‘danger.’ Ji 幾 is the time which is going to happen, and ji 
機 is the outcomes of time. Ji 幾 is omen or subtle seeds which are potential 
possibilities, ji 機 is more like a fixed time, that's why it can mean danger or 
machine.  
The seeds of things have mysterious workings (ji 幾). The roots of Crow's feet 
turn into maggots and their leaves turn into butterflies. Before long the 
butterflies are transformed and turn into insects that live under the stove… 
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Men in time return again to the mysterious workings. So all creatures come out 
of the mysterious workings and go back into them again.162（Zhuangzi. 18） 
The mysterious working is ji or temporalizing, which gives all the possibility of 
change. So Zhuangzi said they come from ji 幾 and going to ji 機, and then go 
back to ji 幾. And also, it probably can give another vista to explain why Zhuangzi 
maintained that ‘the machine heart’ 機心 is dangerous. Since the outcomes of time 
contains the possibility of danger (ji 機), it gives all the opportunity to succeed and 
also the possibility to vanish, if we become addicted to the opportunity/machine or 
clever devices (ji 機) and forget to go back to the time/possibility/nearly/omen (ji 
幾), it could be dangerous for human beings.   
   Ji 幾 is the subtle seed or omen which works as temporalizing and gives all the 
possibility to all the transformations of things. Because it is an omen of the future 
not-yet happened things, we can predict the happening of things, which also is the 
main aim of Yijing. Qi works as original time which determines the perpetual 
transforming, which is the stillness and agitation of things. Wu or nothingness is the 
original happening place of time, and wuwei is the active embodied pursuit of 
temporalizing. Temporalizing, which means acting in an appropriate time, is 
something flexible and between the useful and useless and between speaking and not 
speaking for Zhuangzi.  
 Zhang also connects the sincerity of Confucius with Heidegger’s present 
constitution. When people practice and perceive the ultimate sincerity, they can 
know tian and earth, and then knowledge can expand to a thousand things. For 
Confucius, the dao of tian is the dao of the mean or middle, which means the 
elimination of different thinking from the constitution, rather than that the middle 
path taken between two extremes of thinking. The Dao of Laozi and Zhuangzi is to 
be seen as an ultimate origin and truth. Dao comes from tian, it is the Dao of tian, 
and the Dao as ultimate reality does not have a specific rule or principle. This 
explains why we cannot talk about it directly. Furthermore, people cannot perceive 
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the Dao, and so it is at a ‘higher’ level compared with Western philosophy. If we 
perceive constitution as the fundamental characteristic of phenomenology, it will 
give us the possibility to inspire both the Chinese dao of tian and phenomenology. 
Formal indication and the projection of you, wu and emptiness are comparable. 
Zhang maintains that during the post-Warring States period, tian and Dao lost their 
original meanings, and we need to go back to the primordial context of Lao-Zhuang 
and other schools. Zhang suggests that Daoism and Heidegger can enlighten each 
based on the concept of Ereignis and through the phenomenological method.163 For 
Zhang, the original happening place or Ereignis is qi. Qi can produce other natural 
events, and these events perish or end in qi as well.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
163 See my appendix: first chapter of Zhang’s text. 
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Conclusion  
 
One cannot think about philosophical questions outside one’s tradition, but one can 
distinguish different traditions by asking what the source of meaning and values is in 
each case. Values and meanings from such sources can be given by a god, or 
endorsed by the human world; this source can either promote the significant position 
of a transcendent world or world of ‘ideas’ (for instance, Plato) or the importance of 
humans’ everyday life (Karl Marx). In Chinese culture, there is no transcendent god 
or a dualistic distinction: the meanings and values are the products of the continuity 
between humans and tian. Confucians approach the idea of heart-mind to make 
values and meaning more inward, but also use the idea of li to demonstrate the 
connection between inward dispositions and outward behaviours.     
  Even though li has spontaneous goodness as the foundation, it still needs tian 
as that which is beyond humans’ world to endorse the inward value. Chinese 
intellectuals try to seek the inward value rather than the transcendent value, because 
the inward goodness is the beginning, and to participate and interact with tian is the 
completion of self-cultivation. 
The continuity of humans and tian does not deny the significant difference 
between either parties. The time of tian and the continuity between humans and tian 
give humans good reasons to follow the way of li, because li not only arises from 
our natural spontaneous goodness, but also, following the time of tian is essential. 
Hence li embodies the interaction between tian and humans. It is seen that using an 
organic and evolving method may not fit in the case of Chinese thought because 
there is not a process from the irrational to rational in Chinese thought.  
   
The Emerged Order and Harmony   
 
The structure of the cosmos is a narrative that can affect the structure of the human 
world: humans mimic structures internal to the cosmos in order to maintain the 
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continuity between humans and tian, and these structures can also be affected by 
humans’ will.   
Because of the separation of these fields in the process of modernization, it is a 
question worth asking whether the structure of continuity between humans and tian 
is more primordial than the structure of its contrasting tension. From the view of 
universalism such can be the case, because in ancient Europe there was a stage in 
which people believed in the continuity between humans and tian. In such a case, it 
would be a good idea to approach this issue from a universalist perspective. On the 
other hand, it seems that if one approaches this from the view of a specialism, it will 
lead to nihilism and relativism. To avoid these problems, it is much easier to focus 
on the modern values of this continuity and their possible contribution to the modern 
world.     
This order of tian is not a fixed order or an order of organisms. Rather, it is an 
order that is based on the interpretation of Chinese thinkers. Tian can be indifferent 
if it is not against the whole order of narrative (the continuity between humans and 
tian), and it can also indirectly reward good and punish bad if it is necessary for 
keeping an ordered state. Hence, it is not important to ask whether there is a conflict 
between evil humans and a ‘good’ tian; rather, the most significant and meaningful 
thing we need to be concerned with is why and how tian can be both indifferent and 
‘good’ in the same narrative in Chinese documents. Chinese scholars use the idea of 
either sacred or secular tian when they believe it will endorse their idea about order, 
and they also do not take tian as the only recourse to rely on. They also try to find 
meaning in our everyday life. For instance, the discovery and interpretation of the 
inward heart-mind not only gives the inward evidence of self-discipline, but it also 
bridges the gap between humans and tian. This heart-mind is based in each 
individual rather than an abstract notion of it; and also the idea of time in Chinese 
traditional thought is neither linear nor cyclic. Rather, it is changing and adapting to 
its concrete circumstances, and this idea not only solves the problem that fixed rites 
may confront (not suitable for changing time; out of date), but also puts each 
concrete person’s existence in an important position. Hence, Chinese can also find 
value and meaning in history, and the Confucian interpretation of history instead 
136 
 
follows a cyclic view. With respect to this last point, one may consider, for instance, 
Mencius, Dong Zhongshu and Kang Youwei, because they take history as a socio-
political fact and try to find order in this fact rather than a fact based on linear time.  
 
The Order from Self-cultivation  
 
Promoting the idea of order and harmony does not necessary lead to dismissing the 
idea of person-interests. Rather, the value of person in Confucianism is not conflict 
with maintain order and harmony, and the idea of order not only promotes harmony 
in the narrative of tian, but also, in the micro-sphere, this order begins from the order 
in person (balancing one’s different kinds of desires). Self-cultivation relies on 
practicing different kinds of concrete li, this process of self-cultivation not only 
brings order to oneself (as body-mind), but also brings order in the community, 
because the person in the sphere of Confucianism is always involved in relationships 
with others, as it is a concrete person connected with others rather than an abstract 
person. Value and meaning is endorsed in person through both inward sincerity and 
outward practice, but this does not mean that there is a process of evolution (from 
outward/transcendent/irrational to inward/rational). Rather, the narrative still needs 
to maintain the continuity between humans and tian. 
 
 Tian, Humans and Political Order 
 
This narrative of humans and tian shaped the Chinese way of thinking about 
political order: the narrative of ideal politics involved in ‘all under tian’ and ‘great 
union’. This perspective of politics combined humans and tian, and put these two in 
the same narrative. In this way, the emperor is the son of tian and represents tian in 
ruling ‘all under tian’. According to the interpretation of Confucianism, it is 
necessary to rely on a concrete conception of li to maintain ordered socio-politics 
until humans are able to follow the way of li naturally. Yet, it takes a long time and a 
great deal of repetition of action to achieve a spontaneous way of li.     
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 It can be asked whether it is still meaningful to talk about the requirement of 
order in the Chinese socio-political narrative in modern China. The first question 
that needs to be clarified is what the foundation of li is. If we take filial piety as the 
foundation of li, it can be a problem to fit li with the practice of modernized and 
civilized citizenship. By examining more fundamental resources of li, however, it is 
seen that our natural dispositions, rather than filial piety, are the source of li. After 
reconstructing the foundation of li, this order of politics can fit the modern world. 
What is more essential for li is inward sincerity rather than following the fixed rites 
because rites are changeable. 
Even though Jiang Qing’s manner of reviving Confucianism can be extreme, it is 
a sufficient beginning to consider the modern political value of Confucianism and 
how to create political value based on our own tradition and narrative. Likewise, 
Zhao Tingyang gives a possible way of dealing with international relationships for 
different states, but he fails to clarify what all-under-tian really is, and whether it 
fundamentally only refers to China. The advantage of interweaving value and 
meaning in the traditional ideas is maintaining their authority and ease of 
acceptance, and the disadvantage for China is the potential danger of slipping into 
nationalism. (The Chinese may have an inferiority complex because they accepted 
Western values and believe that their own values are inferior, or else they may 
otherwise adopt a severe form of reactionary cultural arrogance).      
As one cannot simply discard traditional Chinese thought along with the 
traditional political system, one has to examine the importance of China’s own 
tradition, asking how to discover what is the most valuable part of that tradition, how 
to apply it, and how to inspire not only modern Chinese but also other people. 
Because of the interconnection between cosmos, philosophy of life and political 
thought in the Chinese tradition, one cannot analyse one question without incurring 
others. From examining person, community and tian, it becomes evident that the 
person not only plays an important role in bridging our world and tian, but also is 
essential to political order. After addressing certain misunderstandings concerning 
the person in Chinese thought, it is clear that the person is concrete and 
interconnected with others rather than being abstract. Because self is concrete, it can 
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always have its own form of free choice in each concrete circumstance, rather than 
remaining in fixed and potentially conflicting roles. Since the self is concrete and 
interconnected with others, the community naturally achieves order and harmony 
through each self that cultivates itself and follows appropriate timing. It is thus 
worthwhile asking, as part of an in-depth analysis, why and how one can be very 
different from others yet still share harmony and order in one unified model. This 
question is engaged by Zhu Xi and other Neo-Confucians in later Chinese thought.   
The coherent order and harmony in socio-politics are the result of the 
interpretation of humans and tian. If one does not have good tendencies, or at least 
good behaviour (the outcome of good tendencies), it is fair to ask how people can 
have harmony and order naturally in a society in which punishments are not 
encouraged, and which mostly relies on concrete li (which can be practiced by 
people) and the dao of humaneness (which can be implemented by the ruler). 
Because Chinese scholars believe humans have the inward possibility to interact 
with tian and maintain an ordered state and society by their own will.    
Confucianism also promotes sincerity, and that is because one cannot rely on 
fixed rites, and one cannot use the method of behaviourism to analyse the way of 
Confucianism. The essence of li lies not only in outside rites, but it also lies in 
inward sincerity, which cannot be observed by one’s outward behaviours.  
The final aim of Confucians is to achieve the ideal socio-political order 
represented by both the ‘great union’ and ‘small tranquillity’. It is significant that the 
Communist party takes ‘small tranquillity’ as its aim as well, and this embodies the 
requirement of order among Chinese people that can go beyond a difference of 
beliefs (Marxism and Confucianism can be both applied to maintain order). In these 
two ideal models, each person can fit well in community, and there is no conflict 
between public and private interest. It is essential to notice that in both models, li is 
important, even though it seems li is not mentioned in the stage of ‘great union’. Li 
is necessary for the state because it carries the dao, and it is the process towards 
order and harmony.  
These two ideal models of socio-politics also play a role that critiques a political 
reality (For Confucius, his ideal politics is the model of Zhou rulership) that may not 
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bring order, which demonstrates the value of Confucianism: it is necessary to serve 
the dao rather than the ruler. From the structure of two ideal models of socio-
politics, it can be seen that dao and people are those who are important and 
privileged for Confucians, rather than the ruler. 
In order to support the claim that Confucianism is still valuable today, one needs 
to demonstrate that one can reconnect traditional China to modern China. In order to 
do so, as this research highlights, one has to approach this question by analysing the 
focus of order. Even today, order and harmony are promoted by the Communist 
Party, but if one wishes to say Confucianism can contribute to this question, one 
needs to confront the sceptical view that Confucianism belongs in a museum. It is 
valuable to consider how Confucianism can be revived. It can either proceed from 
top to bottom, as Jiang Qing proposes, or from bottom to top, as Zhang Xianglong 
and most Chinese scholars maintain. It is a significant task to revive Confucianism 
in China, not only for theoretical reasons, but also for fulfilling the potential minds 
of Chinese people (a potential now attracted to Christianity), and for providing 
cultural nutrition from the Chinese tradition. Confucianism not only cares about how 
to live a better life, but it also cares about how to have a better world (indeed, a care 
for the whole universe). Likewise, it is not only a school that ceases its function 
when it is satisfied with theory, but it also has the ambition to apply its ideas in the 
real social and political field.  
The main achievement of this project, then, is its way of interpreting the 
continuity of tian and humans in the narrative of order. With respect to the future, it 
is worth finding out how to creatively adapt Chinese thought about order—which is 
very different from the Western thought about order—and make it work practically 
in the modern world; it is ultimately about practicing some reconstructive notion of 
li in modern China. Another question worth asking, for later research, is how this 
narrative of order can affect our worldview on issues such as environmental ethics 
and socio-politics. This specific continuity between human and tian provide a 
valuable world view that can contribute to environmental ethics, and also can weave 
an idea of ordered society under the narrative of continuity between human and tian. 
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Appendix: Tranalstion of Two Chapters of Zhang Xionglong, Haidegeer 
yu zhongguotiandao164 
Chapter 11: Features of Ancient Chinese Thought 
 
‘Heaven’ or ‘tian’ is taken to communicate with the Chinese, and such a 
communication is considered to be exceptionally deep and wise. It is not a god or a 
physical substance; ‘earth’ or ‘di’地 is the mother of the thousand things. Human 
beings live between tian and di, which is the lived realm of ‘heaven and earth’ or 
‘tiandi’, the realm of life, the realm of the self-so (ziran). Many comparative 
philosophers assume that Chinese thought is practical, mundane, and lacks a 
dimension of metaphysics and divinity. It is correct that in the mainstream culture 
there is no supreme anthropomorphic god, and that Chinese thought lacks a system 
of concepts and logic. But if this assumption implies any negative consequences for 
Chinese thought, these implications are groundless. Fundamentally, Chinese thought 
moves in one world, but this is not a barrier for Chinese thought to establish an 
ultimate realm of thinking. Chinese thought has our lived world as its ultimate 
thinking horizon, which is different from Indian and Western thinking. In the age of 
the ‘death’ of God and the ‘end’ of metaphysics, Chinese thinkers are like ‘Scholar-
apprentices’ who must be strong and resolved, for they bear a heavy charge and their 
way is long’(Analects 8.7).[234] 
Among the three major systems of thought in the world, Indian and Greek use the 
alphabet system while China uses a non-alphabet system. China forms its 
philosophical thinking alone with its mysterious generative meaning. Chinese 
constitutive thinking of context has an opposite position to Western conceptual 
thought. Indian thought inhabits the middle ground, as its fundamental horizon is 
beyond concepts and its traditional expression is in the direct predicative. Hence, 
Indian thought distinguishes samsara, which is controlled by karma, and the beyond 
                                                          
164 I translated this chapter and chapter 15 of Zhang Xionglong’s Heidegeer yu zhongguo tiandao 
[Heidegger and Chinese tiandao], because these two discuss the problem of heaven. I also include 
the original Chinese pages and some Chinese words here for reference.  
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world of Brahman and Atman. It is common to intermingle logic and analysis in 
Indian thinking, but in the prajna study of Mahāyāna, especially the Madhyamaka of 
Nāgārjuna, the pursuit of ultimate meaning in interdependent arising 缘起 leads to 
the thinking of context, which is Nirvana as world. Hence, this key term has a 
significant affinity with Chinese mainstream thought. Through this sensitive 
communication, the mysteriousness of this foreign Buddhism may be understood by 
the Chinese. It is in this sense that the method of Indian thinking and expression, 
which appears as a disadvantage to transmission, turns out to be an advantage. 
Instead of being strange and unfamiliar, it is a stimulus for Chinese thought. This 
successful experience of accepting foreign thought is a very valuable model for our 
difficult process of digesting Western thought.  
 
1 Tian: the original context of thinking in China 
 
The terms ‘emperor (di 帝)’ and people in Yin appear in the divination words of 
oracle bone script. In the Song dynasty divination was practiced according to these 
words. The meaning of ‘di’ is close to ‘old grandfather of tian’ (laotianye 老天爷) 
which is located in the sincere heart-mind of Chinese people. Emperor or di is a 
formless existence with many omens and an efficacy which can participate in the life 
of human beings, but is more powerful and deep than anything man-made.[235] 
People in the Song dynasty who relied on the divination words of oracle bone 
script can be compared with people who looked for advice in ancient almanacs or 
worshipped memorial tablets. Oracle bone scripts only had divination words that 
were very short, so it is difficult to continue research of the essence of di except by 
looking into the Book of Documents, Chinese bronze inscriptions, and the folk 
customs of later ages. It is far-fetched to assume di as a ‘supreme god’, and to judge 
it as ‘an anthropomorphic god with will’ is far more groundless. Amun of Egypt and 
Jehovah of Judaism, for example, are anthropomorphic gods. These gods have 
names, the experience of creating earth or a pantheon, conventions to be followed, 
and their own dispositions. These gods have an underlying state or substance 
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(hypostasis). They are independent substances who have reasons and wills. With 
divination words, we know only that people in the Song dynasty believed this di 
could answer their questions, by interpreting the pattern of the cracks in the bones of 
oxen or the shells of tortoises. Hence, such an activity is only concerned with 
efficacy. According to the Book of Documents and Chinese bronze inscriptions 
between the Song and Zhou dynasties, we can deduce that di and tian are closely 
related. After this period, tian takes on the meaning of di, and di gradually refers 
only to the name of the living emperor in the mundane world. 
People in the Zhou dynasty believed in the mandate of Heaven or tianming and 
divination words, but this tian was not an anthropomorphic god. There are clear 
records, for instance, in the ‘Announcement to the Prince of Kang’, ‘Great 
Announcement’ and ‘Announcement of the Duke of Shao’ in the Book of 
Documents; ‘Decade of Wen Wang’ and ‘Decade of Dang’ in the Classic of Poetry; 
zhōng bells and dǐng tripodal cauldrons, and so on, that suggest that people in the 
Zhou dynasty knew that ‘tianming was not unchangeable’, it only accorded with 
people who had virtue or ‘de’. Religions that have an anthropomorphic god always 
take absolute faith, race, and rules rather than de as the primary measure of ‘the 
candidacy of God’, because it is only in this way that the substance {hypostasis} and  
the subjective will of such gods can be embodied. Hence, there is no equivalent 
general faith in a supreme anthropomorphic god in China, as evidenced by the 
clearly written Chinese records. There are some sacrificial ceremonies towards gods 
(including ancestors) recorded in the Zuo Zhuan and Discourses of the States or 
Guoyu, but, as I state in what follows, sacrificial ceremony did not always entail the 
worship of an anthropomorphic god, nor did it always mean faith in a supreme 
anthropomorphic god. For people in the Zhou dynasty, what was supreme was tian, 
and this tian is closely connected with our way of existence.[236] 
‘Tian’ replacing ‘di’ suggests that, as the fundamental dominant power, it became 
more and more contextual and natural for the ancient Chinese. When people looked 
skyward, it was tian they perceived: the great horizon of an unlimited realm. The 
character of ‘tian’ resembles ‘human’ in both oracle bone script and Chinese bronze 
inscriptions. It has an additional stroke atop the symbol of ‘great’ to suggest its 
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supremacy. However, this tian is not only a natural sky including the stars and 
moon. It also has an important aspect of efficacious foretelling 灵验. People in the 
Zhou dynasty believed that tian was a ‘moral’ power that punished the bad and 
benefitted the good. While this may have been its assumed meaning for the Zhou 
people, tian also has various other original meanings besides establishing the 
distinction between good and bad. In fact, tian has many meanings which are subtler 
than the Western terms ‘god’, ‘heaven’ and ‘existence’, so its original meanings 
cannot be analysed clearly by traditional Western concepts. Its originality is 
analogous to the one (neither have nor have not) of Rigveda of the Indian Veda, but 
it is more contextual and mundane. In the everyday linguistic context, ‘tian ah’, the 
Chinese experience and embody the meaning of tian. This tian is in-between form 
and formless, near and far, wu and you; ‘I am looking at it in front of me, and 
suddenly it is behind me’ (Analects 9.11). And ‘what barrenness, what a desert! In 
their midst are the figures. What barrenness, what desert! In their midst are the 
things. What nebulosity, what obscurity! And what seminal energies in their midst! 
The seminal energies are genuine. Therein is trustworthiness’165 (Daodejing 21). It 
is everywhere, but it is not fixed in any abstract concept. It is the ultimate notion that 
the Chinese want to understand. The ancient Greeks drew their questions from 
‘being’, and they subsequently developed the questions of ‘being itself’ or ‘existence 
itself.’ For modern Westerners, subjectivity assumes the position of Being at the 
helm of thought. Ancient Indians tried to find the original source that lay beyond all 
the realms of names. Chinese people favoured tian in the pre-Qin dynasty, but this 
tian is not an ideal form. It does not take subjectivity as central, nor is it beyond the 
phenomenal world. Rather, it is the ultimate of the in-between that gives all meaning 
in the world and life. 
People in the Zhou dynasty and later still performed sacrificial ceremonies 
towards ancestors, mountains, rivers, heaven and earth, and tiandi. However, this 
was not the worshipping of an anthropomorphic god in the Western sense. Rather, it 
was closer to the Confucian expression ‘sacrifice as though present’, taken to mean 
                                                          
165 Hans-Georg Moeller and Laozi, Daodejing (Laozi): A Complete Translation and Commentary 
(Chicago: Open Court, 2007), 53. 
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‘sacrifice to the spirits as though the spirits are present’ (Analects 3.12). That is, 
spirits are present through their perceived influence as a mutual stimulus or trigger 
of existence. Now we have a more complex situation. On the one hand, [237] the 
form and the content of sacrificial ceremony began to separate. The discussion of the 
mandate of heaven denounces the supernatural in claiming that ‘The country is 
going to flourish, the king follows the masses, and otherwise, the king follows the 
spirits’ (Zuozhuan.zhuanggong). ‘Tian has no preference, it only supports the king 
who has virtue’ (Shangshu.Zhongcaizhiming) and, ‘the Dao of Tian is far away, but 
the Dao of the human is near to us’. On the other hand, it is disputable for 
understanding the meaning of ‘masses (min 民)’, ‘de’and ‘the Dao of human or 
rendao’. People endeavoured to find the original power which could inhibit and 
empower, which meant finding a more pure and immanent tian. As the Classic of 
Poetry states: ‘Let me be reverent, let me be reverent, [in attending to my duties]; 
[The way of] Heaven is evident, and its appointment is not easily [preserved]. Let 
me not say that it is high aloft above me. It ascends and descends about our 
doings’.166 
Because Chinese thought is fundamentally concerned with the meaning of 
perceivable tian, its ultimate pursuit is interconnected with ‘all under the Heaven or 
tianxia’ from the very beginning. It rejects those ideas which can imperil this context 
of tiandi (枭乱天下) or rigid transcendent ideas. The ‘conservative’ and immanent 
undogmatic ‘open’ in Chinese culture both emerge from here. But it is impossible to 
discard one to choose another. This tianxia means this world: it includes both the 
world of the human and nature. In another sense, it means that the world of the 
human includes the world of nature, and the world of nature includes the world of 
the human. As a poem says, ‘The spring is gone with running water and falling 
petals, the image is the world of human from Heaven’.167 Hence, it is too narrow 
and cannot contain all meanings of the term if we use the Western categories of 
language and philosophy to discuss it. For instance, if one states that it is ‘mundane’, 
                                                          
166 敬之敬之、天维显思、命不易哉。无曰高高在上、陟降厥士、日监在兹[8]. 
167 流水落花春去 天上人间. 
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then one loses the meaning of the contexts of the ultimate and of depth; if one states 
that it is ‘ethical’ and ‘social and political’, then one neglects the meaning of its 
natural side. In fact, it has both the meaning of nature and to ‘constantly abide in 
equilibrium’ in ‘ethics’ and ‘society ‘, which is very different from the ideas of 
Aristotle, Kant and Nietzsche. If one takes Chinese tian and dao as Western 
‘philosophy’ it is an injustice. It is inappropriate to take it as ‘metaphysics’, ‘ethics’, 
‘political philosophy’ and ‘aesthetics’. To use the old Western tradition to approach 
Chinese culture, [238] medicine, history and economics is to approach nonlinear 
questions through linear means— an approach that is rarely successful. 
In the Discourses of Yue (Guoyu.Yueyuxia), there is a record of the discussion of 
how Fanli assisted the king of Yue in obtaining Wu and Yue. From this we can 
discern the direct experience of tian among the people of the Spring and Autumn 
period, and we can also learn the difference between the tian of our lived context 
which can reveal and withdraw and tian as principle and concept. In the Spring and 
Autumn period, the feudal princes fought each other, and there was flourishing and 
decline among states. For Fanli, even though the tian or tiandi (tiandi is a more vivid 
expression of tiandao) itself has no determination or forms, it can determine the 
existence of human and state. Further, people not only can, but also must, be 
involved in the movement of tianming. This is not to say, as some scholars maintain, 
that Chinese thought has a tradition of ‘humanism’, but also, it is not ‘tiandaoism’ 
either. Rather, it is a co-dependence between tian and ren 人‘tian that punishes or 
rewards people according to their behaviour, the sage acts according to the signs or 
omens of tian’ 168 (Guanzi. 41). If the affairs of people cannot match with tian, it is 
only the affairs of people that are without ultimate meaning. Once the affairs of 
humans match tian, it is as though ‘one wins the war and will not suffer revenge, and 
seizes the territory without repulsion from the masses’ (Guoyu), and becomes the 
ultimate power to form the state of tianxia or tianming. Hence, it is the responsibility 
of the Son of Heaven (tianzi) to coalesce with the movement of tian; this is directly 
connected with the existence of the political state. 
                                                          
168 天因人，聖人因天. 
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However, this is not easy to achieve: it is neither a question of ‘following the rule 
of movements of heaven and earth or tiandi’, nor is it a question of moral self-
discipline. This is because the match between the ultimate place of the movements 
of tiandi and the place needed to make one’s decision is understood by insight rather 
than direct language. The perspective of Western traditional philosophy cannot 
penetrate further here. For Fanli and those who experienced great awakenings in that 
period, the most authentic embodiment of tian is ‘time’, or, as it can mean, 
‘appropriate time’: it disrupts the category of objective presence and merges with the 
realm of pure embodied existence. As Fanli said, ‘The dao of Tian is full but does 
not spill, flourishes but is not arrogant, contributes but does not take this as a merit. 
Hence, the sage’s acts can follow the appropriate time, and that accords with the 
time’.169 The ancient Chinese use the phrase ‘A but not a’ to exemplify their 
perspective of non-objective presence. In this context, A is natural embodiment, and 
‘śūnyatā and interdependent arising’, while a is the objective presence of A. Tian is 
part of our existence, it is embodied anywhere, whereas all a are together, it is only 
part of tian. At the level of a, all endeavours are neither too late nor too early in 
seizing the appropriate time of tian; such endeavours cannot be on the level of 
perceiving the opportunity. Fanli tried to stop Goujian from beginning a war with the 
state of Wu, because he knew that the time of tian was not yet ripe, the affairs of 
humans were not yet ready; if one was eager to act in some way, it would be ‘against 
Heaven and humans’.170 Goujian did not accept this, and he lost the war against Wu. 
When Goujian began to listen to Fanli’s instructions on how to survive in a 
tumultuous time, he began to believe that heaven, earth and humans (tiandiren) was 
not pedantic discussion, and rather, it was a reliable means of predicting the Dao. 
And then, when Goujian followed Fanli’s idea that different situations of the 
appropriate time of tian (tianshi) should have different actions, he restrained his 
outward judgement. Fanli thus waited where the realm of ‘The affairs of humans 
must match and communicate with heaven and earth, and then people can 
                                                          
169 天道盈而不溢，盛而不驕，勞而不矜其功。夫聖人隨時以行，是謂守時. 
170 逆于天而不和于人. 
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succeed’.171 When the opportunity of war was arising, one was to ‘follow the 
appropriate time, [...] like firefighting and catching criminals.’172 Once one seized 
that change, one was to follow the position of tian, follow tianming, and destroy the 
kingdom of Wu thoroughly. That is, ‘once one seizes the appropriate time, one 
should respond immediately, because the appropriate time will not come again. 
When tian presents an opportunity, and one does not seize it, it may instead become 
dangerous for oneself’ 173 (Discourses of the States). Such appropriate time is 
neither an inflexibly linear cosmological time nor the model-based calculation of 
chance. Rather, it is the time of pure constitution. It resonates with Heidegger’s 
‘temporality’ and ‘temporalization’, but it has less theoretical focus and is instead 
more directly vivid in Chinese historical life. 
A major feature of Chinese culture and thought is that history has pure thinking 
constitution or ‘the will of tian' (tianyi). History is not merely a material on which to 
record great events and the course of philosophy. There were almost no historical 
myths in Chinese culture, and there is no myth of creation in Chinese mainstream 
thought. There are only poems without punctuation and paragraphs, which recorded 
history and reveal the ethos in China. The scripts in the Book of Documents and 
Classic of Poetry can still communicate with the modern Chinese. It is a mysterious 
phenomenon. Why was it that, in all the different ancient cultures, only the Chinese 
were so conscientious and faithful in recording their history? [240] 
There were historians in each dynasty, and all such historians used brushes to 
record dates and events on bamboo, although such information was ‘purely 
descriptive’. Because of this, it is a subtleness help to the Chinese understanding of 
the appropriate time of tian. If there were no actual events referring to the historical 
background recorded by the Spring and Autumn Annals, Zuozhuan and Guoyu, then 
the quotations of Fanli may be inflexible and analytical. However, many interpreters 
tend to read the Laozi, Zhuangzi and Huineng in an overt, explicit manner which 
                                                          
171 夫人事必将与天地相参，然後乃可以成功. 
172 This is a metaphor highlighting the quickness and aptness of action required that is typical of 
 both scenarios. 从时者，犹救火、追亡人也. 
173 得時無怠，時不再來，天予不取，反之为災 國語越語下. 
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loses the meaning of that subtleness. Mencius said: ‘Confucius completed the Spring 
and Autumn Annals and struck terror into the hearts of of rebellious subjects and 
undutiful sons’ (Mencius 3B9). He also said: ‘Confucius was apprehensive and 
composed the Spring and Autumn Annals’ (Mencius 3B9). Strictly speaking, this is 
the Emperor’s prerogative. That is why Confucius said: ‘those who understand me 
will do so through the Spring and Autumn Annals; those who condemn me will also 
do so because of the Spring and Autumn Annals’ (Mencius 3B9). These sentences, 
though overstated (and the quotes may not originally come from Confucius), suggest 
the great power these historical texts have for Chinese thinkers. When Plato wrote 
the Republic, he directly stated his ideas about how to govern the state. The Indian 
sages who wrote the Upanishads took this world as broken shoes, and only pursued 
the realm of ‘Brahman as his or her own true self’ (梵我為一). In contrast, Confucius 
purposefully kept silent: ‘but do not hear him discourse on subjects such as our 
natural disposition and the way of tian’ (Analects 5.13) ‘following the proper way, I 
do not forge new paths’ (Analects 7.1). This was to let history itself speak 
(Confucius’ composition of the Spring and Autumn Annals neither changed the facts 
nor made any commentaries). It is only in this way that our thinking can be set free 
from the frame of objective presence and conjecture. One can then understand that 
the proper time, simultaneously, is to reach such a level that ‘[one] could give [their] 
heart-and-mind free rein without overstepping the boundaries’ (Analects 2.4) and the 
ultimate realm of ‘[giving] up their lives in order to achieve it (ren)’ (Analects 15.9). 
We will discuss this again in the later section on Confucianism. 
Hence, seizing the appropriate time of tian as the ultimate reality does not consist 
in another metaphysical principle. It means a way of thinking, speaking, and a realm 
of lived action that is different from what one finds in Indian and Western traditions. 
As such, this is a question of thorough study and perceiving the subtle, and thus 
knowing tian. Compared with Fanli, Goujian and Fuchai were laymen who only 
knew guesses, aims, and methods. But such a study is different from the study of 
mathematics, analytical logic, and yoga, because it does not seek a single skill, 
theory, or situation of consciousness. Rather, it is the ‘ultimate ability’ which can be 
seen in the context of existence (shi 時).[241] 
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This study of the time of tian has no fixed ‘object' that is pursued. Rather, what is 
pursued is the ability not to be restrained by the objects in objective presence, but to 
do so while remaining within the context of interconnected phenomena 
{interdependent arising}. Hence, this study is nonlinear: it is both gain and loss, ‘A 
but not a’. Outstanding scholars not only have the ability to use abstract concepts 
and deduction to follow moral rules, but they also have the ability to always remain 
sensitive to the appropriate time, and remain in the phenomenal context. Confucius, 
Laozi and Huineng all understood the meaning of ‘study’, although their expressions 
of it differed. Because of this, sages in the heart-mind of the Chinese are not 
philosophers in the Western sense (Plato, Aristotle), martyrs (such as Jesus, 
Socrates), or Indian philosophers who took the realm of ‘Brahman as their own true 
self’. Rather, Chinese sages were acting timely. Hence, Mencius takes Confucius as 
‘the sage whose actions were timely’ (Mencius 4B1). Similarly, the followers of 
Zhuangzi praise him in claiming that: ‘his grasp of it was broad, expansive, and 
penetrating; profound, liberal, and unimpeded. Nevertheless, in responding to 
change and expounding on the world of things, he set forth principles that will never 
cease to be valid, an approach that can never be shuffled off’ (Zhuangzi.tianxia 9). 
Thus, there is no fixed manner of knowing the timeliness of tian. Any possibility 
of stimulating and communicating with others, and achieving awakening, is to be 
found through right opportunity, by knowing tian. But these are all concrete, and 
mainstream Chinese thought has different opinions on the concrete expression of 
tiandao and the primary ways of practising it. In spite of this, ‘all the different ways 
can go to the same direction, and all the different considerations can have the same 
aim’.174 Zhouyi.xicixia Furthermore, if such expression is closer to our daily life, 
there is a greater chance of recognizing the subtlety of tianshi. People have had a 
knowledge of this type of time since birth, but such a ‘knowledge’ is not an innate 
knowing of principle, nor a knowing of essence. Rather, it always appears in the 
appropriate actions that follow the time. Attaining the dao of tiandi is only to extend 
the inborn time known to our life and all things, that is, ‘extending this path to the 
                                                          
174 天下同归而殊途，一致而百虑 易系辞下 
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furthest quarters and exhausting its every detail, they reach to the highest and 
brightest limits’.175 In our world, full of time and context as it is, what is crucial is 
whether we are capable of ‘correlating one’s conduct with those near at hand’176 and 
then to ‘make good [our] deficiencies’ (Mencius 6B15). When Fanli discusses the art 
of war, it has the style of the military school and the school of yinyang. ‘In ancient 
time people who good at military take four seasons as the principle’ (Discourses of 
the States. Yueyuxia). [242] 
When Westerners encounter Chinese medicine, which is based on yinyang and 
the five phases (wuxing ), they may feel confused. It may also confuse people to 
state that heaven and earth (tiandi) and the four seasons (sishi) can be the natural law 
for the art of military strategy to follow. If we connect the former discussion about 
the traits of Chinese thinking with the important position of tian, however, 
considering that many Chinese applied it in their lives successfully for a long time, 
we then can deduce that it is a method that, when applied, uses admittedly 
phenomenal contextual methods (for example, set purposes, collect data, sacrificial 
ceremonies), but it still may still benefit our perception and help us go further. 
Hence, yin and yang are not two ‘categories’, nor do they arise from a reductivism of 
simplifying all kinds of things’ double traits. Rather, they are the most 
comprehensible constitutive interdependence that can stimulate others in our pure 
phenomenal existence. In the ancient Chinese intellectual atmosphere, when one 
mentions yin or yang, there is a reflection of constitutive understanding or situation 
perception; when one mentions yin and yang intermingled, there will be another 
interesting realm of thinking. For Fanli, the jargon works as follows: 
When one tries to defend, one should use the Dao of yin, when one tries to 
attack, one should use the Dao of yang; when the enemy tries to advance close 
to one, one should use the Dao of the soft, when the enemy tries to retreat, one 
should use the Dao of the hard. But when one defends, one cannot be too 
                                                          
175 Roger T. Ames and David L. Hall, Focusing the Familiar: A Translation and Philosophical 
Interpretation of the Zhongyong (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001), 109. 
176 Ames and Jr, 110. 
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covert (yin), and when one attacks, one cannot be too overt (yang)177 
(Discourses of the States. 7). 
This jargon has the meaning of a specific thinking pattern and effect of constitution. 
This is a ‘category intuition’ of the pre-Qin. However, there is no concrete way of 
telling what kind of defence and skills are following yin and yang and the concrete 
way of working in appropriate time. 
 
2 The Original Tiandao of Confucius’s Perspective 
 
Following the discussion of the previous chapter and section, it will be easier to 
continue. Up to now, the original meaning of tian is still hidden. Those scholars who 
focus on Chinese history of philosophy tend to use Western concepts and principle 
to divide tiandao into different parts, [243] the tian of governing, the tian of nature, 
the tian of principle, the mandate of tian, and so on. They take the tian of governing 
as an anthropomorphic God that belongs to the religious tradition of the Shang 
dynasty. They also take Laozi and Confucius to be betraying this tradition, or the 
dao of the human. Tian will become an empty sign if it does not have an original 
meaning. If tian has lost its ‘original happening’, how is it possible for Chinese 
thinking that ‘it is the unadorned that enhances colour’ (Analects 3.8)? 
When one says that one admires Chinese culture, which ‘tian’ does one refer to? 
Is it the tian of governing, the tian of nature, the material tian, the tian of principle, 
or the tian of fate? If so, one does not need to find these specifically in Chinese 
culture: in the West and India a more systematic and supreme version can be found. 
Properly appreciated, tian is suffused with the Chinese intellectual atmosphere: 
‘what tian promotes-so profound and unceasing’.178 It is what gives direction to 
Chinese culture, ‘[g]reat indeed is the sage’s proper path. So vast and expansive, it 
propagates and nurtures all things; so towering, it reaches up to the skies’.179  
                                                          
177 国语越语下：后则用阴，先则用阳；近则用柔，远则用刚。阴节不尽，柔而不可迫. 
178 Ames and Hall, 108. 维天之命，於穆不已. 
179 Ibid., 大哉聖人之道！洋洋乎, 發育萬物，峻極于天 中庸 27. 
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So broad, expansive, and profoundly deep, in a timely way they express these 
virtues. So broad and expansive like the heavens themselves; so profoundly 
deep like a bottomless abyss: they appear and all defer to them; they speak and 
all have confidence in what they say; they act and all find pleasure in what 
they do.  
It is for this reason that their fame spreads out over the central states, 
extending to the Man and Mo barbarians in the south and north. Everywhere 
that boats and carriages ply, everywhere that people’s strength penetrates, 
everywhere that is sheltered by the heavens and is borne up by the earth, 
everywhere that is illumined by the sun and moon, everywhere that the frosts 
and dew settle—all creatures that have breath and blood revere and love them. 
Thus it is said that they are the complement of tian180 
‘[H]ow majestic! Only tian is truly great’ (Analects 8.19). Confucius spent his life 
trying to explain this: ‘from fifty I realized the propensities of tian (tianming); from 
seventy I could give my heart-and-mind free rein without overstepping the 
boundaries’ (Analects 2.4). If one does not know the relevant natural origin and 
background of the text, it is difficult for one to discern the proper meaning of the 
analects of Confucius, and he or she may take it as ‘ethics’, ‘politics’, ‘cultivation 
theory’, or ‘education theory’, as Hegel did. They may then undermine Confucius's 
aim as a mere concern with the ‘training of morals’ and ‘poetic wisdom’. Rather, 
Confucius takes inheriting the culture and li of the Zhou dynasty as his 
responsibility, based on its resonance with tian and understanding of tian. 
When the Master was surrounded in Kuang, he said, ‘with King Wen long dead, 
does not our cultural heritage reside here in us? If tian was going to destroy 
[244] this legacy, we latecomers would not have had access to it. If tian is not 
going to destroy this culture, what can the people of Kuang do to me?’ (Analects 
9.5)  
Fundamentally, the culture of the Zhou dynasty understood the will of tian and 
tianming. People in the Zhou dynasty had the sense that ‘[t]he destiny of Tian is 
changeable’ (which is similar with the idea that ‘all actions are changeable 诸行无常
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’in Buddhism). They did not, however, conclude that there was an anthropomorphic 
god who required worship, nor that the mandate of heaven or tianming could be 
disregarded to do as one wished. Rather, they developed a perspective of ‘following 
the middle way,’181 which was to use the existence of human life to match tian. 
The will of tian in our living world was thus maintained in the Zhou dynasty 
through li, music and ceremonies. This is a very rare occurrence in the world’s 
history of culture; Confucius understood this and greatly admired it. 
‘Rituals must be based on tian, be complete in our world, and become our 
concrete everyday life, the rituals change according to the appropriate time’182 (the 
Book of Rites.9). Li is not only records and stipulations of social systems, 
ceremonies, and ethical relationships among human beings, they also have the 
meaning of direct experience of present constitution when we practice these li. For 
Confucius, li is one kind of art, that is, an art to improve life, to reveal a new realm 
of understanding and subtle profundity. Hence, a person’s participation in li is very 
important: ‘if I myself do not participate in the sacrifice, it is as though I have not 
sacrificed at all’ (Analects 3.12). Because of this, the expression ‘sacrifice as 
though present’ is taken to mean ‘sacrifice to the spirits as though the spirits are 
present’ (Analects 3.12). As such, it does not conflict with the claim that ‘to show 
respect for the ghosts and spirits while keeping them at a distance can be called 
wisdom’ (Analects 6.22). Rather, they connect with each other in one sense. The 
former speaks of the spirits of presence (Heidegger’s Anwesen) in ritual 
ceremonies, the latter one is in the meaning of objective presence. Spirits are taken 
as objects of praying and sacrifice, so we need to maintain a distance with them. 
And, because we keep such a distance and respect spirits, they are transposed as 
spirits in the realm of constitutive context. In the process of having to ‘sacrifice to 
the spirits as though the spirits are present’, the fundamentally existential idea of 
Confucius is revealed: the encounter of existence in the process of action and 
engaging (the original meaning of Middle Way), the way of thinking of perceiving 
                                                          
181 惟精惟一，允執厥中. 
182 夫礼必本于天，动而之地，列而之事，变而从时. 
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real knowledge (the original meaning of Middle Way). This ‘ru 如’ is not ‘like’, 
rather, it is ‘sacrifice to the spirits as though the spirits are present’ means ‘being in 
the time of sacrifice to the spirits, being in the meaning of the will of spirits’ or 
‘when sacrificing, being with the spirits’. Confucius does not hold a special attitude 
towards spirits or ghosts, as most people assume. In his horizon, there are no 
dominant ‘strange happenings, the use of force, disorder, or the spirits’ (Analects 
7.21) outside of our experience of lives (for instance sacrifice). Rather, he has [245] 
a sincere attitude and is engaged with the ghosts that are revealed in the process of 
sacrifice. 
The virtue (de) of the gods and spirits is profound. Looking, we do not see them; 
listening, we do not hear them, and yet they inform events (wu) to the extent that 
nothing can be what it is without them. Because of them, the people of the world 
fast, purify themselves, and put on their finest clothes in carrying out the 
sacrifices to them. It is as though the air above our head is suffused with them, 
and as though they are all around. The book of song says: the descent of the 
gods, cannot be fathomed— how much less can it be ignored. Such is the way 
that the inchoate becomes manifest and creativity is irrepressible.183  
This paragraph accords with Heidegger’s hermeneutic context, and the perspective 
of interrelated arising. There must be distance between human and spirits, 
‘[l]ooking, we do not see them; listening, we do not hear them’. Hence, it is 
inappropriate to worship spirits as anthropomorphic gods. We can only have an 
attitude of ‘being there’ in which it is appropriate to ‘sacrifice to the spirits as though 
the spirits are present’. Having this attitude, we will then have a consistent and 
continually happening place (yuanfadi 缘发地), having a sincere context which is ‘as 
though the air above our head is suffused with them, and as though they are all 
around’. This will be to subtly reveal the virtue of spirits. Hence, it is not a de of 
objective presence in tian, which cannot be attained by following social rules and the 
wisdom of our ancestors; this virtue is a natural constitution of rituals and education. 
                                                          
183 Ames and Hall, 96. 
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The reason why Confucius maintains this attitude of sincerity of present 
constitution is closely related with the attitude of the ancient Chinese, who took the 
time of tian as the ultimate reality. For the ancient wise Chinese, there was no 
present reality and sincere situation that could be separated from ‘happening’ and 
‘opportunity/time’. Hence, to understand the ultimate reality is not to analyse 
concepts in order to grasp the idea of substance, nor is it to experience an inward 
spiritual situation through yoga practice. Rather, it should be understood as seizing 
the time of tian through appropriate ‘art’ action to be taken in the constitution of 
stimulus-- as though the spirits are present. Based on the movements of moon and 
sun, yin and yang, and the atmosphere of the situation(xingshi 形势) of human 
affairs, Fan Li had the insight of tianshi; Confucius acquired an appreciation of 
sacrificing ‘as though the spirits are present’ through complex rituals. This spirit is 
not a blind object. Rather, it is a stimulus through rituals, it is a wisdom beyond 
homiletic ethics and ultimate sincerity. Confucius praised the rituals of the Zhou 
dynasty which did not aim at knowing some specific tianshi in a situation. Instead, 
he wanted to embody the sincere situation of communicating tian and di in the 
middle way. [246] 
He could thereby communicate with everything, and finally, know tian and ming.  
‘Creativity is the way of tian; creating is the proper way of becoming human. 
Creativity is achieving equilibrium and focus (zhong 中) without coercion; it 
is succeeding without reflection. Freely and easily traveling the centre of the 
way-- that is the sage’.184  
The supreme realm of the Ru school is the original pure constitution of matching 
goodness, which is beyond general virtues. That is, it is the original meaning of 
benevolence (ren). For Confucius, if one knows the sacrificial rites (di 禘), it is easy 
for her or him to govern a state (Analects 3.11). This is because rituals can guide 
people to the ultimate sincere tiandao. Hence, Confucius could not tolerate those 
who ruined rituals or those who used rituals to serve themselves. Ritual, for 
Confucius, is the art that can communicate with tian and attain the ultimate realm of 
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life: the peaceful tianxia, the welfare of humanity. As such, the rituals were not 
merely unnecessary practices used to maintain the old system. Of course, rituals 
were only one way for Confucius to stimulate students to a state of constitutive 
situation, and for them to maintain this state for a long period of time. The Classic of 
Poetry, The Book of Documents, music, and the six arts were the other ways that 
could open the doors of wisdom and were part of the subtlety (几微) of the Middle 
Way. For Confucius, tiandao is the Middle Way. This middle is not the objective 
presence of a mean between two extremes, rather, it means to get rid of all thoughts 
of objective presence, and to stay in the realm of constitution. Likewise, this is not 
obstinacy, but to always remain in the middle of the Ultimate. That is, ‘targeting the 
aim in the proper time’ (shizhong 时中四声), which means that ‘[c]reativity is 
achieving equilibrium and focus without coercion’, ‘Once the emotions have arisen, 
that they are all brought into proper focus is called harmony’.185 Take Confucius as 
‘the sage whose actions were timely’, whose actions properly target it. ‘I am looking 
at it in front of me, and suddenly it is behind me’ (Analects 9.11). This flexible 
atmosphere permeates the Analects of Confucius, it derives from the natural 
tendency of targeting the aim at the proper time of pure constitution. When we read 
it, we can only admire and sigh, for ‘that it is a rare among the people is an old 
story’ (Analects 6.29). 
‘We can learn from the Master’s cultural refinements, but not hear him discourse 
on subjects such as our ‘natural disposition’ and ‘the way of tian’ (Analects 5.13). 
The Master only rarely spoke about personal advantage, the propensity of 
circumstances, or authoritative conduct (Analects 9.1). The students of Confucius 
noticed this fact, and this suggests that ancient scholars generally care about and 
discuss natural tendency or xing, mandate or ming and the dao of heaven. The 
Classic of Poetry, the Book of Documents and the Zuozhuang have many records 
about natural tendency, the mandate and dao of heaven. However, Confucius 
avoided these topics during his lecturing. This is a point of confusion for later neo-
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Confucians, but they still provide an explanation for this. Zhu Xi’s commentary 
gives one possible explanation of this unusual issue. [247] 
Zhu Xi argues that Confucius would not normally tell his students about natural 
tendency and tiandao. Hence, when Zigong heard Confucius speak of tiandao, he 
praised his luck in hearing Confucius. Alternatively, it may be supposed that there 
were some secret mental cultivation methods that Confucius would not normally tell 
his students.186 Actually, on the contrary, the master said: ‘My young friends, you 
think that I have something hidden away, but I do not’ (Analects 7.24). Confucius 
shared his actions with his students; there were no such secrets. To not have spoken 
of tiandao and natural tendency does not mean that Confucius did not care about 
these questions. In fact, these questions were all-too important for Confucius, who is 
the sage whose actions were timely. Tian is great, hence it was necessary to reveal 
the ultimate meaning of such actions through present constitution or targeting the 
aim on proper time, and he could not use the objective present manner to enunciate 
it. This is also represented in his attitude towards spirits and the world after death.  
Zilu asked how to serve the spirits and the gods. The master replied, ‘not yet 
being able to serve people, how would you be able to serve the spirits?’ Zilu 
said, ‘may I ask about death?’ the master replied, ‘not yet understanding life, 
how could you understand death?’ (Analects 11.12) 
From the foregoing discussion, Confucius was indeed concerned with spirits and 
death; he merely couldn’t ‘serve’ spirits or have an objective present attitude 
towards spirits and death. He is only willing to engage with constitutive, present and 
insightful spirits through vivid and opening sacrifice and other appropriate times, 
rather than talking about some substantial spirits and the situation of another world. 
‘Do not look at anything that violates the observance of ritual propriety; do not 
speak about anything that violates the observance of ritual propriety; do not do 
anything that violates the observance of ritual propriety’ (Analects 12.1). It is not 
only suggested that we should restrain our desires, but also that we cannot know the 
meaning of the mandate of heaven, spirits and death without vital rituals. Ritual 
                                                          
186 朱熹注解性与天道不可得而闻之，子贡至是始得而闻之，而叹其美也 79 四书集注. 
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propriety is neither empty form, nor the objective presence which can be separated 
from context. ‘What has a person who is not authoritative got to do with observing 
ritual propriety? What has a person who is not authoritative got to do with the 
playing of music’ (Analects 3.3). 
Mainly, ren is not one single virtue for Confucius. Hence, one who has other 
virtues does not neccessary have ren but people who have ren must all have 
goodness. For Confucius, ren is the fundamental way of thinking or the appropriate 
attitude towards ultimate reality. ‘Correlating one’s conduct with those near at hand 
can be said to be the method of becoming an authoritative person’ (Analects 6.30). 
‘Correlating one’s conduct with those near at hand’ suggests that there is no ready 
natural tendency of ren, but ren is not totally decided by the outward world, it can be 
constructed by ‘ correlating one’s conduct’ {communicative reflection}. Only one 
‘correlating one’s conduct’ which can reflect {as near} our natural tendency – ren; 
that is the meaning of ‘human beings are similar in their natural tendencies, but vary 
greatly by virtue of their habits’(Analects 17.2). Hence, ‘authoritative persons 
establish others in seeking to establish themselves and promote others in seeking to 
get there themselves’ (Analects 6.30).[248] 
From the other side, that is, ‘do not impose on others what you yourself do not 
want’ (Analects 15.24). This is not equivalent to dictating to people what to do and 
what not to, as with the dictum to ‘love your enemy’ or that ‘one cannot lie’. Also, it 
is not only an expansion to others: because this self or self-desire is not settled, it has 
to be constituted in the process of establishing people and promoting people. Hence, 
ren is only the constitutive principle of mutual encounters and mutual establishment, 
and the principle of the middle way, and is one way to approach the pure context of 
our natural tendency. For Confucius, this is the notion that makes his ideas ‘bound 
together with one continuous strand’ (Analects 4.15), such that they can ‘be acted 
upon until the end of one’s day’ (Analects 15.24). 
Hence, the Dao of ren and tiandao both participate in communicating the 
meaning of ‘[grasping] it sincerely and without deviation’ (Analects 20.1). Attain 
ren know tian, practice the dao of ren in order to know the dao of tian, Cultivate 
your body first and then cultivate a family and then one can govern a state, these 
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descend in one continuous line. However, if one wants to cultivate oneself, one has 
to straighten one’s heart-mind first; if one wants to straighten one’s heart-mind, one 
has to make his or her will sincere; if one wants to make his or her will sincere, one 
has to get knowledge; if one wants to get knowledge, one has to observe things. Zhu 
Xi used zhi (至) to explain ge (格), shi (事)to explain wu (物), so ‘格物致知’ for Zhu 
Xi the meaning is ‘seeking the principle of events, then one can have all the 
knowledge’.187 This is quite general. In contrast, Lu Jiuyuan and Wang Yangming 
claimed that ‘ge is straight and sincere, so one can straighten that which is not’. 
They therefore questioned the criteria for the ‘straight’. If our innate goodness has 
already been effaced by selfish desires. If someone already knows that which is 
‘straight’, but has not acted accordingly, then we cannot say that the person truly 
knows what is ‘straight’. This is so because Wang Yangming maintains the 
importance of continuity of knowledge and practice. Following the meaning of our 
context, we know that this ge wu is neither seeking the principle of things, nor using 
the objective presence of the ‘straight’to get rid of what is ‘not straight’. Rather, it is 
a communicative way with wu through art/skill, in order to stimulate the knowledge 
of tian of constitutive situation. Doing so, the sincere will may be attained. The 
knowledge of experimental observation and the knowledge of the natural tendency 
of the heart which already has such a framework (for example, the pattern of tian, 
‘straight heart’) are different, and cannot attain the ‘ultimate sincerity’. Later Ru 
scholars generally underestimate the skills or arts which seem irrelevant to virtue 
and reading texts, because they do not understand the subtle meaning of ge wu. 
Actually, one trait of Confucius’ ideas is ‘ge wu zhizhi’ being there through six 
arts/skills. Fundamentally, the six classical texts are also a kind of skill or art of 
literature rather than some conceptual or theoretical texts. 
The childhood experience of Confucius here contributes to his way of thinking. 
[249] Confucius said, ‘we were poor when I was young, so I learned many a menial 
skill.’ (Analects 9.6) and ‘it is because I have never been appointed to office that I 
have learned these many arts’ (Analects 9.7). These experiences show that 
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Confucius could not have held any primarily conceptual way of thinking, or non-
artistic/skill-based way of thinking. ‘There were four things the Master abstained 
from entirely: he did not speculate, he did not claim or demand certainty, he was not 
inflexible, and he was not self-absorbed’ (Analects 9.4). For Confucius, it is not that 
the more skills one has the better, the essential thing is to understand the realm of 
thinking of non-objective presence.   
The Master said, ‘Zigong, do you take me to be someone who has learned a 
great deal and who can remember it all?’ Zigong replied, ‘I do indeed. Is it not 
so?’ ‘No, it is not,’ said the Master, ‘I just pull it together in one continuous 
strand’ (Analects 15.3). 
Hence, the essence of the study of Confucius and the ‘instruction’ (hui 诲) inspiring 
his students is in the way of thinking (ren) which was transformed from the realm of 
art/skill and the way of action of ‘appropriate timing’. Confucius mentions the six 
arts, but Confucius focuses more on the first three arts. ‘I find inspiration by intoning 
the songs, I learn where to stand from observing ritual propriety, and I find 
fulfilment in playing music’ (Analects 8.8). Confucius does not need to mention li 
because his affection towards poems and music and the inward resonance with them 
are rare in the history of thought. ‘The Master said of the Shao music that it is both 
superbly beautiful and superbly felicitous. Of the Wu music he said that it is 
superbly beautiful but not superbly felicitous’ (Analects 3.25). ‘When the Master 
was in the state of Qi he heard the Shao music, and for several months he did not 
know the taste of meat. He said, “I had no idea that music could achieve such 
heights”’ (Analects 7.14). It is not difficult to attain the ‘superbly beautiful’ realm, if 
one attains the superbly felicitous, it is unavoidable to weave it together in one 
continuous strand. Hence, Confucius had an inquiring attitude towards the meaning 
of the Classic of Poetry which is always linked with music. Regarding this, 
Confucius claimed that ‘if you do not study the songs, you will be at a loss as to 
what to say’ (Analects 16.13). This attitude suggests an artistic constitution of 
language, and that Confucius gave his sincere praise to those of his students who 
could transform the realm of songs/poems to other contexts, especially the realm of 
thinking.  
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Zigong said: “what do you think of the saying: ‘poor but not inferior; rich but 
not superior’?” The Master replied: “Not bad, but not as good as: ‘Poor but 
enjoying the way; rich but loving ritual propriety.’” Zigong said: “The Book of 
Songs states: Like bone carved and polished, like jade cut and ground. Is this 
not what you have in mind?” The Master said: “Zigong, it is only with the 
likes of you then that I can discuss the Songs! On the basis of what has been 
said, you know what is yet to come” (Analects 1.15). 
This beautiful dialogue is the outcome of traditional, classical Chinese culture. 
Confucius maintains that being ‘Poor but enjoying the way; rich but loving ritual 
propriety’ is better than ‘poor but not inferior; rich but not superior’, because the 
former has more traits of art or skill. This dialogue originates from the poetic 
thinking of Zigong: ‘Like bone carved and polished, like jade cut and ground’. This 
not only means to keep improving, it also has more significance in transforming the 
rigid meaning of poor and rich, [250] thereby making them sublime. This echoes 
with the reply of Confucius, like the echo of music. Hence, Confucius praises 
Zigong because he properly understands the meaning of the Songs; ‘On the basis of 
what has been said, you know what is yet to come’. This is the trait of wise timing 
which originates from art or skill. Another vivid exchange with Zixia (Analects 3.8) 
concerning the Songs is also about using the artistic realm as a means of 
explanation. Hence, Confucius considered as superbly great and superbly pure ‘the 
songs [that] are three hundred in number, they can be covered in one expression: 
“Go vigorously without swerving”’ (Analects 2.2). If one wants to understand this 
without force, one needs to perceive the songs as an art or skill of pure constitution, 
like music. If one perceives the context of constitution of the songs rather than the 
speaking of objective presence, there is no swerving. Some people think it is too 
forceful to put what Confucius said after the song, but they do not realize that it is 
connected with the way of his thinking. 
In contrast to later Neo-Confucianism, Confucius does not focus on the pattern of 
tian which is counter to the desires of human beings. Rather, he focuses on the realm 
of pure constitution. ‘I have yet to meet the person who is fonder of excellence than 
of physical beauty, and I am afraid I never will’ (Analects 15.13). He wishes to 
162 
 
transform the realm of pure natural constitution of fondness for physical beauty to 
the realm of fondness for excellence. That is to say, being fonder of excellence needs 
to be as vivid as the fondness for physical beauty. We can do this by ‘achieving 
equilibrium and focus without coercion; it is succeeding without reflection. Freely 
and easily traveling the center of the way’ (Zhongyong 20). “‘The cry of the Osprey’ 
is pleasing without being excessive, is mournful without being injurious” (Analects 
3.20). This makes sense because the fondness for physical beauty includes in itself a 
part that is fondness for excellence. Hence, Confucius always believed that to “truly 
love it is better than just to understand it, and to enjoy it is better than simply to love 
it” (Analects 6.20). ‘Happy joy’ (le 樂) is inwardly communicable with ‘music’(yue
樂), if one can take de as happiness (le), one can then be in the musical realm of de. 
‘When they are troubled, they certainly turn to it, as they do in facing difficulties’ 
(Analects 4.5) adequately describes this de.  
The fondness for learning of Confucius resembles neither the curiosity of Greece, 
from which science originated, nor is it derived from the need to be erudite. Rather, 
it is for attaining the realm of happiness and the superbly happy. ‘As a person, 
Confucius is driven by such eagerness to teach and learn that he forgets to eat, he 
enjoys himself so much that he forgets to worry, and does not even realize that old 
age is on its way’ (Analects 7.19). In the Analects, there are troubles, worries and a 
happiness that cannot be separated from life experience, and cannot be manipulated 
by the objective present situation. [251] 
It is touching to read it. ‘The Master said, “To eat coarse food, drink plain water, 
and pillow oneself on a bent arm—there is pleasure to be found in these things. But 
wealth and position gained through inappropriate means—these are to me like 
floating clouds”’ (Analects 7.16). Confucius aimed to apply his ideas through his 
whole life; he failed, but he still always felt pleasure in his efforts. One cannot have 
this if one does not have a realm of thinking of pure constitution which continually 
interweaves one’s life. ‘It is only tian who appreciates me’ (Analects 14.35). In the 
Analects, when there is a realm of ‘pleasure/enjoyment’, there is realm of ‘ultimate 
context’. ‘Other people would not be able to endure his hardships, yet for Hui it has 
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no effect on his enjoyment. A person of character is this Yan Hui’ (Analects 6.11). It 
is not enough to say it is a virtue, because one cannot have this enjoyment without 
the realisation of one’s ultimate natural tendency. 
The dao of governing a state according to Confucius, ‘giving peace to all under 
heaven’ is non-objective presence.  
Ji Kangzi asked Confucius about governing effectively, saying, “What if I kill 
those who have abandoned the way to attract those who are on it?” “If you 
govern effectively,” Confucius replied, “what need is there for killing? If you 
want to be truly adept, the people will also be adept. The excellence of the 
exemplary person is the wind, while that of the petty person is the grass. As 
the wind blows, the grass is sure to bend (Analects 12.19). 
It initially makes sense to ‘kill those who have abandoned the way to attract those 
who are on it’, but this is merely to take dao as an objective presence and objective 
criterion. This criterion of Dao will then be decided by potentate. The real dao of 
governing is constitutive art/skill, and it employs ritual, music and education to 
purify our realm of existence. For Confucius, this is to have ‘effected proper order 
while remaining nonassertive’ (Analects 15.5). Because rituals, music, rightness and 
humaneness are not, and should not be, forcefully added to tianxia, it is how all-
under-heaven can be tianxia as it is not forceful. Hence, Confucius does not approve 
of zuoxingding188(鑄刑鼎), because this will lead to a loss of the art of governing. 
Confucius opposes using an objective present way—the will of potentate, articles of 
law-- to divide the tianxia represented in the statement ‘And yet the four seasons 
turn and the myriad things are born and grow within it’ (Analects 17.19); Also, 
Confucius approves, or at least is not against, any art as a constitutive way of 
governing. He not only approves that ‘if Dao is here, the king uses wuwei to govern 
his or her state’ but he also would not be against a realm of ‘effected proper order 
while remaining non-assertive’ that artistically combined democracy and laws. That 
                                                          
188 An ancient ceremonial pot used for storing legal documents for display to the public. 
Confucius gives two different judgements on the use of this instrument: for Zichang in the 
kingdom of Zheng, Confucius approves such an action, but for kingdom of Jin, Confucius 
disproves, as the masses will doubt the royal authority, and that is dangerous.   
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is why Confucius said ‘As for Yu, I can find no fault with him at all’ (Analects 
8.21). However, Confucius would not agree with a representative system that was 
based on individualism and surface appearance, because this system is a place for 
exchanging and judging interests [252] rather than a place of constitutive art. ‘When 
the way prevails in the world’ fundamentally means the dao of artistic constitution, 
although it accompanies the situation of ‘ritual propriety, musics, and punitive 
campaigns [that] are initiated by the emperor’ (Analects 16.2). It is not always as 
such; ‘if the way does not prevail in the world’ means the concealment of the 
existing situation of constitution, and tianxia is controlled by the objective present 
power (mainly appearing as a massacre) and unchangeable presence. The effective 
governing of Confucius was greatly influenced by the culture of Zhou, but 
fundamentally, it is an open and purely active model rather than persisting in an 
objective present way of governing. 
Yan Hui, with a deep sigh, said: “The more I look up at it, the higher it soars; 
the more I penetrate into it, the harder it becomes. I am looking at it in front of 
me, and suddenly it is behind me. The Master is good at drawing me forward a 
step at a time; he broadens me with culture and disciplines my behaviour 
through the observance of ritual propriety. If if I wanted to quit, I could not. 
And then I have exhausted my abilities, it is as though something rises up right 
in front of me, and even though I want to follow it, there is no road to take. 
(Analects 9.11)  
This vivid description can only come from Yan Hui, who ‘chose the path of focusing 
the familiar affairs of the day (zhongyong), and on gaining something worthwhile 
from doing so, would clasp it tightly to his breast and not lose it’ (Zhongyong 8). 
That explains why ‘yet for Hui it has no effect on his enjoyment’. The Analects is 
the most pure work of the Ru school. 
After Confucius, although in The Doctrine of Mean (Zhongyong) natural 
tendency and tiandao are discussed, using the centre still maintains the Confucian 
meaning. The ultimate sincerity and the Dao of the middle are the realm of the art of 
coming to things or gewu; hence the Song Ru School put it after Great Learning 
(Daxue), which makes sense as such. This is inherited from Confucius, ‘The dullest 
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of ordinary men and women can know something of it, and yet even the sages in 
trying to penetrate to its furthest limits do not know it all. The most unworthy of 
common men and women are able to travel a distance along it, yet even the sages in 
trying to penetrate to its furthest limits are not able to travel it all’ (Zhongyong 12). 
Up to Mencius, this is not purely Confucian thought, but the framework still 
remains. ‘Benevolence, dutifulness, observance of the rites, and wisdom do not give 
me a lustre from the outside; they are in me originally. Only this has never dawned 
on me’ (Mencius 6A6). When Mencius states ‘wisdom does not give me a lustre 
from the outside; they are in me originally’ he already goes against Confucius’ ideas. 
From here, innate goodness, the same pattern and setting the heart-mind indicated a 
new means of approach for neo-Confucianism. According to this, heart-mind, 
pattern and rightness seem more like a prior substance, that which has come from 
tian which is only obscured by our desires. Hence, ‘The sole concern of learning is 
to go after this strayed heart. That is all’ (Mencius 6A11). This, then, is a waxing and 
waning relationship between prior objective presence and later objective presence, 
[253] distanced from the Confucian pure constitutive thought of ritual or li, music or 
yue, ren and yi. However, cultivating qi, the heart-mind of empathy and the innate 
goodness of Mencius’s philosophy all have subtle meaning, the novelty of which 
earlier philosophers did not address. Further, in the age of taking war and conflict as 
beneficent, he still attempted to popularize the ideas of Confucius, in order to follow 
the innate goodness of human beings, since this is contributing to the sage. But it is 
certainly an over-estimation to say that Mencius’s thought is ‘pure’. 
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Chapter 15: Communication between Heidegger’s Thought and the 
Chinese Idea of tiandao 
Hitherto we discussed the different characteristics of Heidegger’s early and later 
thinking, the ultimate questions of West and East, Indian orthodox schools, 
Pratītyasamutpāda, and the Chinese idea of tiandao. In these discussions some inter-
cultural comparisons were made, but huge challenges remain when we begin our 
comparison of Heidegger’s thinking and tiandao. Communication between Western 
and Eastern thought began early. Nevertheless, the circumstances of the twentieth 
century have made such communication unavoidable rather than the result of mere 
curiosity or reciprocity. When our pioneers of modern Chinese philosophy 
encountered the decay of Chinese thinking they were expelled – exiled/forced into 
‘isms’ which intermingled West and East. Today some shallow and provocative 
commentaries have to be tolerated under the guise of the main situational 
comparisons and communications. Especially in the beginning of comparative 
philosophy, ‘comparative’ translations were actually expedient means of importing 
foreign ideas rather than responsible and reliable comparisons. Western scholars and 
Chinese scholars who learned Western philosophy value the Western spirit of 
rationality and the methodology of concepts as universal truth. Using Western 
philosophy as a standard for their ‘comparison’, they constructed Chinese 
philosophy to meet Western requirements by deciding which parts were essential 
and which parts were irrational and redundant in the twentieth century. [341] This is 
how ‘Chinese philosophy’ was constructed. 
This kind of thinking cannot satisfy us, since it is rooted in the immature 
presumption that Western philosophy is the standard. At last, it seems that historical 
and textual research have come to be as the only sound scholarship. Recently, 
because of the great popularity of Richard Rorty’s language-centrism or 
ethnocentrism, there is an argument that Chinese philosophy is ‘untranslatable’, 
‘incommensurable’ and ‘cannot have dialogue’ with the West. On this basis, one can 
reduce one’s dissatisfactions about the methodology of comparative concepts, which 
prompts us to reflect on our own cultural characteristics. However, if one attempts to 
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understand Eastern culture from a standpoint that avoids the clumsy comparisons 
mentioned above, it is also premature, because the root and situation of the culture 
are formed by the ‘time of Tian’ of comparisons and communications (that is the 
main situation). As long as we fail to be aware of this danger, we may begin our 
dialogue on the wrong footing. The only meaningful comparison and 
communication of philosophy is to realize the capability of constitution among 
different languages and the existence of humans; that is, a dialogue between India, 
the West and China that does not elide the respective contexts of their thinking. 
Furthermore, once we attain the ultimate realm, the pure thinking situation will be 
revealed without the restraint of systems or structures, and meaningful dialogue 
between the two cultures becomes possible. 
Fundamentally, Heidegger’s thinking and the idea of tiandao are purely 
situational. Keeping this in mind, the dialogue between these two will not remain 
with a mere comparison of concepts, but will afford the possibility of revealing the 
Mysterious interdependent in their thinking. Such an understanding of tiandao 
should resonate with our experience of reading Lao-Zhuang, Confucius and Sunzi in 
that it reflects the agreement in our heart-mind and stimulates other ideas which our 
heart-minds have not touched yet, but it also has to be within the background of the 
phenomenology of existentialism. It is the same when we grasp Heidegger’s 
thinking. In this dialogue, the phenomenology of existentialism will fuse with the 
Chinese natural perspective. But this fusion should deepen our sincerity of ‘Zurück 
zu den Sachen selbst’ rather than impede it. [342] 
 
1 Non-vorhanden Attitude  
Two Ways to Think the Ultimate Questions (China and the West) 
Western philosophy and the idea of tiandao emerged when we began to investigate 
questions thoroughly through pure thinking rather than other forms of intellectual 
inquiry. Although our life experiences may appear different, there are in fact 
similarities. Namely, that they are fundamentally inconstant and full of surprises, 
even though ‘constancy’ and ‘intention’ appear close at hand in our life. This 
confusion can spur the thinker’s curiosity in the ultimate. In addition, different 
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people have different ways of ‘thinking until there is nothing left to be thought’, 
which refers to the different methodological approaches to thought. For some 
specific questions, for instance ‘the meaning of happiness’, we have different 
answers. Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, Kant, Confucius, Yangzhu and Zhuangzi have 
different opinions about happiness, thus there are different positions (this is called 
‘isms’ in the Western world). However, the more important and fundamental 
difference is the contrary understanding of ways (Weg, Dao) of thinking. That is to 
say, to the question of ‘what is the ultimate of thinking, which means thinking 
thoroughly or leaving nothing left that is thinkable’, people naturally have very 
different opinions, whether they are aware of this or not. These (usually unaware and 
on the edge of horizon) opinions, which are ‘ways of thinking about ultimate 
meaning’, strongly determine the directions of philosophy and pure thinking.  
We could have two distinctive ways of thinking about ultimate meaning. The 
thinkers who adopt the first method of thinking maintain that if thinking can find the 
source of ultimate meaning or the ultimate understanding of ‘what’, that is the end of 
thought: there is nothing left for us to consider. With regard to what is this ‘what’, 
there are different explanations in different periods of time, leading to the formation 
of different ‘isms’. People who subscribe to the second kind of thinking maintain 
that we have not yet reached the end of thinking, or the ultimate of ‘nothing left for 
us to be thought’ [343] because ‘what’ is connected with ‘how’, that is to say, how 
to be understood and embodied. According to the second view, the ultimate 
questions are the questions of ‘how is that possible’ rather than ‘what is that’ or the 
related ‘how to reach the aim’. This ‘how is that possible’ means how to be 
understood directly to reach the clarity of ‘nothing left to be thought’. Therefore, 
revealing the subtlety {techne} of constitutive meaning, as opposed to the source of 
meaning, will help us to reach this clarity. 
This opinion towards ultimate thinking is inconceivable for traditional 
philosophers. For them, the pure meaning which cannot be reached by any carriers 
of meaning (expression forms, grammar forms, objects of forms and physical 
objects), the pure possibility of something prior in all stipulate situations (including 
active situations) and the pure ‘in-between’ among divarication, are mysterious and 
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irrationally transcendental. However, for someone who has the ultimate thinking of 
pure constitution, there is nothing more natural and inescapable than contextual 
constitution of meaning and understanding. The basic lived experience is full of 
these extension realms which are formed by the pure constitution. 
Hitherto, pure thinking peruses this understanding of the ultimate, it appears as 
the original source of the universe, meaning of life and death, or the vital elements 
for ‘the decline and flourishing of all under heaven’. We cannot claim that there is 
no attempt to understand the ultimate after Plato. Scepticism and the critiques of 
different schools of thought, especially with the popularity of phenomenology and 
the analytical philosophy of Wittgenstein, have embodied the sensibility of an 
original pursuit from different perspectives. However, up to Heidegger, the main 
trend of philosophy attempts to grasp ‘what’. We cannot say that Chinese thinkers 
do not also have this kind of understanding, since many ideas from the Warring 
State and after the pre-Qin periods incorporate aspects of cosmology, morality and 
metaphysics, but it is these aspects that prevent these ideas from attaining ultimate 
thinking. Nevertheless, the idea of tiandao penetrates different perspectives in 
Chinese culture after the West Zhou period, through the constitutive understanding 
and popularization of Confucius, Laozi, Fanli, Sunzi, Zhuangzi and so on. [344] 
Although this ‘Dao’ has eroded, changed and lost its splendour, the whole great 
image is still outstanding. 
By this token, thinking which can deeply embody these two approaches, and that 
has the self-awareness to expand upon them, is really rare. Heidegger’s Being and 
the Chinese idea of tiandao are outstanding among these ideas. Besides these, 
ancient Indian thinking, especially the middle way of Mahayana Buddhism, Tiantai, 
Huayan, Chan Buddhism in China, and the thinking of Wittgenstein in Western 
philosophy, all attempt to understand the ultimate meaning of pure constitution and 
exclude objective presence. 
Therefore, Heidegger’s thinking concerns not only a kind of idea belonging to 
some schools, rather, it should be understood as a self-awareness of the original 
mission of Western philosophy, and the rectification of a deviation in the past paths 
of thinking. Because of this self-awareness and the resulting turn in philosophy, the 
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ultimate meaning of thought is revealed. On the other hand, the idea of tiandao in 
Chinese thinking is not a ready-made heritage, which can be picked up randomly in 
order to make comparisons. On the contrary, the idea conceals itself in many 
inappropriate explanations and discussions. It needs to be clarified, and then we can 
see the meaning of Tian or the ultimate meaning. Only if the two main ways of 
thinking revive their original vitality can the possibility of a dialogue between 
Heidegger and Dao take place. 
The Attitude of non-objective Presence in Heidegger’s Thinking and the Idea 
of Chinese Tiandao  
The main commonality between Heidegger’s Being and tiandao in Chinese thinking 
is that we cannot attain the ultimate in our life and thinking through the concepts of 
objective presence. This kind of opinion is not only difficult to reach but also 
difficult to totally convey theoretically. In both Western and Eastern culture, or in 
the whole of history, the reification and institutionalization of thinking is an 
especially stubborn trend. It seems as though thinking has to be grounded in the 
‘what’, otherwise it will lose its foundation. Therefore, both Heidegger [345] and 
Chinese thinkers, who focus on the pursuit of the Dao, have to confront the problem 
of how to get rid of this reified thinking, and to make their ultimate understanding 
more vivid. 
As a philosopher in the twentieth century, Heidegger perceives the concealment 
of essence in the Western tradition’s thought. It first appears in the understanding of 
being. In the ancient Greek philosophies of the pre-Platonic period, being (eon) and 
logos shared meanings, which referred to the openness and revealing of presence 
and holding, which is pure constitution in phenomenology. This is where the charm 
of Greek culture comes from. The pure constitutive opinion in Parmenides’ being is 
revealed by Zeno’s paradoxes, ‘logos’ in Heraclitus gets rid of the reification or 
objective presence in time and fire. He critiques those who exist in the constitution 
of logos, but only see objective presence: ‘they are against logos, which they cannot 
separate with, and which give all directions to things’. Heraclitus addresses the pure 
consciousness of constitution in Western wisdom. Before Heidegger, scholars either 
could not understand Heraclitus, viewed him as a mystic who disdained human 
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beings, or thought of him as a metaphysician who appealed to change, the opposite 
of Parmenides. We already know that Heidegger could not agree with this historical 
judgement of Heraclitus’s philosophy. 
Socrates still has the mind-set of constitution. He seldom gives judgements, 
because such judgements always refer to a specific ‘what’. He values himself as a 
gadfly who was sent by the gods to help the Greeks to get rid of their objective 
presence. Unfortunately, the unwelcomed revealer was trampled by the horse, 
because the horse preferred to live in chaos rather than awakening. More ironically, 
it is Plato, a student of Socrates, who raises the question of ‘what’—the theory of 
forms—the biggest ‘what’ in Western philosophy, [346] which conceals the spirit of 
doubt and the perspective of phenomenology. The reason Heidegger deconstructs 
the history of Being in the West is because history forgot the ultimate reason for 
thinking as thinking. Instead, the focus on beings and ‘what’ predominated, leading 
to a ‘dizzy and hazy’ life, nonetheless thinking that a rational spirit was retained. 
The Western preference for adventure or creativeness arises from a fundamentally 
false situation. Independent thinkers will not accept the objective presence that has 
been found by others. As successors, however, they may be said to exist in more 
convenient circumstances to search for objective presence; it seems that there is a 
higher possibility for them to find the origin of the world and the meaning of life. 
Therefore, we have the so-called ‘development of the categories of philosophy’, 
which knit these dreams into the layers of thinking. Every new philosophy has the 
tendency to critique others and open a new beginning. ‘I have nothing to say about 
philosophy, I know philosophy has been discussed for a thousand years by 
intellectuals, but nothing is agreeable for all intellectuals, so nothing is undoubtable’. 
Descartes’ insightful remark describes the inevitable destiny (to be doubted) of 
metaphysical concepts and his own philosophy. Every philosopher has pursued the 
ultimate of thought as well, but such philosophers can always deny other theories in 
a rational way, and then they may put forward their own ‘what’, which will be 
denied by others in turn. After ‘aufhebung’ (sublating) and having been 
‘aufgehoben’ (sublated), is there any specific ‘what’ that has come out on top? No, 
there is only thinking which is, like a ghost, still haunting philosophy. 
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The pursuit of Kant’s discussion of ‘how is that possible’ and Husserl’s ‘intuitive 
self-awareness constitution’ allows for the possible overturning of a hopeless 
intellectual climate. However, until Heidegger, there is only a relative self-
awareness of the pure constitutive mission of thought in an existential meaning. 
Anyone who absorbs and digests this will have a different opinion to former 
philosophers. 
In China, from the Western Zhou period, ancient thinkers began to realize the 
meaning of heaven, which is the ultimate pure constitution. [347] The expression 
‘the destiny of tian is changeable’ means that all objective presences are unable to 
comphrehend the meaning of Tian, no matter how esteemed they may be. ‘Matching 
Tian with de (virtue)’ means that it is only the situation of the life of human beings 
that can communicate with tian. Also, it is only the De, which can embody the 
constitutive meaning of a lived situation that can match Tian. This should not be 
restrained in a situation of objective presence because we can adapt (changeability) 
our understanding of the meaning of Tian. This way of understanding Tian in its 
pure constitution is called Dao. If we go further, Tian is not superior to human 
beings. Rather, it is more profound than any objective presence or situation of 
objective presence. Tiandao means the pure constitutive original situation in Chinese 
traditional wisdom. Nevertheless, later Daoists and the Legalists (Fajia) take ren 
(human being) and renzhi (the rule by man) as the objective presence which is 
opposite to Dao and wuwei. 
The idea of tiandao has profound meaning and has rarely been sufficiently 
realised. It is amazing how the constitutive opinion in China suffuses mainstream 
Chinese culture, compared with how constitutive opinion embodies a specific 
philosophy or system of self-cultivation in other cultures. Further, tiandao’s 
subtleness can compete with religious tendencies or the trend of anthropomorphising 
ultimate concern. This serves to explain why the Chinese have never theologised, 
but they still have sufficient ultimate lived experience. This is the ‘tiandao’ of pure 
Ereignis-formed Chinese culture. ‘Zhou observes the example set by two dynasties, 
so how splendid is its culture! And we take Zhou as our model’ (Analects 3.14). 
Although there are unworthy descendants in both the West and China, the culture of 
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Tian Dao (through the mingling of the thought of Confucius, Laozi and Zhuangzi) 
differs greatly with the cultural situation formed by Christianity, Plato and Aristotle.  
At this point, it is necessary to address the assertion that Lao-Zhuang has 
fundamentally different opinions with Confucius, who seldom discusses tiandao, 
since Lao-Zhuang mentions the Dao directly and forms a metaphysics, epistemology 
and methodology in accordance with it. This assertion has failed to note that, on the 
one hand, Lao-Zhuang’s tiandao of non-objective presence is in conflict with the 
metaphysics of concepts, and on the other hand, that Lao-Zhuang has a connection 
with Confucius regarding the pure constitutive way of thinking. The critiques of Ren 
and Li reveal that Lao-Zhuang and Confucius have different styles of pursuing 
thought. The two thinkers [348] take the natural constitutive context of life as the 
ultimate, and hold a suspicious attitude towards any institutionalization. As such, 
Confucius believes that Ren, yi, ritual propriety and zhi can rid us of the restraint of 
institutionalization and become the art/skill by which to experience and reveal 
tiandao. While they are suspicious of institutionalization, both Confucius and Lao-
Zhuang also dislike the abstract object in metaphysics. Confucius’s ‘verification of 
names, zhengming’ is a ‘return to ritual propriety’ without giving objective concepts 
to names (ming). Therefore, from the whole picture of Chinese culture, tiandao is 
thoroughly ultimate Ereignis. It is not, therefore, a contingency that would catch 
Heidegger’s specific attention.  
 
2 Lived Experience is the Foundation for us to Understand 
 
The nature of human beings will never be satisfied by any lived situation of 
objective presence. When human beings are restrained in institutions and a wicked 
environment, they will fall into chaos. Once there is a rift in the institution, this 
provides a gap (Riss) for the nature of human beings to develop. People will get rid 
of things that restrain their lives in objective presence, and they can then pursue 
meaning and the real in an ambiguous and nebulous way. This is called the pursuit 
of freedom in Western thinking. According to such thought, freedom is considered 
to be the nature of human beings. Human beings are born free, but they lost their 
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freedom in identification with a specific country, legal systems, ideology, religion, 
ethics, economic and social relations. The essential problem does not concern one 
specific country, religion or relationship, nor is it found in one specific ‘what’. The 
nature of human beings cannot be restrained by one specific ‘what’.  To flee from 
all kinds of forces and pressure is what is ultimately pure and real. However, it is 
difficult to find a real home for human beings’ freedom. It is only “shining its happy 
light in the suffering night”. [349] Once we have freedom, it is not attractive any 
more. Actually, this is not freedom, and it seems that the realized present is not the 
real present. In the name of freedom, people can do many ridiculous things. 
Western thinkers pursue freedom through many methods. They attempt to find 
the natural quality that matches with freedom in human beings. Real freedom means 
to reveal this kind of quality or release of freedom in our body. For most thinkers, it 
is only reason which can be matched with freedom, or it is reason that can benefit 
from freedom without suffering its ill effects. The whole of modern Western culture 
pursues the rational mechanism of freedom. Science, industrial technology, 
democracy and rationalism are all different embodiments of this trend. The reason of 
experience, the reason of self-discipline; the reason of combined divinity and nature; 
the reason of combined ‘authenticity kindness and beauty’, and the dialectical reason 
which appears as both opposite and complementary, all explore the possibility of 
happiness in the life of human beings. However, there is a difference between the 
reason of opinion and that of freedom which could reach the extremities of human 
beings’ nature. Therefore, for reason, which is derived in its current form from the 
Enlightenment, people have the feeling of disappointment and being un-free in their 
lived situation, the situation of a country and the situation of a culture, as formed by 
reason. This is not because they are hypercritical, without understanding that 
freedom means to set laws for oneself, rather, it is that this rational opinion of 
freedom that cannot match the nature of human beings. Therefore, romanticism, 
intuitionalism, mysticism, historicism and the theory of will and so on, formed a 
storm that shook the very structure of rationalism; they pursue freedom in different 
ways. Nonetheless, it that like rational opinion is the main structure in this age, all 
kinds of anti-rationalisms form complementary ideas to rationalism. The destiny of 
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the age could be revealed through the choice of personal life style. If one has the 
experience of freedom for a while under the discipline of Western rationalism, he or 
she will not return to the simple, natural and un-Western life style, no matter how 
strong their feelings of emotional dependence towards that culture and life style. 
[350] 
This (freedom of rational opinion) is not perfect, but safe and transparent. 
Nevertheless, that (natural freedom) is unstable. We can be enchanted by its 
goodness, and also shocked with its brutality and arbitrariness. The best strategy of 
life, therefore, is actually to live according to rational freedom, but appear as living 
in natural freedom. That is the mainstream situation in the modern world. 
Since the twentieth century, people began to break the dominant position of the 
rational concept. Phenomenology and analytical philosophy attempt to find an 
inevitable beginning of non-objective presence, which is a thinking projection of 
lived situation. These discussions replaced the traditional concept of reason in the 
path of thinking rather than merely presenting another complementary idea. They 
exposed an un-clarified and confused rational situation. Because of insufficient self-
clarification they have not, however, been digested by Western culture and are never 
mentioned in terms of rebuilding economics, ethics, the state and other kinds of 
lived situations. In twentieth century philosophy, Heidegger has a special position as 
a critic of Western philosophy and introspection. He pursues freedom per se (being) 
rather than freedom which is framed by some concepts (beings). He maintains the 
spirit of freedom and also has the awareness of the pure constitution of freedom per 
se. Therefore, he can precisely maintain a non-objective presence that seems like it 
could never be meaningfully thought. It is not a negative thing to say that our 
freedom is limited (endlich). It seems like our freedom has always been restrained 
by external necessity and environment. The real meaning of this is that human 
freedom has to maintain itself as self-freedom in order to exist in this world, and to 
take this world as the realized ultimate (Ende). If one takes freedom to be 
Omnipotence (god, the superman) or random (the lucky man), it will lose all its 
intense original meaning. If one understands it as the setting and following of one’s 
laws, it is a great step towards freedom, but one has not understood the rough, non-
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objective presence and situational freedom. [351] According to Heidegger, former 
metaphysics and theologies do not really confront the possibility of the free being of 
human beings. 
Therefore, ‘being per se’ is not a question of conceptual meaning, rather, it is a 
question brought forth from {Da-sein}’s Da and sein. It is how Da-sein’s 
{ereignend} freedom (Da) can be constituted and how it maintains being in the 
world. If one separates the questions which are the closest to our life meaning 
(freedom, happiness), our mortality or ultimate world context, being will become an 
empty concept. This is a fundamental question of pure thinking, as opposed to using 
ethical problems or religious problems to replace the questions of epistemology and 
ontology. Heidegger clarifies this in Kant and the Problems of Metaphysics after 
realizing the public’s misunderstanding of his Being and Time. All rational 
fundamental questions and questions of synthetic a priori Judgments are, after all, 
‘prior imagination’ and time, which works as pure constitution, while the {Da-sein} 
of human beings and freedom (authentic situation of being) in the world highlights 
the pure constitutive meaning of time and prior imagination. 
Heidegger helps reveal the traits of the ultimate questions of being and freedom 
rather than offering new questions. The questions of freedom and being cannot be 
solved by concepts or the appearances of ‘what’. It is just like how we are unable to 
solve the questions of religious beliefs through ‘the proof of an ontological god’ in 
our thinking, the meaning of life through the use of ethical principles, or the issues 
of recognition through a subject/object epistemology. Heidegger clarifies that these 
questions, which lie beyond the methods of traditional metaphysics and theology, 
have a strong connection with pure thinking, and can be explained meaningfully 
through other ways of thinking. What is more important is that Heidegger clarifies 
these ultimate questions as inseparable from how human beings totally contextualize 
the constituted self in lived experience. The real ultimate question [352] is the 
meaning of human beings in the world, or the lived meaning of constitutive being 
per se. It has authentic and inauthentic situations which can communicate with each 
other.  
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Until Heidegger, Western philosophy had the basic attitude of ‘an ultimate 
context that cannot be separated from our living world’ which can resonate with the 
ancient Chinese thought. That the ultimate exists in our living world is the natural 
outcome of the non-objective presence of tiandao, rather than because of insufficient 
thinking or insufficient imagination of the transcendent in China, as some Western 
scholars have argued. Otherwise, it would be difficult to explain the extensional 
realm of ‘mysterious and mysterious’.  
At least from the West Zhou period, Tian has been the ultimate concept for 
Chinese people. However, for those who dominate Chinese thinking, this Tian is not 
something that is beyond life (as is God in the Christian tradition) as a meaning of 
substance, or the representation of human’s desire, will and thinking of concepts, but 
rather, as in the case of the Greek gods, it means the context of the living world and 
the meaning of the living world. A characteristic of ancient Chinese culture is the 
ability of introspection. Theology is not the most appropriate way to embody the 
meaning of life, the most authentic meaning of Tian only manifests itself in fulfilled 
being in the world (omission). A lived situation is the mingling of Tian and the 
human, as well as the mutual influence of the dreaming world and the awakened 
world, rather than a ‘real world’ of desires and the confliction of subject and object. 
The authentic tiandao for ancient Chinese thinkers is the in-between situation of the 
original life. The extremes of too ‘high’ or ‘low’ and too ‘early’ or ‘late’ are unable 
to fulfil it. Western philosophies of concepts and religions of personalized divinity 
cannot attain the ultimate opinion. It does not matter which kind of ‘ism’ or theology 
it appears as. It is only Heidegger’s interpretation of human nature, freedom and 
religions, which can fulfil Er-eignis’s context and contribute to the Chinese idea of 
tiandao. [353] 
 
3 ‘Ultimate’ as Constitutive Context 
 
The ultimate is something that exists vividly in our lives rather than as an objective 
presence. Therefore, the real ultimate is the happening context of the mutual 
constitution of humans and the world. In what sense is the world an ultimate world? 
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Is it the family, schools, social networks, provinces, countries or the international 
world with which we engage every day? Why are there so many people who have 
not awakened to this ultimate? The answer is that we only have this one world in 
which we live, there is no other place for us to find the root of meaning and 
understanding. Nevertheless, to ‘live in this world’ and ‘to understand living in this 
world’ is not the same thing, because one does not necessarily understand what 
makes the world as world even if one lives in all-under-heaven. For Heidegger, 
Being per se makes the world as a world, and for Pre-Qin thinkers, it is ‘the will of 
heaven’ which means the will of tian. People (das man) tend to take beings as reality 
rather than as the context per se in the world. They do not understand that the 
context precedes things and gives possibility to these things. Different groups, 
organizations, societies and countries are manifestations of the world, but it is a 
world without real freedom, since it is mingled with social structures and ideology. 
After distinguishing between to ‘live in the world’ and ‘to understand living in 
the world’, is there any meaning in saying that the ultimate is the world? Will what 
Heidegger called existential difference trigger unlimited regression in the concept of 
the ‘world itself’? From the former analysis, we know that, even with this 
distinction, it is still meaningful to take the ultimate as the world, since it changes 
our ways of understanding and the status of ultimate reality. The ultimate is the 
[354] revealing place of Ereignis context rather than some specific thing. Therefore, 
we would not need to be trapped in an infinite regression of always seeking another 
higher being. The world context and beings in the world distinguish each other in 
accordance with the mainstream and non-mainstream, rather than in terms of the 
lower and the higher. This way of distinguishing is very different from the 
distinction between phenomenon and essence, specificity and generality, material 
and spirit, human and divinity. The more important ultimate context counters the 
ultimate of an abstract ‘what’ (essence, substance, God, universal), and is very near 
to us compared with things in the world, this nearness leads to an undistinguished 
self and others. Our action, thinking and speaking are Ereignis context if we analyse 
them deeply enough. Therefore, the exhaustion of beings converges with the self 
rather than leading to an unlimited self-awakening and self-revealing. Confucius 
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said that ‘correlating one’s conduct with those near at hand can be said to be the 
method of becoming an authoritative person’ (Analects 6.30). This is the way to 
approach the sincere context. Therefore, the ultimate of lived context is a sincere 
approach to the self {eigentlich}, ending in thorough understanding. 
This ‘self’ is not a subjective self. It means the ultimate intersection and Ereignis 
context of self. We should perceive Hui Neng’s talking of ‘Tathatā Svabhava’ and 
‘original heart’ in the context of Ereiginis happening and constitution, rather than 
some self-controlled heart, or Svabhava (zixing) which is supposed to counter 
Pratītyasamutpāda Śūnyatā (Yuanqixingkong ). According to the Dharmic Treasure 
Altar-Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch:  
Thence he proceeded to expound The Diamond Sutra for me. When he came 
to the Text of ‘One should not reside in anything while generating the Heart’, 
all of a sudden, I became profoundly enlightened on the Tenet that ‘all the 
Dharmas are actually not dissociated from the Original Nature’. Forthwith I 
addressed deferentially to the Patriarch, How unexpectantly wondrous it is 
that the Original Nature has always been pure in itself! How unexpectantly 
wondrous it is that the Original Nature has always been unbegotten and 
unperishing in itself! How unexpectantly wondrous it is that the Original 
Nature has been self-sufficient! How unexpectantly wondrous it is that the 
Original Nature has always been impregnable in itself! How unexpectantly 
wondrous it is that the Original Nature can generate all the Dharmas! (The 
Dharmic Treasure Altar-Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch, Fahai version 1) 
When Hui Neng heard  
One should not reside in anything while generating the Heart’, he woke up, it 
is the Buddhist nature, it can also address that Heart and Svabhava (zixing 自
性) are the ultimate of Pratītyasamutpāda Śūnyatā and generate all the 
Dharmas, there is no presence that can reside in. ‘Not reside’ is addressed 
again in ‘Non-deliberation signifies to be detached from any Notions while 
contemplating on the Dharma. (The Dharmic Treasure Altar-Sutra of the 
Sixth Patriarch, Fahai version 4) 
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In this quote, there is a Chinese word ‘shizhong’ which suggests that this Buddhist 
text may have been influenced by the notions of the time of tian (tianshi) and 
appropriate time (shizhong). The Ereignis Svabhava (zixing) of ‘non-residing’ and 
‘appropriate time’ or Shizhong is the context of the world itself. [355]  
This is expressed in the following passage: ‘Wisdom of Bodhian Prajna has been 
in the possession of all people from the origin’ (The Dharmic Treasure Altar-Sutra 
of the Sixth Patriarch, Fahai version 2). ‘Good Mentors, when in your Mind you 
take Refuge under your own Original Nature, it means taking Refuge under the 
Truthful Buddha’ (The Dharmic Treasure Altar-Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch, Fahai 
version 6). In this context, Buddha, awakening and Nirvana are not beings like an 
incarnation of Shakyamuni or Sukhavati, a different world to the one in which we 
live. Rather, they are the Ereignis context of the lived world and Svabhava (zixing).  
The Original Nature is the Buddha; apart from the Original Nature, there 
would be no other Buddha. “What is meant by the word ‘Maha’? Maha 
means Great. It signifies that the capacity of the Mind is as immensely vast 
as the Ethereal Space, which is without borders or frontiers…All the 
Buddhaic Universes are exactly like this Ethereal Space, and the worldly 
people’s Wondrous Essence is also thus vacuous originally; therefore there is 
never an iota of Dharma to be obtained anywhere, and the Veracious Vacuity 
of the Innate Essence is also the same as this. (The Dharmic Treasure Altar-
Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch, Fahai version 2.2)  
The interdependent arising/Pratītyasamutpāda of Buddhism and the ultimate 
perspective of Chinese tiandao penetrate these texts. Maha means ‘big’ in Sanskrit. 
Hui Neng’s saying, ‘Mind is as immensely vast as the Ethereal Space’, also has the 
meaning of Da or great which has come from Lao-Zhuang. For example, as used in 
the big tree, Great Dao, big image, great language. In the previous discussions, this 
Great means to have been in the original happening context, which is beyond all 
limits. Hui Neng uses the sunya of the middle way/mādhyamaka, but he adds the 
meaning of ‘void’ which is the context in Daoism. He also clarifies that the void is 
not ready to hand, we cannot become affixed to it. Hui Neng perceives the subtle 
essence of the non-objective presence in both Indian and Chinese traditions without 
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rigidly adhering to the Buddhist texts, then he can see the possible communication 
between these two ideas. Hui Neng then develops the idea of Nāgārjuna’s pratītya-
samutpāda, and discards all presences which are respected by other Buddhists. For 
instance, the necessity of sitting, reciting sutras, respecting Buddha, and so on. He 
maintains ‘if within and without you are deluded then you are apart from duality…if 
you awaken to this Dharma, in one instant of thought your mind will open and you 
will go forth in the world’.189 From this, it is clear that the thoroughly non-present 
ultimate ideas have to ‘go forth in the world’, and it also includes the middle way, 
constitution ‘apart from duality’ and contextual reality. Even through Nāgārjuna’s 
majjhimā paṭipadā or middle way and the Chinese middle way have very different 
backgrounds and connotations, their ultimate perspectives resonate with each other. 
Chan Buddhism appeared as an amalgamation of these two ideas when at their peak, 
and shows the ultimate constitutive context [356] in a vivid way. ‘I remarked: 
‘Deliberate not on the Good, nor on the Evil—and right at that very instant, that 
which is manifested is just Elder Ming’s Original Visage’ (Altar Sutra Fa Hai 
version 1.13). There is no dualistic separation, or separation of life experience or 
pratītya-samutpāda experience, neither the forceful or unnatural prescription; there 
is a transformation from presence to the possible constitutional situation which 
makes presence possible, and the transformation from random different categories to 
Ereignis happening situation of awakening thorough communication. This context 
can make us ‘enlightened directly, and…able to perceive the Original Nature of 
Veracious Thusness instantaneously’ (Altar Sutra Fa Hai version 2.7). This is 
because pure constitutional context situation is no more than ourselves and the 
thousand things. Even in our dreams or some situations which we were deceived by, 
there is still a constitutional context situation which makes these possible. The 
Ereignis context and the pratītya-samutpāda in the context are always mingled 
together which the traditional dual relationship cannot compete with. Therefore, 
                                                          
189 Hui-neng, The Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch. Translated by Philip Yampolsky (New 
York City: Columbia University Press, 1978), 166. 内外不迷 即离两边 若悟此法 一念心开，出现于世 坛
经惠昕本 41 
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Nāgārjuna gets rid of all presences, Lao-Zhuang always holds the opinion of 
subduction, and reveals thorough awakening and the realm of wuwei and wu buwei.  
Heidegger and Chinese Tian Dao (Including Chan) share the same opinions in 
this key point, that is, no matter whether the ultimate reality is called Being per se, 
Tian or Dao, it can be understood as pure constitutive context. It is called ‘jing’ and 
‘yu’域 (these two words together mean context, both of them mean place), because 
the ultimate present is vivid, but not any specific presence, it can help us perceive all 
possibilities that we encounter. Therefore, on the one hand, this understanding of the 
ultimate is very different from the ultimate of entity, it does not need to set any 
higher, one ultimate beyond the meaning of constitutive context; on the other hand, 
the ultimate of constitutive context is different from pragmatism and any post-isms, 
because it penetrates the deepest ultimate understanding of life rather than using 
relativisms against the absolute or using ‘ramblings’ to escape entities, even though 
it is not an entity per se. These relativisms are the different pieces from disruptive 
entities, with these quasi traits of presence, these cannot thoroughly transform into 
the realm of pure constitutive perception. Once involved in this disruptive free 
thought, people will for a short time experience thinking afresh but then sink into 
meaninglessness. [357] 
The relationship between this relativistic way of thinking and the fixed, 
metaphysical way of thinking is analogous with the ‘centre’ and the ‘edge’. They 
need each other, but they do not form a mutual constitutive happening context. Since 
the twentieth century, especially in the time of ‘post-industrialism’, ‘post-cold war’ 
and ‘post-philosophy’, anti-metaphysics is a fashion, the real problem has been to 
dispel metaphysics, which includes an ultimate metaphysics to increase our 
understanding of lived existence. 
Therefore, this ultimate constitutive context cannot have any objective presence, 
for instance, fixed notions of ‘place’, ‘environment’, ‘historicity’ and ‘textual 
explanation’ and so on. These are embodiments or manifestations of context. This 
ultimate context only means Clearing (Lichtung) of all ultimate of presences, it is the 
original realm of understanding. 
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Hence, ‘[a]ccording to Advaita, a liberated human being (jivanmukta) has 
realised Brahman as his or her own true self’ in the Indian Upanishads reveals the 
original realm without the distinguishing of subject and object, but this does clearly 
realise the original position of lived（maya, illusion）existence, and it still seeks 
transcendent lived existence and to achieve the high ultimate realm in the practice of 
yoga. Heidegger and Chinese Tiandao cannot agree with this. That explains why Hui 
Neng adjusts the tranditional understanding of the meaning of ‘Chan’, when he 
wants to turn Chan to the real ‘Chinese style’. He no longer maintains that Dhyāna 
of sitting can achieve awakening in the ultimate realm. For him, the opportunity of 
Chan which happens anywhere can help people reach the ‘real Chan’. If there is still 
distinguishing, then there is no ultimate realm. Then, ‘if you have passed the 
Mumonkan (gateless gate), you can make a fool of Mumon. If not, you are betraying 
yourself’.190 So, then, make your whole body a mass of doubt, and with your three 
hundred and sixty bones and joints and your eighty-four thousand hair follicles 
concentrate on this one word ‘Mu’. Day and night, keep digging into it. Don’t 
consider it to be nothingness. Don’t think in terms of ‘has’ and ‘has not’; it is like 
swallowing a red-hot iron ball. You try to vomit it out, but you cannot. Gradually 
you purify yourself, eliminating mistaken knowledge and attitudes you have held 
from the past. Inside and outside become one. [358] 
You’re like a mute person who has had a dream-you know it for yourself alone. 
Suddenly Mu breaks open. The heavens are astonished, the earth is shaken. It is as 
though you have snatched the great sword of General Kuan. When you meet the 
Buddha, you kill the Buddha. When you meet Bodhidharma, you kill Bodhidharma. 
At the very cliff edge of birth-and-death, you find the Great Freedom. In the Six 
Worlds and the Four Modes of Birth, you enjoy a samadhi of frolicking and play’.191 
Those who can achieve the ultimate context and gain the ‘Great Freedom’ must 
dissolve non-interdependent happening and the stubborn. ‘Concentrate on ‘Mu’’ 
                                                          
190 Katsuki Sekida, trans. Two Zen Classics: Mumonkan and Hekiganroku (Boulder, Colorado: 
Shambhala Publications, 1995), 137. 透得无门关，透不得无门关，亦乃辜负自己’无门关·乾峰. 
191 Robert Aitken, The Gateless Barrier: The Wu-Men Kuan (Mumonkan) (New York: Farrar, Straus 
and Giroux, 1990), 7-9. 
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without ‘considering it to be nothingness’ or ‘think in terms of ‘has’ and ‘has not’’, 
but one will be like someone swallowing a red-hot iron ball who cannot vomit, in 
this between right and left, has and has not, all the presences are dissolved in a self-
happening context. So ‘inside and outside become one’, ‘at the very cliff edge of 
birth-and-death (the ultimate point), you find the Great Freedom’. In this awakening 
realm, one is in Samahdi. But it isn’t a 定 of sitting, rather, it is a 缘定 maintaining 
of constitutive context of ‘samadhi of frolic and play’. 
It is amazing to read these words! But it is difficult to reach the ultimate context, 
‘one goes deep-deep to the bottom of the sea-and winnows the mud and pumps up 
the sand. The other goes high-high to the top of the mountain-and raises foaming 
waves that spead over the entire sky’.192 At the same time, it seems near and simple 
to get, that is ‘ordinary mind is the dao’193. The following case (the discussion 
between the master and the students) has the connotive meaning of the discussion of 
easy and difficult. 
Chao-chou asked Nan-chuan, ’what is the Tao?’ Nan-chuan said, ‘ordinary 
mind is the Tao.’ Chao-chou asked, ‘should I try to direct myself toward it?’ 
Nan-chuan said ‘if you try to direct yourself you betray your own practice.’ 
Chao-chou asked, ‘how can I know Tao if I don’t direct myself?’ Nan-chuan 
said, ‘The Tao is not subject to knowing or not knowing. Knowing is delusion; 
not knowing is blankness. If you truly reach the genuine Tao, you will find it 
as vast and boundless as outer space. How can this be discussed at the level of 
affirmation and negation?’ with these words, chao-chou had sudden 
realization.194 
This ‘ordinary mind is the Tao’ mingled classical Chinese style and the perspective 
of ‘Nirvana is lived world’ in Madhyamaka. If one does not understand the un-
present situation of ultimate reality, one can only gain confusion rather than great 
awakening. This ordinary heart-mind is the original understanding of life. If we want 
to distinguish it as Paramārtha-satya or samvritha -sattva, and take Paramārtha-satya 
                                                          
192 The Gateless Barrier, 283. 无门关 乾峰一路. 
193 The Gateless Barrier, 20. 无门关 平常是道.  
194 The Gateless Barrier, 126. 
185 
 
as the direction, it will betray our fundamental nature of Dao, it only make things got 
worse. [359] 
Hence, the ordinary heart-mind is easy to get, because it is part of our life 
existence, which seems like Heidegger’s ‘lived experience’; the ordinary heart-mind 
is difficult to get, because in the frame of systems, people distinguish things and 
choose complexity rather than simplicity. This ordinary heart-mind is analogous to 
the sincerity of The Mean, wei wuwei in Lao-Zhuang. Nevertheless, in Indian and 
Chinese cultures, Chan seems more sensitive towards the non-presence of original 
understanding. The desires and pursuits of humans are not the ordinary heart-mind 
of original situation, regardless of the desires towards spirits or materials. The life 
situation of ascetics suggests that there must be some things to be pursued, ‘how can 
I know Tao if I don’t direct myself’, so Nan-chuan breaks the obsessiveness of 
‘Dao’, ’Buddha’, ‘reading sutras’, ‘sitting’ or any persistence of elite situation. ‘The 
Tao is not subject to knowing or not knowing’. Ordinary heart-mind is the pure 
constitution of the in-between, ‘ordinary’ includes the pure real situation of ‘cliffs 
rise thousand feet sheer’, ‘no more no less, no one feather can add, no one fly can 
stand in’[6]. In the situation of neither this nor that, we can only use the language of 
context or the thinking of context of that which is ‘as vast and boundless as outer 
space’ to perceive it. Because when we reach the ultimate, we have to transform it, 
in this book, we discuss ‘constitution’ and ‘context’, that is ‘constitutive context’. 
For this, ordinary heart-mind is the pure heart-mind of context. It is difficult to have 
the ordinary heart-mind, it is not because of the limitation of the ability of human 
beings, rather, it is because the ability is divided  into sensation, intellectuality, 
desire, will, and keeps us blind to the nearest and the spontaneous situation. We all 
live in pure constitutive in-between context, we dissolve all these paradoxes in 
‘neither have nor does not have’. ‘Ordinary heart-mind’ is not only the undoubtable 
‘common sense’ which is immune to scepticism, but also the original understanding 
which crosses from many dilemmas, and then begins to understand that there is no 
depth, no happening, there is only the fighting which is far away from the original 
spring in the framework of presence. Hence we have the thorough awakening of 
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‘stop in goodness’, we can make this decision of changing: this is the ultimate, this 
is the original meaning of existence. [360] 
 
4 The Information of Context Itself 
 
We cannot limit ourselves to analysing norms and concepts in order to understand 
and experience the speciality of Chinese tiandao and Heidegger’s Being, because 
this analysis cannot reveal the way of thinking that is beyond norms and concepts, 
and it subsequently cannot be distinguished from the anti-substantialism of Western 
philosophy. The ultimate context which constitutes our existence, call it ‘existence 
itself’, ‘tian’, ‘dao’ or ‘the nature of Buddha’, has to reveal itself originally before 
subjective consciousness, to be ‘heard’, ‘seen’ and ‘understood’, and it constitutes 
itself in this ‘seeing’, ‘hearing’ and ‘understanding’.  
As for this proper way, we cannot relinquish it even for an instant. Were it 
even possible to relinquish it, it would not be the proper way… creativity is 
self-consummating, and its way is self-directing. Creativity is a process taken 
from its beginning to its end, and without this creativity, there are no events. It 
is thus that, for exemplary persons, it is creativity that is prized. But creativity 
is not simply the self-consummating of one’s own person; it is what 
consummates events…Thus, whenever one applies this excellence, it is 
fitting.195 
The embodiment of ultimate context is not abstract in both everyday life and poems. 
This embodiment does not give us any information about specific presence, but it 
includes the process of changing context according to the time. One follows this 
context, even if ‘[one does] not speculate, [one does] not claim or demand certainty, 
[one is] not inflexible, and [one is] not self-absorbed’ (Analects 9.4), nonetheless 
one will complete one’s natural tendency and set up one’s fate. ‘As a person, 
Confucius is driven by such eagerness to teach and learn that he forgets to eat, he 
enjoys himself so much that he forgets to worry, and does not even realize that old 
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age is on its way’ (Analects 7.19). Hence, the context itself has the original form 
which is not different from emptiness. It has color and sound, and can be heard and 
seen; but it is not only the one to be seen and heard, it is the one that lets people see 
and hear. ‘Lighting’ has the meaning of opening the door of truth. [361] 
That is because the thoroughness of the ultimate question makes it so. The 
specific perspective of Heidegger and Chinese thinkers realises that this ‘lighting’ 
does not come from some higher substance, rather, it is generated from the existence 
of constitutive human being. This ‘great lighting’, ‘sounds of sea waves’, is not 
distinguished from either human beings or things, it is the reason people are people, 
and why the world is the world. It cannot be heard, seen and spoken, because it is 
not any specific or fixed object. In this sense, both Heidegger and Lao-Zhuang are 
aware that ‘lighting’ cannot be separated with ‘dark’, it is ‘the light full of dark’. The 
belief in anthropomorphic gods and the intellect of ideas requires different spiritual 
abilities: Western philosophy, in spite of recognizing the possibility of mutual 
transformation in dark and light, nonetheless maintain that light (truth, goodness, 
beautiful, existence, useful) and dark (fake, evil, ugly, nonexistence, useless) are 
fundamentally different. Heidegger and Chinese sages are aware that ultimate place 
cannot tolerate this dualism, rather, it should be a fulfilled Ereignis. ‘Things in 
existence carries within them both yin and yang, and attain harmony by blending 
together with qi’. (Daodejing.24) The real fulfilled life cannot reach its ultimate in 
‘happiness’ (even the happiness of thinking) or the traditional ideas of ethics, 
because it is fundamentally not a question of finding some fixed ‘what’, rather, it is a 
question of constitutive context of happening. We cannot assume one is happy once 
one gains a fixed thing, or that one can flee from pain because one gets rid of a fixed 
thing. In this sense, Nirvana and Tian do not have a fundamental difference with the 
lived world. Interdependent happening is an unavoidable ultimate for all divinities. 
The fulfilled place of ‘sounds of world’, the touched place is ‘sea wave sounds’, the 
nearest or the most subtle place of Dao of human is tiandao. The light of stars and 
candles in the dark is the real light in the context of time. Is it possible for us to have 
persistent happiness and reach the dao? We will discuss this in the next chapter, 
section three. Here, if happiness and Great Freedom are real, then they must be 
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constituted by pure and happening context. [362] Vivid ethics and beliefs have to 
have this existential foundation. 
But our sense organs cannot receive the information of this ultimate context, we 
think we are in a time-space without constitutive context. This information is neither 
good nor bad, neither ‘have’ nor ‘have not’, but it can enlighten or serve as a 
heuristic for people. Poems and music (music of earth or dilai, music of heaven 
tianlai) are created for us to sense the information of context, to let us ‘open’ 
{Offen}, to reach the level of going vigorously without swerving. That is why 
Heidegger takes Hölderlin (the poet of poets) as the pure thinker. The vivid 
understanding we get from poems and music are neither rational nor irrational, it is a 
more real original understanding compared with rationality or irrationality. All the 
purposes of thinking and practice are completely submerged in the constitutive 
context and the understanding of the context. Heidegger reveals the traits of ultimate 
context and information in ‘fear’, ‘care’, ‘the sound of good tendency’ of Being and 
Time. In his later works, he turns to the context of language, the context of poems 
and the context of the self-interdependent. He always thinks that Dasein is creative 
by the context of happening of being, hence Dasein can perceive the non-present 
information of context naturally. This is neither category apriorism, nor 
experimental perception, rather, it is a theory of constitutive context. It is 
meaningless to distinguish that which is apriori and experience in this sense. Chinese 
sages perceive ‘tian’ and ‘dao’ as sincere like a divinity that has position and natural 
tendency, they assume there is a context of a dao of chaos, and the good tendency 
and tendency of dao which belongs to the context of Dao naturally before the 
distinction. Some schools without this understanding, such as the Mohist, cannot 
exist in the Chinese cultural atmosphere permanently. Tian has the meaning of Tian, 
the sincere can know the subtle and has the information to know oneself and the 
mandate of heaven. Mozi takes Confucius’s mandate of heaven as a fate, modern 
people take tianming as following the will of tian, [363] which all betray the original 
meaning of Confucius. This is one of the biggest obstacles for us to understand 
Heidegger and Chinese tiandao. Both slip from the original happening place freely, 
and change the topic. 
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Just like ‘information of yin and yang’, the information of ultimate context can 
have waxing and waning, embodied as the lived situation of human being. The 
Ultimate is not a substance which waits to be understood. It always communicates 
with our lived understanding, and has its growths and declines. The later Heidegger 
mentions ‘the human protects being’, ‘language is the house of being’ which takes 
great situation of context itself as presupposition. The master said, ‘As for Ning 
Wuzi, when the way prevailed in the land, he was wise; when it was without the 
way, he was stupid’ (Analects 5.21). Confucius said, ‘When the way prevails in the 
world, ritual propriety, music, and punitive campaigns are initiated by the emperor. 
If the way does not prevail in the world, then they are initiated by the various 
nobles’ (Analects 16.2). Laozi said that if all-under-heaven has dao, horses live in 
the field (Daodejing 46). 
Hence, Being itself and Dao itself can grow and decline, they are not the origin 
and fundamental rules of cosmology and ontology. The growth and decline of Being 
and Dao are the changing of time and lived situation, they are not only related with 
our understanding and use of rules. Humans as subjects cannot deny or change the 
growth and decline of ultimate context, because lived situation forms the reason of 
humans as human. But, different to the Western thinking pattern of either this or 
that, this a priori context does not mean it can control the fate of human beings 
monomial, because it is a constitutive context of existence of human beings. Human 
beings can participate in this constitutive context in the way of ‘forgetting self’. It is 
the fulfilled ultimate swinging of the ‘middle’ in ‘between’. In 1966, Heidegger 
states that ‘there is only one god that can save us’, ‘thoughts are involved in the 
dialogue with our age, rather than doing nothing’ ‘thoughts and poems are prepared 
for the coming of god’,196 this means human beings participate in the constitution of 
context in the way of stimulating Ereignis rather than through changing and 
conquering. It cannot be pragmatism, because there are no purposes and outcomes 
ready at hand. Confucius ‘realized the propensities of tian’ (Analects 2.4) at the 
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same time, he believes that ‘it is the person who is able to broaden the way’ 
(Analects 15.29). [364] 
Laozi said ‘act in the context of non-acting’ and that ancient people who are good 
act according to dao, this is the specific way of thinking of heaven or tian and 
human. It is neither ‘adopting the mandate of heaven and making use of it’ (Xunzi 
17.15), nor ‘dominant by tianming ’, rather, it is to stay in the middle and melt 
within it. 
For Heidegger and Confucius, Poems open the gate of communication for the 
human and the ultimate context. In this sense, Heidegger and Confucius are ‘near’. 
Writing poems and reading poems are the most outstanding traits of constitute 
context. It opens a new realm which fulfils rhythm and makes situation 
understandable, it is more abundant and understandable than our subjective ideas, it 
seems to communicate with divinity, and makes ‘li’ have the ability to reveal 
presence. But this poetic context of rhythm has growth and decline which follows 
the lived situation of human beings. Fundamentally, it belongs to the lived situation 
of the human itself. There are no rituals, no bureaucracy or ecclesiastical institutions 
that can maintain this. The consistent exposing of this context means the flourishing 
of a person, a group, a school or a culture; the decline of this context means their 
withering away. The king in the Zhou dynasty observed all-under-heaven through 
enjoying wind and reading poems. This communicated with the will of tian, and 
resonated with the will of people, as a wise innovation in the history of human 
beings totally different to astrology and divination, combined with the mystical 
beliefs (chenwei 讖緯) of Han Ru. Further, it is very different with modern forecast 
techniques which rely on science and demonstration. Confucian culture cannot be 
separated from music and poems. Confucius’s affection for music and poems and his 
insightful appreciation of music and poems have shaped the two thousand year-old 
culture. For Heidegger, ‘What poetry, as clearing projection, unfolds of 
unconcealment and projects into the rift within the figure is the open’.197 The poets 
who work towards opening the ultimate existence are pure and genuine, and they 
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have tianming which goes beyond their own fate or ming, just like Holderlin. The 
ages and the context of time form an uncontrollable tide in Holderlin’s language; 
language for him, becomes ‘the most dangerous wealth’. In this language, ‘The all-
governing expanse of these open relations is the world of this historical people’.198 
[365] 
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